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
HER GOVERNMENTAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND
SOCIAL ORGANISATION,

Exposed and Considered,

IN ITS PRINCIPLES, IN ITS WORKING, AND IN ITS
RESULTS.

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CONTENTS.

	Page
Dedication to Sir Robert Peel	v
Introduction	1

FIRST PART.

Chap.		
I.	The Administrative Organisation	15
II.	Ministry of Interior	19
III.	Ministry of Justice.....	27
—	Ministry of Public Worship	35
IV.	Ministry of Public Instruction	40
V.	Ministry of Public Works	45
VI.	Ministry of Trade and Agriculture	49
VII.	Ministry of Finances	55
VIII.	Administration of the Post-office	57
IX.	Administration of the Customs.....	60
X.	Administration of the indirect Taxes (Excise)	64
XI.	Administration of the Forests	67
XII.	Administration of Registration, Stamp-office, and Domains	69
XIII.	Central Administration of Finances.....	71
XIV.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	75
XV.	Ministry of War.....	77
XVI.	Ministry of Marine and Colonies	79
—	Legion of Honour	81
—	Resumé of the First Part	82

SECOND PART.

CONDITION AND ORGANISATION OF THE PEOPLE.

I.	General Considerations	89
II.	Statistics of the French Population	90
III.	Municipal Organisation	102
IV.	Councils of Arrondissements and Departmental Councils	108

Chap.	Page
V. Chamber of Deputies	119
VI. The Courts of Justice and the Trial by Jury	135
VII. The National Guard	141
VIII. The Public Press	151
IX. Resumé of the Second Part	159

THIRD PART.

THE WORKING AND THE RESULTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM.

I. The Working of the Governmental and Administrative System ..	162
II. The Ministries of Interior and Justice tending only to enslave and oppress the People	169
III. The Ministry of Public Instruction tending to keep the People in ignorance, or to teach errors	182
IV. The Ministry of Finances absorbing all the resources of the country	190
V. The Ministry of Agriculture and Trade trammelling agriculture, manufactures, and trade.....	197
VI. The Ministry of Public Works, an obstacle to, or a cause of failure in the execution of public works	205
VII. Ministries of War and Marine	214
VIII. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	225
IX. Conclusion and General Tables	226

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR ROBERT PEEL, BARONET,

FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY.

SIR,

I TAKE the liberty of dedicating to you this volume. I do so after many months' consideration, without your leave, without even asking for it, and without putting my name to it. Such a proceeding is not in accordance with customary formalities; and, therefore, I feel bound, not indeed to apologise, but to account for my determination.

The assent given by an individual to a proposed Dedication is generally construed into a token of patronage; and this naturally implies a sort of responsibility. Not being desirous of patronage, and not wishing to make you in the least degree answerable, as an approver, for the publication of my book; and for the facts, the opinions, and the views expressed in it, I did not deem it proper to ask for a permission which, even if you agreed with me on every point, you would not be at liberty to grant consistently with your political situation.

Yet, it is that political situation which determined me to dedicate a work on the political and social organization of France, to the head of the political rulers of Great Britain. Not that I wish it to be considered as an homage paid to your statesmanship, and as a mark of my approbation of your system. I admit that I have no such intentions;

that, having for the last twenty-seven years attentively observed your political career, I have almost constantly differed from you, and taken the liberty of blaming most of your measures. In saying so, I must disclaim all disrespectful feelings. You may easily believe, that, if I was prompted by such feelings, I would not take the trouble of penning this somewhat extraordinary dedicatory epistle.

I write it, Sir, because, in my opinion, (and that opinion is entertained by many of our countrymen,) you are vastly superior in intelligence and in abilities to most, and inferior to none, of the political men of the present time, not those of your party only, but also your political rivals; because I believe that, of all party men, you are the most disinterested, the least prejudiced, the least bigoted, and the most open to good and patriotic motives; because I feel convinced that, with your past experience, with your calm and practised judgment, when considering the difficulties that surround you, your mind oversteps the bounds of party spirit, and looks somewhere else than to a misnamed conservatism for a remedy adapted to the present state of the country; because, lastly, I have seen, in most of your speeches, during the two last sessions, symptoms of rapid advance, in spite of the conflicting party interests and passions which urge, assail, or trammel your intentions, towards those alterations in the general system, the necessity for which nobody can better or more fully appreciate than yourself.

But, at the same time, I have observed in you, and in many other political men, and more particularly in some of the Whig school, a disposition to follow a most mischievous direction, and gradually to transform the government into a universal administration, on the French system. The praises so frequently bestowed, until lately, upon that system, and upon the wisdom of the actual rulers of

France, who have (not established it—that was done by Napoleon, but) carried it to its present perfection, appeared to me as the indication of an imitative leaning which must be discouraged; and it is to warn the public that I drew up, and, to invite your attention, that I dedicate to you, the picture of that administrative engine, of 900,000 officials, and 500,000 muskets power, which drains France, and corrupts, enslaves, and crushes her people.

Many of the measures proposed by the administration of which you are the head, it would be unjust to attribute to a design of establishing, in this country, such a ministerial and administrative despotism as that which is fully exposed in this volume. I am certain that not only you have no such intentions, but also that you would be the very first, and the most strenuous opponent of such a project, if entertained or proposed either by your party or by your political rivals. But I have frequently observed that measures of the most mischievous tendency are adopted, not only without any sinister views, but also with the very best intentions. As an instance, I will quote one of your own acts, the establishment of the New Police.

The system superseded in 1829 was certainly very bad. To alter it was the duty of an honest and intelligent minister, and you readily undertook that duty. The organisation of the force is certainly much better adapted to the end proposed—the prevention, the discovery, and punishment of offences; and, notwithstanding the incriminations daily repeated by a portion of the public press against that force, I am bound to declare that a better behaved set of men cannot be found anywhere; and that I have seen nowhere else, the difficult duties imposed upon these men discharged with such regularity, propriety, and forbearance. A few individual exceptions cannot deprive that force of the honourable character to which, as a body,

it is entitled. So far then, Sir, you may claim some credit for its institution; the more particularly as you have taken care to protect the public against the excess of authority, the abuse of power, on the part of these men, by outward signs, which enable any individual to identify those who have acted improperly or rashly, and to obtain redress for any wrong inflicted.

But when I acknowledge the advantages derived from the measure, you cannot but admit the dangers with which the organisation of the force is pregnant, and the pernicious advantage it affords to despotic, to corrupt, to immoral ministers, for gratifying their hatred of freedom, their cupidity, their libidinous passions.

You are a moral man, Sir; you are a man of mild and merciful disposition; and, although a party man, you would not, on any account, take advantage of the facility afforded by the organisation of that force for the annoyance, the ruin of your political adversaries. But that which is repugnant to your honour, to your sense of justice, to your moral feelings, may be considered in another light by other ministers in your situation. Place Guizot, or Thiers, or Decaze at the head of the English administration, and, by only substituting a fellow worthy of them, a Gisquet or a Vidocq,* for the present chief superintendent, they will be able to do in London, what they do in Paris. Every policeman will become a spy and an informer. The honour and reputation of families will be daily sacrificed, to secure a favourable reception in a royal closet, by a constant supply of scandalous matters. Political rivals will be entrapped into concocted plots:

* These two fellows have been dismissed by a more respectable minister: the first was afterwards degraded from his dignity of councillor of state for his abandoned practices; and the second, a liberated convict, has again been sentenced to five years' imprisonment for swindling.

insurrections will be prepared, matured and carried into effect, at any risk of life and property, to enable the government to claim more extensive powers: thousands will be crowded into every prison, and the great statesmen will proclaim themselves the saviours of the country. For doing all this, Sir, they would have nothing to change in the organisation of your force, except taking off the numbers from the coats of your men, to free them from all danger of responsibility, adding a sword to their truncheons to encourage them to violence, and to shut the police offices against the public; so that prisoners, when brought before well chosen magistrates, and secretly examined, without liberty of calling witnesses in their favour, or the assistance of a counsel, should have no chance of escaping a long confinement.

Surely, Sir, you never dreamed of such use being made of, and such improvements being added to, your new police; but you cannot deny that others, nay, even persons around you, or at all events some of your successors in office, may think of it. In quiet times, such alterations are considered as impossible; but in times of agitation—of agitations of every kind, of agitations extending to all parts of the country, of agitations which you yourself admit to be not without some excuse, and which result from the conflict of powerful opposite interests; is it unreasonable to predict that agitation will beget passion, and that, in the conflict of passions, no one will consider what is honest and just, but only what is most injurious to his enemies? and then, no doubt, advantage will be taken of your institution, which, with its French improvements, might be turned against you and your political friends, who, when subdued and safely lodged in well guarded cells, would have the gratification of reading in the French newspapers the praises of your conquerors, and of the wisdom and energy

with which they maintain public order against the attempts of factions.

In most of the pretended reforms made by your predecessors in office, and in those proposed in the last two parliamentary sessions by your colleagues, I have observed new approaches towards the French centralisation; and I thought it proper that all should see it, in its full extent, in its working, and in its results.

These results are truly lamentable; and I beg particularly to call your attention to that part of my book, and especially to the tables, which are, in some sort, the official resumé of the effects of the French administration on the physical and moral condition of the people. There you will see, that whatever may be the state of this country, however great and urgent the necessity for a remedy to sufferings which cannot be endured much longer; yet that remedy cannot be found in the adoption of any part of the French governmental and administrative system.

You will see that the cost of that administrative system is quadruple that of the British; that, with a public debt amounting to one-third only of that of England, the burden of taxes is now heavier by nearly £4,000,000 sterling a-year; that the assessment of these taxes on the departments is made without any regularity, or proportion to the population, the real wealth, the industry of the several departments; that, for instance, the department of Eure et Loire, with a population of 285,600 inhabitants, with a minimum of agriculture and of manufactures, pays 8,491,725 francs a-year, whilst the department of Manche, with a population of 603,600 inhabitants, and, according to the returns, a maximum of agriculture and manufactures, pays only 4,091,425 francs. This French *égale répartition de l'impôt*, and an annually increasing deficit, notwithstanding annually increased receipts, forbids you to

look to French financial science for the cure of your financial ailments.

Will the French method allay your agricultural distress? It seems that, under the fostering care of the ministry of agriculture, France does not yet grow wheat enough to supply its inhabitants with wholesome food. You will see, that, on a general average, seventeen quarters of inferior corn, or maize, or other grain, are consumed for ten quarters of wheat; that in the forty three most agricultural departments, the proportion is twenty to ten, and in the ten most agricultural, thirty-four to ten; and that the pauperism amounts to six per cent. of the population.

Manufactures and trade are under the protection of the same ministry, and are managed with equal success. That protection seems to consist in preventing the French from manufacturing those goods which they could produce at a small cost, and sell with advantage; and in promoting the manufacture of goods, which cannot be made but at an immense cost, in insufficient quantity; and which could be obtained elsewhere at a trifling price. It enables the iron-masters (the Duke de Caze for instance) to manufacture and sell at 14*l.* or 16*l.* sterling per ton, the iron which we could provide at 6*l.*: and the ministry who do that, without saving the Duke from insolvency, proposes the suppression of beet-root sugar manufacture, which was the main source of prosperity in twenty departments.

Your colleague of the home department, treading in the paths of Lord Brougham and Lord John Russell, lately contemplated the importation of a part of the French system of public instruction, inspectors, inspectors-general, normal schools. The result of these institutions in France is, on an average, as the tables show: 501 completely ignorant out of 1,000 young men of twenty-one years of age. The average in forty-three departments is 630 per

1000. In the forty-three most agricultural departments, the average is 571; and it is 438 in the forty-three most manufacturing. Lord Ashley might, by a strict investigation, find out that the same proportion, though with much less ignorance, exists in the two corresponding divisions of this country. But the adaptation of the French organisation will not mend the matter.

So far from it, Sir, that you will see, by the tables, that the instruction given is as bad, if not worse than ignorance; that in the most ignorant of the French departments, the Corrèze, with 804 ignorants on 1000 young men of twenty-one years of age, there is but one criminal on 10,360 inhabitants. In the department of Creuse, where the ignorants are 621 to 1,000, there is but one criminal on 21,800 inhabitants; whilst, in the Seine Inférieure, with 346 ignorants; or Seine et Marne, with 228, the proportion is 4,496 inhabitants for one criminal, in the first; and, in the second, 6,194. The general average of departmental criminality gives this result. In the forty-three most criminal departments, there is a convict in every 6,379 inhabitants, and 484 ignorants in 1,000 men; while, in the forty-three least criminal departments, the ignorants are 518 in 1,000, and one convict in 11,829 inhabitants.

Neither is pauperism to be considered as the cause of criminality. The two departments which contain the greatest number of poor, a number out of proportion with the other departments, the Nord and Pas de Calais, are amongst the least criminal; while, on the other side, the Haut Rhin, the Bas Rhin, with the very minimum of pauperism, are most criminal. On the general average, the proportion is, for the forty-three most pauperised departments, seventy poor per 1,000 inhabitants, and one convict in 8,464 inhabitants; while, in the forty-three other departments, the poor are forty-two per 1,000, with one convict for 9,744 inhabitants. In this case, pauperism is less by three

sevenths, while the decrease in criminality is only one seventh.

But what, in the course of my long investigations upon the subject, caused me the greatest astonishment, was to find that, according to the official documents on which I was pursuing my inquiries, religious zeal, far from being a preventive to criminality, seemed to be a promoter of it; and that, in most cases, the greater the number of clergymen in a department, the greater also was the number of criminals, as you will find by the tables: and, by the double average of religious zeal and criminality, you will see that the forty-three most criminal departments, in which there is one convict for 6,377 inhabitants, reckon eighty-eight aspirants to the priesthood on 3,000 young men of twenty-one; and that in the forty-three departments where the maximum of religious zeal is found, where thirty-nine young men of twenty-one on every thousand are clergymen, there is one criminal on 8,733 inhabitants; whilst, in the forty-three departments with the minimum of religious zeal, where there are but nineteen aspirants to the priesthood on every thousand young men of twenty-one years, there is one convict on 9,435 inhabitants.

Such facts deserve the serious attention, not of moralists only, but also, and principally, of statesmen; and thus, Sir, I justify the dedication of this volume to you, who, besides drawing proper conclusions with your superior abilities, are in a situation to render them useful to the social and moral improvement of the country now under your rule.

Is it not worth your while to examine how far these conclusions, drawn from the official accounts on the state of France, are applicable to Great Britain; to inquire into the various causes which, however different, produce the same results, and to apply proper remedies? Is not this the greatest service you can render the country? Would it not be an honour to you, as well as a blessing for the people?

I have scarcely any doubt that your mind would be disposed boldly and honestly to undertake such an enterprise ; but that obstacles are thrown in your way by party associations, by powerful interests, and perhaps by still more powerful considerations ! Then, Sir, the sooner you resign, the better for you and for the country. Be free at least ; and, if you are prevented from doing good, do not assist in doing wrong. Depend upon it, your fame will not suffer from such a determination ; and the day will soon come, when you shall be reinstalled in power, without any of the trammels which now paralyze your intentions.

This is the opinion, the advice of a well-wisher. I do not give my name, because I am more desirous of repose than of excitement. I feel conscious of discharging a duty in publishing this volume, and that it is calculated to produce some good effects ; but I am also aware that the expression of conscientious opinions on political matters, on political men, and on moral and religious subjects, in opposition to adopted notions, to long entertained prejudices, and to profitable nuisances, subjects an author to persecutions, which, at my age, and with my disposition, I do not wish to be exposed to. I should not like, when visiting Paris, to be hunted by the swordsmen of public order, excommunicated by the archbishop, and even here treated somewhat worse by some of my political friends.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

THE AUTHOR.

FRANCE.

HER GOVERNMENTAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION.

INTRODUCTION.

It is now seventy years since Delolme published his work on the British Constitution. The whole continent of Europe, under absolute and tyrannical governments, was then in a state of complete ignorance as to the institutions of Great Britain. Even in France, where philosophers and publicists had already agitated the most important social questions, and paved the way for a new political organization, England and her government were known only from the accounts of the exiled Jacobites, who represented their countrymen as a race of restless and sanguinary savages, intent only on robbery and murder. So late as 1768, a French poet was still writing—

“ Insulaires cruels, qui, des mêmes couteaux,
Coupez la tête aux rois, et la queue aux chevaux.”

The work of Delolme rectified the ideas received through partial and corrupt channels. The French listened, observed, and learned that the pretended savages were humane and orderly citizens; that, in a severe struggle, in a long contested battle, for their ancient and legitimate birth-rights, they had indeed slain some of their enemies, made

others prisoners, and put the rest to flight: and that the result was not, as reported, organised anarchy; but freedom, under the protection and within the limits of equitable laws, with a responsible government.

It was a great and instructive lesson, which the misconduct of the French Government impressed still more forcibly on the minds of the people; and the desire for institutions similar to those of England, was the first incitement to, if not the ultimate object of, a revolution in France.

In my attempt to expose the governmental and administrative system of France, and the condition of the people, my task is not so pleasant as that of Delolme; yet, the work may be equally useful. I cannot, unfortunately, exhibit the French institutions as a model worthy of imitation, but as a beacon to warn other nations.

I am certain that the government and the state of France are not better known in England, than the government and state of England were known to the French seventy years ago. Some are still under the impression, produced by the recitals of the French emigrants—the modern Jacobites, and maintain that all the French are so many Robespierres and Marats, longing for massacres and pillage. Others proclaim, that the Napoleonian ideas of glory and conquest are still prevalent, and that they are dissatisfied because they are not allowed to disturb again the peace of Europe. Others, again, attribute the unsettled state of the country to the inconstant and restless character of the people; and all, while praising to the skies the wisdom and firmness of Louis Philippe, come to the same conclusion, that no reliance can be placed on the French, and that no alliance can be contracted with them.

This conclusion has for the last twelve months furnished a text to the leading newspapers of all parties in England.

All of them have made the people answerable for the acts of a government over which they have no control; and they have given credit to that government for its good intentions, and its resistance to the prejudices and bad passions of the nation: whereas a strict and judicious examination of all the facts would convince every body, that to the French government alone are to be attributed the causes of the existing political and diplomatic animosities.

I am sure that most of the English newspapers have not willingly perverted the truth, that they have not been intentionally unjust towards the French; but it cannot be denied that they *are* unjust; and the result of that injustice has been to rekindle national animosities, which may lead to disastrous consequences, if the honest and intelligent men of England and of France do not hasten to elucidate the truth and to repair the breach.

The feeling of hostility against England, so suddenly awakened, and so rapidly extending in France, cannot be observed without profound concern by the friends of civil and religious liberty in both countries. Thirteen years ago, union between France and England was the general sentiment in Paris as well as in London; and the philanthropists and patriots of all countries hailed that union as the first step towards the destruction of the despotism which oppressed most of the nations of Europe. These expectations have been sadly disappointed. The continental despots, who then were panic-struck, feel now more secure, are more absolute than they ever were, and indulge the hope of renewing the conflict that had so long been carried on between France and England.

The declamations of the French newspapers, ministerial as well as oppositionist, against the ambition and the perfidy of England, have certainly excited the people to such a degree, that, at the present moment, a war with England

would give popularity to the minister who dared to undertake it. This being my opinion, and knowing well that the men who now govern the country would not hesitate to go that length to keep themselves in power, I consider it a duty to enter into some details on the principal events which, since the revolution of July, have contributed to estrange from the government the affections of the people, and at the same time to ascertain the causes of the deplorable change in the opinions and in the relations of the two countries.

The first cause is, the personal character of the King of the French, and the peculiar situation in which he found himself, when placed on the throne, so long the object of his ambition. All the foreign ambassadors at the time resident in Paris protested, in the name of their respective governments, against his usurpation, as soon as they saw him accepting the crown, and threatened him with a new invasion of the country. It is certain that Lord Stuart, at first, participated in that *démarche*, and that nothing but the attitude of the British people prevented the English ministry from entering into a new holy alliance, and thereby baffled the designs of the continental powers.

But Louis Philippe, not expecting such a display of enthusiasm in favour of the Revolution, in England, and dreadfully alarmed by the menaces of the diplomatic body, hastened to declare, that he had taken no part in the Revolution; and solemnly promised, that, although he had been compelled to accept the crown, he would resign it to its rightful owner as soon as, by his skilful exercise of the royal authority, he had reduced the people to their former condition of helplessness and passive obedience. This cannot be denied. The Duke of Mortemart, who was the first person summoned to the Palais Royal by the Duke of Orleans, on his arrival from Neuilly, and who, by the last

ordinances of Charles X., had been appointed president of the council, has publicly stated the fact.

These promises were renewed in the autograph letters written by the King of the French to William IV., to the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and to the King of Prussia. To England, he further engaged to fulfil the promise of Charles X., to abandon Algiers.

Thus, at the beginning of his reign, the new King had bound himself to govern in opposition to the principles of the Revolution; and it was with the view of proving his sincerity, that he called into his ministry Casimir Perrier, who had also been appointed minister by the last ordinance of the late King, and Guizot, who had fled to Ghent during the hundred days; who, on his return, was a violent Legitimist, and, afterwards, when out of place, an equally violent Oppositionist; and who, in the protest of the Deputies against the violation of the Charter, on the 28th of July, 1830, had inserted the ordinary formulas of fidelity and devotion, which were unanimously rejected by all the members of the Assembly. For the same purpose he sent, as Ambassador to England, (the only country which would then receive his envoys,) Talleyrand, who had signed the treaties of 1814 and 1815, so disastrous to France.

The choice of those men was too significant not to cause a general dissatisfaction; which was so unanimously expressed, that the King soon perceived that the realisation of his promises would not be an easy task: he, however, thought he could succeed, by lulling the people into a sort of security, on the one hand, by his liberal professions, and on the other hand, by giving instalments of illiberal measures, to please the absolute governments. Such is the system he adopted: and he succeeded in conciliating, in some degree, the French, by saying, "I can do no more, from fear of the coalition," and the coalition by writing,

“ I cannot comply with all your wishes, from fear of a new insurrection. Give me time, and I will set every thing right.” Deception was then, and has ever since been, the basis and the instrument of the royal system.

The change of administration in England, and the advent of the Whig Government, seemed at first to have more surprised than satisfied him. The triumph of the Liberals of London could not fail to encourage the Liberals of Paris; and the secession of England from the continental alliance, would not allow him to speak any longer of a foreign invasion, as an excuse for his despotical predilections. Broglie and Guizot, who were determined to act on the plan they had devised with the King, had already been compelled to leave the ministry. Then, certainly, France began to rely upon England. Their cause was, in some sort, common. The Government of France, the offspring of a Revolution, and the Whig Ministry pledged to Reform, were equally odious to the continental sovereigns. A close alliance between the two governments was the wish of every Frenchman. “ England and France united, and we defy the whole world,” was the sentiment in every bosom and in every mouth.

The Belgian and Polish Revolution soon dissipated these cherished expectations. These two events, which afforded the Whig administration an opportunity of correcting the faults committed in the treaties of 1814 and 1815, and of signaling their advent by a more equitable and permanent adjustment of the *balance* of European powers, were unfortunately left, in the cabinet, to the judgment of the most unprincipled and the most incompetent of the British statesmen; and certainly, if the facts which follow are true, the French have some right to accuse the English Government.

It may easily be conceived, that the Belgian revolution

would cause the utmost anxiety to all the crowned heads of the continent, and would increase their hatred against revolutionary France and its revolutionary king. If the object of that revolution was only to get rid of a sovereign, who certainly, in the latter part of his reign, had given to the Belgians just cause for discontent and rebellion, (and this is my opinion,) the consequences of the revolution seemed naturally to be the re-union of Belgium to France. All the French, of all political parties, desired and expected it. Such was also the wish of almost all the Belgians, who were fully sensible of the utter impossibility that their country should prosper as an independent nation. To be just, it must be admitted, that the French were less actuated in their desires by ambitious designs, than by the necessity of securing a better line of frontier than the present one, which, besides being very defective, would allow foreign armies to reach the capital in a week's march. This was felt by every one; and every one was convinced, that, if England had been really reconciled to France, she would not have objected to the re-union of two countries speaking the same language, and so long united; and that the assent of England would have compelled the European monarchs to submit to the necessity. The opposition to that re-union, was therefore attributed to England; and no doubt of this remained when a British prince was called to the throne of the new kingdom.

There is not an individual in France, except the King and his court, that did not applaud the noble effort of the Poles, that did not wish for their success, and was not desirous of assisting them. The most influential of the peers and deputies, Lafayette at their head, pressed the ministers and the King himself to interfere in their favour. Lafitte, who was then president of the council, and even Marshal Soult, minister at war, not only countenanced in

the council the views of the friends of Poland, but also took the necessary measures to afford to the Poles the assistance they needed, both by diplomatic negotiations, and by a supply of arms and of volunteers.

The French, on the authority of their king and his minister for foreign affairs, believe and assert, that Lord Grey and his colleagues, when requested to unite with France to compel Nicholas to acknowledge the independence of Poland, and, by so doing, establish an insurmountable barrier to the encroachments of Russia on the east, refused their co-operation to the project; and that their ambassador at Constantinople, acting according to his instructions, opposed the attempts of the French ambassador to induce the Sultan to avenge his wrongs, repair the disasters of 1828, and regain his conquered provinces; which diversion would have afforded to the Poles the most beneficial assistance.

It is undeniable, that, had England and France acted in concert on this occasion, the cause of Poland would have been triumphant; and that Russia, confined on her southern and northern frontier by powerful nations, would have ceased to be, as she had long been, and as she will continue to be for a long time, a permanent cause of alarm and danger to all Europe and Asia. We must certainly regret that such an opportunity of restraining an ambitious power within its proper limits should have been lost; and, if Lords Grey and Palmerston did, as it is confidently stated, refuse to concur in such a project, they deserve not only the curses bestowed upon them by the Poles and the French, but also the reprobation of their own countrymen.

From that time, the French ceased to consider an alliance with England as of any benefit; and the friendly feelings, so warmly expressed, gradually subsided. We will now

proceed to show how these feelings degenerated into hostile dispositions.

No sensible and conscientious man in France will deny that the government of Louis Philippe has, from its beginning, been carried on upon principles in direct opposition to the expectations of the country; that almost all the political measures adopted by the King have been a violation of his most solemn promises; that the most oppressive laws, enacted by corrupt legislators, have constantly been carried into execution, with such violence, by subservient and cruel agents, that almost everywhere the people have been driven into rebellions, which have been repressed with circumstances of the utmost cruelty. Yet, the British free press, the government, and even the Opposition, have never mentioned the French King, without praising to the skies the wisdom of that prince. Such a unanimity in exalting a man whom the French consider, with reason, as the enemy of their public liberties and national independence, is construed into an approbation of all his misdeeds; and, consequently, is regarded as a proof, that England wishes nothing better than to see France enslaved at home, and humbled before Europe. This was the general feeling in 1838, when a most unjust and injudicious measure of the British government added to that feeling the firm persuasion, that England was a party to the preparation for another invasion.

The French could not see in any other light the cession of Luxemburg to Holland, or rather to Prussia and the Germanic confederacy, who thus obtained a formidable fortress and a place of rendezvous, at five days' march from Paris. They could not attribute to any other motive than hostility, the part taken in that transaction by a government which had assisted in taking Antwerp from the Dutch. Hence, England was considered as re-entering

into the holy alliance, from which she had separated in 1823, under Canning's administration.

Such being the general opinion, the violent excitement produced by the treaty of July, 1840, concluded without the participation, and, as it was asserted, without the knowledge of the French government, is not to be wondered at. I was present in the chamber of deputies during the debates; and both Thiers and Guizot, although sworn enemies, agreed upon this point, that they were apprised of the negotiation only by the official notification of the treaty.

The fact of the exclusion of France, when, two years before, England had proposed to France a sort of offensive and defensive alliance, to arrange, without the participation of the other powers, the quarrel between the Sultan and the Pasha on very different terms, as stated, in my presence, to the deputies, without any contradiction or explanation, could not but raise an accusation of perfidy against England. The signal had been given by the King, on hearing of the treaty; it was repeated on the following morning by the court and ministerial journals, who, till that time, had been in favour of the English alliance. The Opposition papers did not fail to join in the cry; and the whole of France was arrayed against England.

To this new general feeling must be attributed the opposition to the right of search, which furnished another subject of parliamentary and diplomatic controversies. The question of Algiers must probably soon afford a new aliment to the existing hatred; and, indeed, I am alarmed at the consequences, especially as the ministry of Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington is regarded as inimical to France.

Many intelligent Frenchmen take every opportunity of trying to convince their countrymen, that they labour under a most mischievous error, in thinking that England

bears any ill-will against France ; that the French government alone has acted with duplicity in the Polish, in the Spanish, and particularly in the Eastern question. It is asserted by many Englishmen, that, in this case, instead of entering into the views and accepting the proposal of the British cabinet, Louis Philippe had those proposals communicated to the Czar, with a view to court his imperial good-will ; and that it was in his own defence that Lord Palmerston resolved to rely no longer on an alliance with the French government, and felt compelled to answer to M. Guizot's protestations, as M. Guizot himself declared in his despatches, communicated to the Chambers, " We cannot believe you ! " But nobody is convinced ; they want proofs ; and unfortunately, the secrecy in which the political and diplomatic papers are buried, does not enable the public to examine those proofs. Were all the papers produced and printed by parliamentary order, I have no doubt that the British government would be exonerated from the greater part of the blame arising out of all these transactions, and that the French, convinced of their error, would soon return to less unfriendly dispositions ; but, until that is done, until the causes are fully stated, the facts alone can form public opinion ; and the facts, so far as known, are against the English government, with the exception of the non-ratification of the treaty relative to the right of search.

In this case, all the blame evidently rests with the French government, which, faithful to its habits of duplicity and deception, endeavours to justify its breach of faith, by pleading the ignorance and the prejudices of the people. But the people had no hand in the transaction. The government's partisans in the chambers are the guilty parties. The author of the amendment for the non-ratification, M. Lefebvre, is a violent Philippist and Guizotist. It is now pretended, that Lefebvre acted under the influence of

Molé, and was supported by Thiers and his party. But the French have nothing in common with those political *roués*; nay, with the exception of the parties interested in the conservation or the overthrowing of the present administration, the people do not care a straw about the right of search; and the long articles in the French newspapers, so frequently noticed and translated here, are completely disregarded, even in Paris.

The fact is, that far more important questions of internal policy engross the attention of the people. What is to them negro slavery itself, when they themselves are hardly better than slaves; when they are as completely at the mercy of the government as the Russian serfs; when eight millions of them are deprived of all municipal and political rights; when the governmental and administrative organisation is such, that there is no country more despotically misgoverned, than France with her boasted charter and her citizen King? Very few, if any persons, in this country, can have an idea of that organization, and the exposure of such a tyrannical mechanism cannot but be interesting and useful to Englishmen; interesting, because it will account for the constantly increasing expenditure, the difficulties and the violence of the government, and the equally increasing discontent of the people; useful, because they will see, by what is done in France, what ought not to be allowed to be done in England by any political party; all such parties being generally too prone to follow such an example as the very best means of securing the perpetuity of their power.

This work is naturally divided into three parts:—

1st. The governmental and administrative system, with an enumeration of the governmental and administrative agents.

2nd. The condition of the people, divided into classes, according to their trades, profession, property, and education.

3rd. The constitutional and legislative measures, which secure the despotism of the government and the subjection of the people.

In a composition like this, not only are truth and the utmost accuracy the first duty of an author, but also, considering the extraordinary and almost incredible character of the facts exposed, it is necessary to quote authorities in support of all statements which concern individuals or the system; therefore, I had appended notes and references to every chapter of this work; but, on reflection, seeing that their great number would have doubled the bulk of the volume, and that such innumerable annotations would constantly interrupt the reader, I thought it better to abandon that plan, and to give, as a general reference, a list of the documents on which I have founded my work, and which, for the most part, are to be found in the library of the British Museum; the best conducted establishment that I have anywhere seen.

1. Documents statistiques sur la France, publiés par le Ministre du Commerce. 1835.
2. Rapports au Roi sur l'administration de la Justice Criminelle en France; annually made by the minister of Justice; from 1831 to 1841.
3. Rapports au Roi, (annual reports to the King, during the same period, on the administration of their respective departments,) par le Ministre de l'Intérieur.

Ditto . . .	Instruction Publique.
Ditto . . .	Travaux Publics.
Ditto . . .	Agriculture et Commerce.
Ditto . . .	de l'Intérieur.
Ditto . . .	des Finances.
Ditto . . .	de la Guerre.
Ditto . . .	de la Marine.

4. Comptes rendus aux Chambres, (annual accounts presented to the Chambers, during the same period, by the several ministers.)
5. Procès verbal des Séances de la Chambre des Deputés et de la Chambre des Pairs ; from 1830 to 1841.
6. Le Moniteur Universel ; Journal officiel.
7. Annuaire du Bureau des Longitudes.
8. Essai sur la statistique de la population Française, par le Comte d'Angeville, membre de la Chambre des Députés.
9. Mémoire sur la distribution de la population Française. Par M. de Villermé.
10. Recherches sur la Paupérisme. Par le Baron de Gerando, le Comte de Laborde, le Baron de Morogues, et M. de Villeneuve Bargemont.

Besides other sources of intelligence, too numerous to be mentioned here, I have had, by my personal position, ample opportunities of ascertaining the truth of every statement contained in this volume, relating either to the organization or to the Rulers of the country.

With regard to the Rulers, I have said but little. More will be found in another work, which will follow this, under the title of, "Political Parties and Political Men in France."

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

THE GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

THE very best standard by which we may judge of the corruption and of the despotism of a government, is the amount of its expenditure, the extent of its patronage, the number of its salaried officials. Some publicists have long ago maintained that a free government is incompatible with a large standing military establishment. In 1815, on the return of Napoleon from Elba, M. Comte published in Paris a dissertation on the "*Impossibilité d'une monarchie constitutionnelle, sous un chef militaire.*" That question is no longer controverted.

In the United States of America, they have gone further. They have considered a funded debt as equally irreconcilable with free institutions; and, acting on that principle, they succeeded in paying off their creditors in the course of a few years.

But there is something much more dangerous, much more destructive of public rights and individual liberty; and that is, a numerous and universal administrative body, appointed by, and responsible only to, the government.

France is cursed with these three scourges. She has a numerous standing army; she has a large funded, and a

considerable unfunded debt; she has, thirdly, an almost innumerable and exceedingly expensive body of placemen, under the absolute control of the government. The natural consequence is, and it cannot be otherwise, the constitutional slavery of the people, the constitutional despotism and the constitutional corruption of the government, of its agents, and of an important part of the population.

Before entering into the details of the administrative organization in France, I must call the attention of my English readers to a few facts, which will show the importance of the subject.

According to the financial measures proposed in last April, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the expenditure for the year was fixed at £50,222,000

The charges on the Consolidated Fund are . 31,820,000

So that there remains, for maintaining the army and the navy, and for carrying on the government £18,402,000

In France, the yearly expenditure, according to the last budget, was fixed at £52,462,124

The charges on the Consolidated Fund (public debt and dotations) are 15,200,000

For the army and the navy, and the administration £37,262,124

From this statement, it results, that the expenses of the French government are more than double those of the British. This might be enough to deter any one from advocating the French administrative system, and from supporting its introduction into this country; but it is not enough to enable my readers to judge correctly of the cost

of that administration ; and I must, therefore, go further on with my statements.

The total expenditure for the army and the navy, and for the ordnance, in England, has been fixed, by the fore-mentioned budget, at 15,467,000*l.*; so that there remains but 2,935,000*l.* for carrying on the government and the administration of the country.

The estimates of the expenditure for the army and the navy, in France, are set down, in the last presented budget, at 18,800,000*l.*; and, consequently, the cost of the civil administration of the country is 18,462,124*l.*; that is to say, six times as much as the same kind of expenditure in England.

I do not know what is at present the number of persons employed and paid by the British government; but, in 1835, it was, in the whole, 23,578, and the amount of the salaries was, 2,786,278*l.*; while the registered electors are above 900,000. If the influence exercised over the British people in the elections is notoriously great and corrupting, what must be the case in France, with 180,000 electors only, and with 500,000 paid offices at the disposal of the King and his ministers; and so artfully graduated, with regard either to rank or to emoluments, that the holders of them always have a strong inducement to tyranny and subserviency?

The emoluments of all these offices vary from 12*l.* to 2,000*l.* a year;* so that bribery and corruption may work in all classes of the people. About 500 of these officers receive a salary of 800*l.* a year, or more; and most of them are either peers or deputies, or near relations of those

* This refers only to the general class of officials, and does not include the ministers, the envoys, the residents, plenipotentiaries, and ambassadors, who receive from three thousand to sixteen thousand pounds a year; and those well-paid diplomatists are ignorant of the negotiations carried on till their conclusion, or sign treaties which afterwards cannot be ratified.

legislators. There are about 18,500 places, the emoluments of which are from 120*l.* to 800*l.*, which fall to the share of the deputies, and influential electors in the departments. 80,000 offices, with salaries under 120*l.*, but above 60*l.*, are, for the most part, bestowed on the principal electors, as an inducement to, or a reward for, electoral services; and all the other offices are given to the poorer electors, or to their relations and their friends. Under such circumstances, one must wonder, not at the servility of the French legislative bodies, but at the existence of any opposition to a government exercising so vast a patronage.

The worst of all tyrannies is that which is exercised under legal forms, with the appearance of a free constitution, and the sanction of the legislative bodies. Such is the case in France. Neither of the chambers represents the people. The peers are appointed by the government, and represent the King and the different coteries which promoted them to the peerage when in power. As to the deputies, they are the nominees and representatives of public functionaries, and, in great part, public functionaries themselves, or aspiring to public functions. It cannot be otherwise. The number of electors in France is under 200,000, while the number of public functions at the disposal of, and paid by the government, is, as I said before, about 500,000. It follows that the government, by disposing of all the offices in favour only of the electors and their families, have always in their power the means of securing the majority in the electoral colleges. It is not only on the 500,000 holders of office that the government can rely, in electoral contests, but also on an equal number of expectants for those same offices, whose principal qualification must be subserviency.

This will be rendered evident in the exposition of the

several branches of the administration. Before proceeding to it, I must, in a few lines, show the administrative division of the country.

The territory of France is divided into departments; the departments are divided into arrondissements; the arrondissements into cantons; and the cantons are composed of several communes (parishes).

There are 86 departments, 361 arrondissements, 2,846 cantons, and 38,096 communes.

The administration is divided into nine ministries, as follows:—1. The Interior; 2. Justice and Public Worship; 3. Public Instruction; 4. Public Works; 5. Trade and Agriculture; 6. Finances; 7. Foreign Affairs; 8. War; 9. Marine and Colonies.

CHAPTER II.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.—(HOME OFFICE.)

THE Ministry of the Interior is the stronghold, the *citadelle* of the administrative despotism in France, and, on that account, is entitled to the first place in our strictures on the French administration.

The central administration, as the French call it, that is to say, the ministerial bureaux, are classed under the following heads: general secretariat, departmental and communal administration, general police, fine arts, and telegraphs. The departmental and communal organisation is the first branch to be examined, because, when fully exposed, it will facilitate the perfect understanding of all the others.

There are in every department a prefect and a council of prefecture, appointed by the King; and in each arrondissement, a sub-prefect, also appointed by the King, and acting under the direction of the prefect, who is the head of the

administration. There are a general council in every department, and a council of arrondissement in every arrondissement, both chosen by the cantonal electors. Finally, there is in every commune, (parish, or union of parishes,) a municipal council, elected by the highest tax-payers of the commune, in the proportion of one elector for ten inhabitants, when the population is 1,000 or less; of fifteen per cent. of the inhabitants, from 1,000 to 15,000; of fourteen per cent., when the population is above 15,000 inhabitants. The number of municipal councillors varies also, according to the population, from ten in communes of 500 inhabitants or less, to thirty-six for communes of or above 30,000.

In every commune, there are a mayor, and one or more *adjoints*, (assistants,) selected by the King from among the municipal councillors, in communes of 3,000 inhabitants or more, and in the other communes by the prefect of the department. The municipal council and the councils of arrondissement are re-elected by halves, every three years, and the mayors and assistants are then appointed.

So far as this statement goes, it would appear that there is a sort of popular control, something like interference of the people, in the management of the public affairs of the departments and the communes; but such is not the case; and, however startling the assertion may appear, it is certain that all those councils are without any power, and of no use whatever, except when acting in opposition to the interests of the people, and in defiance of their opinion.

This will be shown hereafter, when we examine more particularly the organisation and the official duties of those councils.

The mayors and assistants receive no salaries: some, however, are allowed an indemnity or a gratuity, which is generally the price of some good offices, in police or election business. Others are gained by a cross of honour; but

that is not absolutely necessary to secure the compliance of the mayors with any order of the minister, particularly in the rural communes.

The prefects, the sub-prefects, the mayors, and the adjoints are the principal agents of the departmental and communal administration, consisting in the execution, by the departments and the communes, of the ministerial orders, which, transmitted by the prefects and sub-prefects to the mayors or their assistants, are communicated by them to the inhabitants, who must forthwith obey.

The mayors and their adjoints are moreover bound to perform all the duties relating to the civil state, (*les actes de l'état civil*), such as the civil forms of marriage, the registration of births and deaths, and some other acts of minor importance; all which is done by the communal secretary, who is appointed by the mayor.

The number of mayors for all the communes of France is 38,108, and that of the adjoints about 52,000: so that the minister of the interior has 90,100 officials, appointed by himself, subject to be instantly dismissed, and consequently at his mercy.

The police is a principal branch of the departmental and communal administration. The mayors and their assistants are *ex-officio* the officers of that police in the rural communes, and the *garde champêtre* (a rural constable), appointed by the prefects, is their agent. In towns, one or more commissioners of police, in proportion to the population, are appointed by the minister; who have regular policemen and spies acting under their directions. In a few of the large towns, there is, besides the ordinary commissioners, a general commissioner, and, in Paris, a prefect of police. The commissioners of police are under the orders of the prefects and sub-prefects, and report to them; but the general commissioners and the prefect of police

correspond with the Minister, through a principal *employé*, the director-general of the police.

It is out of my power to give any accurate account of the number or the cost of the police in France. The number of the rural constables is about 35,000. The regular policemen in the towns and cities amount to about 11,000. There are above 600 commissioners of police, a few general commissioners, and the prefect; and their emoluments amount altogether to about 11,000,000 francs. But there is, besides these, the Secret Police, the agents of which are unknown, and for whom 2,400,000 francs, *fonds secrets*, are annually voted by the chambers.

Next to the police, and forming its powerful assistant, is the telegraphic administration, which, in consequence, is attached to the ministry of the interior. The French statesmen, Pasquier, De Caze, Guizot, De Broglie, Thiers, and others of the same school, know from experience all the advantages of that system of communication. Arrest L., a republican! and, one hour after the first move of the machine in Paris, the order is executed at La Rochelle. No respite, and no mercy! and Didier, and nineteen other victims, are beheaded at Grenoble. No conditions and no quarter! and Lyons, stormed by an army, is put to the sword; and the next morning, the Minister proclaims, "Order reigns at Lyons!" or, "Justice is satisfied at Grenoble!!"

The Court and the Stock Exchange, which go hand in hand, derive also some other benefits from telegraphic communications. This is no longer a secret. Yet, while producing such advantages, the administration of the telegraphs is the least expensive of the governmental engines. It employs but 700 officials, and costs not more than 900,000 francs.

The minister of the interior is the general director of the national guard; for the national guard is, like every

thing else in the country, under the grasp of the government. In most parts of France, there is none. The people have left it in disgust; and, how obligatory soever be the law ordering all the citizens to be enlisted in its ranks, and drilled, the government does not enforce it. That guard is now in existence only in large towns, and, except in Paris, performs no duties.

Every citizen between the ages of twenty and sixty belongs to the national guard. They elect their non-commissioned officers, and these elect their officers and the candidates for the colonelcy of the legion. The colonel is chosen by the minister from amongst the candidates. The minister also nominates an adjutant-major in every battalion.

The national guard cannot assemble without an order from the colonel, which order the colonel cannot give without permission from the prefect or the sub-prefect. They cannot deliberate on public affairs. They are, by law, condemned to passive obedience.

The commander-in-chief of the national guard of Paris, the major-general of his staff, and all the adjutant-majors of battalions receive the emoluments of their respective ranks. The number of these officers is about 1,200; and the yearly expense of the national guard is 2,800,000 francs.

A portion of the *fonds secrets* is distributed among the ranks of the national guard. There is not a company in which the police has not two or three agents, to report the opinions and conduct of their comrades; for that body, so devoted seven or eight years ago, is now generally disaffected, and the government can rely but on a small number, to whom the guard of the palace is intrusted, under the control of double the number of regular soldiers.

The press ought to be, as it is in England, the best of the national guards; but the freedom of the press, solemnly

proclaimed in 1830, has experienced the fate of all the other safeguards of liberty. The minister of the interior has the *direction générale de la librairie et de l'imprimerie*. The number of printers and booksellers in France is limited by ministerial ordinances. They are appointed by royal patent, and can be deprived of their patents by the minister. As the number of printers in provincial towns is fixed in proportion to the population, a great many towns have but one printer, who takes great care not to meddle with politics, or to print any thing that might give offence to the sub-prefect, the prefect, the mayor, or any public officer. The number of the printers and booksellers throughout France is about 7,000.

The royal printing-office (*imprimerie royale*) may be considered as a dependency of the ministry of the interior, although (I do not know for what reasons) it is placed in the accounts of the ministry of justice. It has a director and administrators, clerks and others, *employés*, amounting to 350, and it costs about 500,000 francs.

The administration of fine arts seems to be established merely for the purpose of gratifying the taste for pleasure of the Parisians, and of patronizing some artists of the metropolis. The departments derive no benefit from the 2,500,000 francs voted under this head. Here you find 1,625,275 francs given as subvention to the three royal theatres, by a government which gives 120,000 francs only to the societies of maternal charity. *Panem et circences*, was the demand of the Romans under their tyrants. The Parisians cry *Circences* only.

The number of paid officials or other *employés* in the administration of fine arts is about 700.

There is also attached to the ministry of the interior a direction of public monuments, with a president, a council, architects in chief, inspectors, ordinary architects, assistant

architects, and *employés* of all sorts, besides contractors. The expenditure of this administration amounts annually to 3,000,000 of francs, 2,500,000 of which are expended in Paris, and principally in the palaces. The number of the *employés* is about 300.

The French government is the general pawnbroker. This sort of trade is a monopoly under the designation of *administration du mont de piété*, which employs, in Paris, and in the principal towns of the departments, 1,200 officials, at a cost of about 1,800,000 francs.

The hospitals, of all kinds, are also under the control of the minister of the interior, who appoints all the officials, administrators, physicians, and surgeons. The total number of these *employés* is above 2,000, and their emoluments amount to about 3,000,000 of francs.

The prisons are a necessary complement of such a political organization, and of the governmental system. Four new ones have been built in Paris since the revolution of July; the Citizen King finding that the eight old ones were not large enough to contain the victims of his policy. The annual expenditure for the prisons in France is about 10,000,000 francs. The number of persons employed in those establishments, including the inspectors-general and ordinary inspectors, is about 3,500.

Such are the several branches of the administration of the home department. The central office, the ministerial *bureaux*, are composed of directors, under-directors, chiefs of offices, sub-chiefs, and clerks of all ranks, altogether 250 *employés*, receiving 640,000 francs, besides some extra expenses, called *matérielles*, amounting to 400,000 francs more. Total, 1,040,000 francs, without reckoning the emoluments of the minister, amounting to 80,000 francs a-year.

Let us now put together all these officials, with the total amount of their salaries.

	Employés.	Francs.
Prefects, sub-prefects, councils of prefectures, and clerks . . .	10,600 .	8,160,000
Mayors and assistant mayors . .	90,100 . .	unpaid
Secretaries of the communes and clerks	39,500 .	8,750,000
Rural watchmen, policemen, com- missioners, and clerks . . .	46,500 .	11,600,000
Secret police	unknown .	2,400,000
Administration of the telegraphs	700 .	900,000
National guard	1,200 .	2,800,000
Royal printing-office	350 .	500,000
Printers and booksellers . . .	7,000 .	—
Fine arts	700 .	1,800,000
Public monuments	300 .	740,000
Mont de piété (pawnbrokers) .	1,200 .	1,800,000
Hospitals	2,000 .	3,000,000
Prisons	3,500 .	3,200,000
Ministerial bureaux	250 .	1,120,000
Total	203,900	46,770,000

With such an administrative army, and so many dependents, under the command of one chief, having no rule of conduct but his own will, it is not astonishing that a minister should consider himself at liberty to do every thing he pleases, and substitute his own interests and the caprices of his master for public interests and the national will. And his subordinates, either paid or unpaid, are always impelled to second the views of their leader, not only by the fear of a dismissal, but also by the hope of being promoted to higher or more lucrative functions.

These promotions are very skilfully arranged. Mayors and assistant mayors are made councillors of prefecture; councillors are made sub-prefects; and sub-prefects are

appointed prefects; nay, to stimulate their ardour, the rank and emoluments of these *employés* are on a progressive scale. These emoluments vary from 12,000 to 33,000 francs for the prefects, and from 3,000 to 6,000 francs for the sub-prefects.

Such is the ministry of the interior.

CHAPTER III.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.

MINISTRY of *injustice* is a more proper denomination for the department which is the subject of this chapter; and I have no doubt that most of my readers will arrive at that conclusion, when made fully acquainted with the organization and the administrative hierarchy of this branch of the government. Never did the genius of despotism devise a more powerful engine for crushing a nation, than the judicial system of France.

All the judges are appointed by the King; and almost the only qualification required is, to be from twenty-two to thirty years of age. To proceed with method, I will begin with the lowest class, the justices of the peace.

Their powers are very similar to those of the county magistrates in England with regard to matters of police; but they are, besides, judges in civil actions, and without appeal, when the amount of the sum claimed is not above 50 francs (2*l.*).

There is a judge of the peace (*juge de paix*) for every canton, with a clerk (*greffier*) and one or two *huissiers* (bailiffs), according to the population. In some places, the justices of the peace have a substitute (*suppléant du juge de paix*). The justices of the peace are chosen from amongst the inhabitants of the canton, as well as the

greffiers. The former must be thirty years of age. They can be deprived of their emoluments, suspended, or dismissed, when they do not give satisfaction to the prefects, or to the minister.

The emoluments of the justices of the peace in rural cantons are from 600 to 800 francs a year (24*l.* to 32*l.*) ; in towns, the salaries are from 800 to 2,500 francs, according to the population. The clerks' salaries in the rural cantons are about 12*l.* a year, and in the towns from 12*l.* to 40*l.* The bailiffs (*huissiers*) receive no salaries from the government, but are entitled to some fees paid by the parties.

The small amount of the salaries paid to those functionaries, particularly in rural cantons, must necessarily lead to the conclusion that such functions are not filled by men of education, and that those men must often be disposed to increase their income by acts of partiality. Thus, in this class of judges, we have the first elements of injustice,—subserviency, ignorance, and corruption. We shall see that such is the case, also, in most of the other courts of justice.

The number of the justices of the peace is 2,846, and their salaries amount to 2,327,400 francs. The salaries of an equal number of clerks amount to 775,800 francs ; so that, with the bailiffs, the total of the *employés* in this jurisdiction is about 9,000, who cost the country 3,103,200 francs.

The second jurisdiction in the French administration of justice consists of the “Courts of First Instance,” which decide on the cases of appeal from the justices of the peace, or on any other civil action brought before them. There is no appeal from their decisions, unless the claim is above 1,500 francs (60*l.*) or 50 francs (2*l.*) a-year.

There is a court of First Instance in every arrondissement. These courts are composed of four, seven, eight, nine, ten, or twelve judges, including the president, in pro-

portion to the population, and a king's solicitor, with one, two, or three substitutes. There are three supplementary judges in the courts composed of four judges; and, in the courts having from seven to twelve judges, there are four supplementary judges. A *greffier* (remembrancer) is attached to every one of these courts.

To be a judge, or a king's solicitor, one must be twenty-five years of age, a licentiate in law, and have attended the bar for two years. The substitutes can be appointed at two-and-twenty.

The emoluments of the presidents and the king's solicitors are, in proportion to the population and the importance of the towns, from 1,800 to 3,000 francs, except in Paris, where they have three times as much. It is the same with the judges, who are paid from 1,200 to 1,800 francs a-year. The judges are *inamovibles*; that is to say, they cannot be dismissed. The king's solicitors and his substitutes are subject to dismissal according to ministerial pleasure.

The observation I made with regard to the justices of the peace, apply to the courts of First Instance. No barrister of any talent and practice is desirous of a judgeship, the emoluments of which are considerably inferior to the profits of his profession, and in which he could display neither his legal acquirements nor his eloquence. The fact is, that most of these courts are recruited from the young advocates without any practice, who, two years after leaving the law schools and obtaining their licence, solicit the government to obtain an appointment of substitute to the king's solicitor, or of supplementary judge. But the *sine qua non* to succeed, is to belong to the ministerial party, and to abjure all liberal opinions.

One may easily conceive that courts of justice thus organised and composed do not enjoy any great consideration. A

judge is but a poor personage even in a poor country town. The president himself is not regarded when out of his judicial seat. The only member of the tribunal who has a sort of rank in society is the *procureur du roi*, the king's solicitor, because this magistrate is the head of the police in the *arrondissement*, and has the power to arrest, imprison, and detain any citizen who has not the good fortune of agreeing with him in law or in politics. They are generally chosen on account of their violent party feelings, and, as they are subject to dismissal, are at all times ready to do anything that may be desired of them, and often overstep the commands of their master.

The impartiality of the judges, even in civil cases, cannot be relied upon. Politics always interfere in some way. The judge in a small town, with a salary of 1,200 francs a-year, is desirous of being translated to another seat of 1,500 francs; then he wishes for another with 1,800 francs; and then he looks for a seat in a royal court; and all this cannot be obtained but by rendering good offices generally contrary to justice.

There are 361 courts of First Instance. The total number of the judges, king's solicitors, substitutes, and remembrancers, is about 4,300, and the total of their emoluments is above 5,555,000 francs.

There are eighty-six courts of Assize in France. They are composed of two of the judges of the court of First Instance of the town, presided over by a councillor of the Royal Court of the department. These courts have about 250 officers, and the salaries are 154,400 francs.

The Royal Courts, courts of appeal from the courts of First Instance, are composed of at least twenty-four judges, called *conseillers* (councillors), including the president. These courts are divided into three or more chambers, each chamber having a president, and the whole court a first

president. There are an attorney-general, a substitute, and as many solicitors-general as there are chambers; a remembrancer (*greffier*) in chief, and an assistant-remembrancer, for every chamber. Councillors of the Royal Courts must be twenty-seven years of age, and have attended the bar for two years. Attorneys-general must be above thirty.

The councillors of the Royal Courts are taken, in great part, from the courts of First Instance; but many amongst them are appointed without having passed through that ordeal, and by special favour of the minister, at the solicitation of ministerial deputies, and as a reward for their votes. So that the judges of these courts of appeal are either the former presidents or the King's solicitors of the courts of First Instance, who have been promoted for their misdeeds; or young members of the bar, of good families, with a small income, and desirous of judicial honours without the trouble and *ennui* of preparing for their functions by exercising them in the humble capacity of judges of First Instance. The Restoration had intended those judgeships for the sons of the nobility, who were, if I may so say, apprenticed, under the title of *conseillers auditeurs*. Since the revolution of July, this practice has been abandoned, and no new councillors' auditors have been appointed.

For many of the councillors, there is no chance of arriving at the presidency of a chamber, or the first presidency of the court; and therefore they might be inclined to become independent and impartial judges. To guard against that danger, the government has, in its usual way, established a graduation, not in the rank, but in the salaries of the councillors of the Royal Courts. In some, the councillors are paid 2,400 francs a-year; in others, 3,000 and 3,600 francs; so that a councillor of a Royal Court, as the court of Pau, is induced to support any measure and any

member of the government, by the hope of being removed to the court of Toulouse, and then to the Royal Court of Lyons, and finally to that of Paris.

There are twenty-seven Royal Courts in France. The total number of the presidents, attorneys-general, solicitors-general, substitutes, councillors, remembrancers, and their assistants, is about 1,100, and the emoluments amount altogether to 4,300,000 francs a-year.

At the head of all these courts is the court of Cassation. This supreme court of appeal from the judgments of all the other courts, is composed of one first president, three presidents, and forty-five councillors, an attorney-general, six solicitors-general, a chief remembrancer, and four sub-remembrancers. Total, sixty-one members, who receive altogether 793,300 francs a-year.

This court, under Napoleon, was an assemblage of the most celebrated jurisconsults of France; and it must be admitted, that political opinions never influenced his appointments; his enemies even were chosen by him for those eminent functions.

But, since the Restoration, this court has been the refuge of all the political adherents of all the successive ministers who appointed them; as if to remunerate their apostacy and their violence. It is now worse than it ever was. There are no other qualifications than the hatred of liberal principles, the prosecution of the public press, as attorney-general, and the support of any ministerial measures as a deputy. Isambert is the only member of that court, honest and consistent in his principles, and worthy of his situation, by his truly astonishing knowledge of the laws. But, had not that reward of his long services been granted a short time after the revolution of July, he would never have obtained the dignity from the government since the ministry of Dupont de l'Eure.

The court of Accounts, although a financial court, is under the control of the minister of justice. This court is composed of a first president, three presidents, eighteen master councillors (*conseillers maitres*), eighteen reference councillors of the first class, and sixty-two reference councillors (*conseillers référendaires*) of the second class, with an attorney-general, a remembrancer, and three assistant remembrancers. These 107 officials cost the country 900,000 francs.

The Council of State is the last of the institutions under the ministry of justice. This council is somewhat like the privy council in England, except that its members are subject to dismissal entirely at the pleasure of the ministry, and that they have a sort of judicial authority in all cases in which the state or the government's officials have any interest. Thus, if a prefect or sub-prefect, a mayor, or any official, has, in the exercise of his functions, injured a citizen in his person or in his property, they cannot be sued in any court of law, without previously obtaining the authorisation of the Council of State. In any law-suit, when the communal or domanial administration, or any of the ministerial departments are interested, the courts of justice are declared incompetent, and the Council of State alone adjudicates on the case. The ministers are then both judges and parties.

The councillors of state are ordinary, extraordinary, and honorary; and the number is about one hundred. These, with about eighty masters of requests, in ordinary and extraordinary service, and about eighty auditors of the first and second classes, compose the Council of State. Total, 260; and the cost, 468,000 francs.

The central administration of this ministry, the *bureaux*, costs 524,000 francs; the number of the *employés* being about 130.

Let us now recapitulate the number of the official agents of this administration and the emoluments.

	Employés.	Francs.
Justices of the peace	9,000	3,103,200
Courts of First Instance	4,300	5,555,000
Royal Courts	1,100	4,300,000
Court of Cassation.....	61	793,300
Court of Accounts.....	107	900,000
Council of State	260	468,000
Ministerial <i>bureaux</i>	130	524,000
	—————	—————
Total	14,958	15,643,500

To these regular officials must be added a numerous class of professional men, who, although they are not paid by the treasury, are equally, if not more, dependent on the minister who appoints them. I now come to that class designated by the title of public and ministerial officials, and comprising the notaries, the solicitors (*avoués*), the appraisers, and the ushers.

The transfer of property, the agreements between parties, marriage settlements, powers of attorney, any contract whatsoever, must be executed by notaries. Their number is determined by law, and by ministerial caprice. There cannot be fewer than two, nor more than five notaries in every canton. In towns, where the population is above 100,000 inhabitants, there is, or may be, a notary for every six hundred. They are all appointed, but not paid, by the government. They give security, a very inefficient one, and are allowed to sell their offices, and to recommend their successors to the choice of the minister of justice, who can admit or reject them.

The number of the notaries in France is above 7,500, who, with an equal number of head clerks, aspiring to the offices of their employers, are interested in supporting the ministry, as the only means of profiting by the sale and purchase of their functions.

The *avoués* (solicitors) practising in the Royal Courts and the courts of First Instance, the ushers, and the appraisers, are similarly appointed; and, their number being very limited, it is easy to conceive that they are the most subservient of all the ministerial officials.

The number of the solicitors is about . . .	2,500
The ushers	5,500
The appraisers	720
The notaries	7,500
Total	16,220

Which number, added to the 14,058 judicial functionaries, makes the contingent of the ministry of justice to the administrative army amount to 30,278 *employés*.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORSHIP.

The minister of justice is at the same time the minister of public worship; and the ministerial *bureaux*, comprising fifty-six *employés*, cost 145,000 francs.

The Catholic worship being, though not, according to the Charter, the religion of the state, (the state having no religion,) yet that of the majority of the French nation, we must give it the first place in our observations.

There are thirteen archbishops and sixty-six bishops in France. They are appointed by the King; and, after having received the papal confirmation, take the oath to the King before being installed into their respective bishoprics. The

salary of the archbishops is 15,000 francs (600*l.*) a-year, except the archbishop of Paris, and the two or three of them that are cardinals, who receive 25,000 francs (1000*l.*) a-year. The salary of a bishop is 10,000 francs (400*l.*) a-year. I beg leave to recommend this fact to the attentive meditations of the dignitaries of the established church of England.

The archbishops and bishops have each three or two vicars-general, and eight or ten canons in their cathedrals. The emoluments of the metropolitan vicars-general are 3,000 francs (120*l.*) a-year; and the others receive 2,000 francs (80*l.*). The canons, in Paris, have 2,400 francs (96*l.*); in the other cathedrals, they have but 1,500 francs (60*l.*).

This part of the Catholic establishment, which is its staff, comprising the 79 archbishops and bishops, 172 vicars-general, and 694 canons, annually costs 1,386,400 francs. The bishops and archbishops appoint their vicars-general and the canons; but the appointment of the former must be approved by the King.

We now come to the working clergy, who are divided into two classes; the *curés* (answering nearly to English rectors), and the *desservants*. There is one, and sometimes, according to the extent and the population of the canton, two *curés* for every canton. The duties in all the other parishes are performed by clergymen, called *desservants*, who are under the control of the *curés* of their respective cantons: these are themselves under the control of the *curé* of the chief town of the arrondissement, who has the title of archdeacon, or archpriest, according to the pleasure of the bishops.

The number of cures or benefices in France is 3,263. They are divided into two classes. In the first class, the emoluments are 1,500 francs; in the second, 1,200 francs

a-year. When a *curé*, of either class, is above seventy years of age, he has 100 francs more.

Every *curé* has one, two, or three vicars, according to the extent and population of the parish, to assist him in his religious duties: the fixed salaries of these vicars is 350 francs (14*l.*) a-year.

The *curés* are appointed by the bishop, but with the approbation of the King. They cannot be dismissed, although they may be interdicted from their functions. The vicar is also appointed by the bishop, but can be removed at pleasure.

The 837 *curés* of the first class, and the 2,426 *curés* of the second class, with 6,212 vicars (9,475 priests), cost 5,900,000 francs (236,000*l.*) a-year.

The *desservants* are appointed by the bishops, and can be dismissed by them. Their fixed emoluments are 800 francs (32*l.*) a-year; but when they are between sixty and seventy years of age, they have 100 francs a-year more; and when above seventy, 200 francs. The number of *desservants* in France is 25,472; and the total of their salaries is about 20,000,000 francs a-year.

The bishops have, in their respective dioceses, ecclesiastical seminaries for the candidates for the priesthood. Most of the candidates are of very poor families, and the government pays, for the maintenance of about 3,500 of them, about 1,000,000 of francs a-year.

Besides providing the salaries of the Catholic clergy, the state takes charge of the expenses incurred for the repairing of the cathedrals, episcopal buildings, and seminaries: the amount is about 1,600,000 francs a-year. The archbishops and bishops, besides their emoluments, annually receive an allowance for their diocesan visits, of about 1,500 francs (60*l.*)

The total number of the regular Catholic clergy is about

40,000; and the total cost of the establishment is about 33,000,000 of francs.

The *Cultes Non-Catholiques* (such is the legal and administrative denomination for the Protestants and Israelites) are also maintained by the state. Except the appointment by the government of a few dignitaries in the Lutheran or Calvinist churches, the ministers enjoy a greater share of freedom than the Catholic clergy.

The Calvinist establishment in France is composed of 365 *pasteurs*, whose emoluments vary from 1,200 francs to 3,000 francs a-year. The Lutheran church has about 250 clergymen, who are paid at the same rate as the Calvinist. The expenses of repairing the churches, and of the ecclesiastical seminaries, amount to 130,000 francs a-year. The total expenditure for the two *cultes* is about 900,000 francs.

Neither the Lutherans nor the Calvinists of France have adopted the episcopal regime. The presidents of the general consistory are the heads of their churches. They have under them inspectors and sub-inspectors, and local consistories or synods. The deliberations of the synods or consistories, on matters of doctrine or discipline, cannot be carried into execution without being first approved by the minister. The pastors are elected by the local consistories, subject to the approbation of the government.

The *culte* Israelite has one grand rabbin, the president of the general consistory in Paris; seven grand rabbins, presidents of local consistories; seven ministers, and about ninety communal rabbins. There is a central rabbinical school maintained by the state. The official estimates for the Israelitish *culte* are 80,000 francs (3,200*l.*) a-year.

The other religious persuasions, or sects, although acknowledged, are not supported by the state. The number of those sectarians being very small, they are left to them-

selves, and manage their religious concerns as they please, but subject to the surveillance of the police.

Our readers will, probably, wonder at the enormous difference between the budgets of the Catholic clergy and those of the non-catholic pastors. This may be accounted for by the still greater difference in the character of the clergymen of those persuasions. The Protestant clergymen are generally gentlemen of respectable families and good education; and most of them profess very liberal opinions. The government cannot expect from such men that servile disposition so characteristic of the French Catholic clergy; and, therefore, it shows a great parsimony in the distribution of its favours. Had they admitted of a hierarchy similar to that of the Catholic church, an archbishop, two or three bishops, vicars general, &c., &c., then the government, exercising, through those dignitaries, all power over their establishment, would have done a great deal more to promote the propagation of Protestantism.

The Catholic hierarchy is certainly the best adapted to the support of political or religious despotism. Twenty-six thousand parish priests, subject to dismissal at the will of bishops appointed by the minister, and 10,000 more, who can be suspended from their offices, must always be ready to comply with any order from their superiors, not in religious matters only, but also in civil and political affairs.

Such was the case during the reign of Charles X. Then the alliance between the church and the state was complete; the church being the governing power, and the ministers of the crown being but the tools of the fanatical party which surrounded the bigoted monarch. The priests, at that time, acted as informers. They reported to their superiors the conduct of their parishioners with regard to their attendance at church. They denounced the mayors, the assistant-mayors, or any public officer, for not-confessing,

and had them dismissed. They had their lists of marked men; and frequently these lists have caused the arrest of the inscribed parties: at the same time, nothing could be obtained from the government but by persons belonging to their congregations, and certificates of confession were required from the applicants for any public office.

The Revolution of July, which was, in great part, caused by that religious despotism, put an end to it. The clergy have, since that event, manifested their hatred of the new government. Most of the archbishops and bishops have not acknowledged Louis Philippe as king. The late archbishop of Paris, M. De Quélen, had set the example; and even now, in a great many churches of France, no prayers are offered for the King. But the decease of the archbishops and bishops appointed by Charles X. enables the government to change the dispositions of the clergy by the nomination to the vacant seats of staunch partisans of the present dynasty; and, in the course of a few years, all the head priests of the Catholic church will be as devoted to the present government as they were to the preceding one. The minister of justice will then have the absolute command of a clerical militia, amounting to 40,000 men, in addition to his 30,000 judicial officers.

CHAPTER IV.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

THE imperial decrees of 1806, 1808, and 1811, organizing the Imperial University, and framed in that spirit of despotism so characteristic of their author, had been maintained in force during the Restoration; the only change made in their application being the substitution of a clerical direc-

tion for the military system which had been established in all the schools. But since the Revolution of July, M. Guizot, who has been twice minister for that department, has introduced another alteration, and the bigotry of the Restoration is now transformed into an absolute doctrinarian servilism.

The minister, or, as he is still styled, grand master, (and he is a grand master indeed,) has a general staff, composed of eight councillors and fourteen general inspectors. The emoluments of the councillors are 10,000 francs a-year; the general inspectors have a fixed salary of 6,000 francs, besides their travelling expenses. The ministerial *bureaux*, composed of eighty-seven clerks of all grades, cost annually 273,000 francs.

The university is divided into academies. These academies, twenty-seven in number, are established in the same towns with the Royal Courts. At the head of each academy is a rector, with two inspectors, or, in some cases, three, and even four. The rectors receive 6,000 francs a-year, and the inspectors 3,000, besides their travelling expenses. Besides those inspectors of academies, there are eighty-seven inspectors of primary schools, (*écoles primaires*), with a salary of 1,500, 1,800, or 2,000 francs a-year. The total amount of salaries of these 200 superior officers of the academies, with their clerks, is 819,900 francs. So that 1,100,000 francs are expended in maintaining the *état major* of the French university.

The royal colleges are under the immediate control of the rectors and the inspectors of their respective academies, to whom the censors and provisors are obliged to make weekly reports on all matters concerning either the pupils or the professors.

The number of secondary schools or communal colleges in France is about 460. The salaries of the professors are

from 600 to 1,500 francs. The directors' emoluments are from 1,200 to 2,000 francs. The total number of these *employés* is about 3,900, who receive 4,600,000 francs. These secondary schools, like the royal colleges, are under the control of the academic rector.

It is impossible to ascertain the number of ministerial primary schools in France. It is not more than 9,000; and their annual cost is about 3,500,000 francs.

All the professors and teachers of the schools, colleges, and faculties, as well as the censors, provisors, inspectors, and rectors, are appointed by the minister of public instruction, and can be suspended, removed from one place to another, or dismissed, according to ministerial pleasure. So that the 11,000 professors paid by the state are compelled to submit to the caprices of the government, either to obtain promotion, or to be maintained in their employment.

But, besides these public schools, there are, in France, about 800 private secondary schools, and 12,000 primary schools, which, although they are private speculations, are as much at the mercy of the minister, and perhaps more so, than the public schools. These private schools cannot be established without a licence from the minister, and they can be shut up by a simple ministerial order, on the denunciation (often an anonymous one) of a rival in the same line. This frequently happens; and the head of such an establishment cannot entertain liberal opinions, express them, or vote in their support at the elections, without exposing himself to complete ruin.

The instruction is divided into four classes: the primary schools, where reading, writing, and arithmetic are taught; the secondary schools, where the pupils learn the elements of Latin and Greek, and such schools are established in every chief town of arrondissements; the royal colleges,

where the study of the Latin and Greek languages, and of mathematics, is finished; and the academic schools, for what they call *études supérieures*, preparatory to taking degrees.

The academic studies are distinguished by the denomination of faculties. There are five faculties, the *belles lettres*, the sciences, law, theology, and medicine. The faculty of medicine is established in three academies only; the faculty of theology in eight; and that of law in nine of the academies. The emoluments of the professors of these faculties vary from 2,600 francs to 6,000 francs, according to the population or importance of the towns. The number of the professors and substitutes, or assistants, is about 500; and the cost, according to the official account, is as follows:—

	Francs.
Fixed salaries and fees of the professors in the	
faculties of law	711,403
Ditto in the faculties of medicine	548,490
Ditto in the faculties of theology, letters, and	
sciences	598,700
Total of the expenditure of the superior studies,	1,858,593

The number of the royal colleges in France is forty-one. The principal officers of the colleges are—a *proviseur* (director), a censor, and an almoner. The number of professors and substitutes is not the same in all these colleges, and their emoluments vary from 1,200 francs to 2,600 francs. It appears, from the official estimates, that the salaries of the provisors, censors, and professors, about 1,000 individuals, amount to 980,100 francs.

At the head of all the schools is the normal school of Paris, where young men, having completed the course of their studies in the royal colleges, and wishing to enter upon the career of public instruction, receive a complement

of education at the expense of the state, when, after examination, they are admitted. This school, very different from that intended by Napoleon, when he established it by his decree of March, 1808, is now nothing more than a political job. There are sixty-five or seventy scholars, who cost about 60,000 francs, and they have twenty-six professors, masters, and directors, at an annual cost of 62,000 francs.

The Royal College of France, the most ancient, and certainly the best of all the literary institutions of France, is in some sort independent of the minister of public instruction, since he cannot deprive the professors of their emoluments. But they cannot obtain those situations but from ministerial favour; and some of them have had no other title but this to the appointment.

There is a part of the prerogative of the minister of public instruction, which is particularly calculated to establish and extend his influence, and of which M. Guizot has made large use. In all the royal colleges there are foundations (*bourses*), paid either by the state or by the departments, for the education of children of poor families, who are admitted on the appointment of the minister. Some of these *bourses* are for the whole amount of the charge of the boarding and instruction, some for three-fourths, and some for the half of it. The number of these foundations is about 2,000. M. Guizot, and after him his successors, have, generally, disposed of them in favour of electors, or of deputies of their party. You will find that more than 200 deputies have their sons and nephews so educated at the public expense. The total amount of these foundations is 600,000 francs.

The total expenditure of the ministry of public instruction is 13,000,000 francs; and the number of persons dependent upon the goodwill of the minister for their subsistence is altogether at least 25,000.

As to the system of education, it is entirely determined by the minister. The private secondary schools are obliged not only to submit to that system, but, in every town where there is a royal college, to send their pupils to the college, to attend the lessons of the professors; and they pay a subscription to the university, even when, on account of the distance of the royal college, they are exempted from sending their pupils. The books used in the course of the studies must be approved of by the minister, as well as those that the young men are allowed to read in their leisure hours. This enables the minister to patronise certain authors and booksellers, who generally bribe some influential member of the council to have their unsaleable books adopted by the university. Had it not been for this, the voluminous publications to which MM. Guizot and Cousin have affixed their names, with the addition of a preface, would have remained unknown. As a proof of the extent to which the minister for public instruction goes with regard to the patronage of his friends and supporters, I give you the amount of the sums actually paid for distributing such books; it is not less than 400,000 francs!

CHAPTER V.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS.

CANOVA, the celebrated sculptor, being in London in 1816, went one day, with a friend, to view the principal monuments of the metropolis. On arriving at Waterloo-bridge, he was so struck with that magnificent specimen of British engineering, that he exclaimed, "This is worthy of the government of a great nation!" "Oh!" replied his friend, "the government had nothing to do with it; it was

projected and built by private individuals, capitalists, and merchants." "What, then, does the government do," rejoined Canova, "if private individuals erect such stupendous monuments?" "You shall see it in a short time," answered his friend; and soon after he led Canova into St. James's Park; and, pointing to the Chinese wooden bridge thrown over the water, added, "This is one of the monuments erected by the government, with the people's money; and it is by no means the worst." Canova, who had expected to see a new wonder, said, with a sigh, "It would be better for the government to do nothing."

This observation might, with still more justice, be applied to the French government, with regard to the public works. Immense sums are squandered away every year, under pretence of building bridges, making or improving roads and canals; and there is no country where so little benefit is derived from so large an expenditure of public money. Yet they have here a minister of the public works, and a numerous and costly army of engineers of all grades, for planning and carrying on those works. Let us first enumerate that army, and the expenses it entails upon the country.

The minister and the ministerial *bureaux*, composed of sixty-nine clerks, of all ranks, receive about 300,000 francs a year. Then comes a general council of the *ponts et chaussées*, composed of seven general inspectors, with a salary of 13,500 francs each; a secretary of the council, with 8,000 francs a-year; and ten other subordinate officers. The total cost of the council is above 200,000 francs. After the general inspectors come the inspectors of divisions (*inspecteurs divisionnaires*), fourteen in number, with emoluments amounting to 10,500 francs; then 130 engineers, or chief directors, divided into three classes; and 300 ordinary engineers, and as many official foremen (*conducteurs*

des travaux); and the total of the fixed salaries of these engineers (750), is 2,900,000 francs; which sum is generally more than doubled by gratuities and allowances for travelling expenses.

There is a royal school of *ponts et chaussées*, recruited from the polytechnic school, and composed of about two dozen pupils, with a director, twelve professors, and two medical men. The official estimates for the school amount to 63,000 francs.

There is a director of the *ponts et chaussées* in every department, to superintend all the repairs or improvements of the roads or bridges of the department. Nothing can be done in any parochial or cantonal road, by anybody, even at his own expense, without the assent of the director, whatever may be the urgency of the case. Every director has two or three engineers in ordinary under his orders, residing in the chief towns of the arrondissements, and as many foremen (*conducteurs*) to direct the works in course of execution, and men regularly employed on the roads at a salary of 400 or 500 francs a-year, and called *cantonniers*. Their number is about 12,000.

Besides the departmental directors, there are others especially attached to the canals and to the rivers, for the purpose of rendering them navigable, or removing all the occasional obstacles to their navigation; with what success, will be seen in the third part of this work.

The mines are also in the department of the ministry for the public works; and, certainly, nothing can be worse managed than that part of the French administration. A general council of the mines, composed of ten members,—many general inspectors, thirty engineers in chief, divided into two classes; fifty-six ordinary engineers, also of first and second class; and a royal school, where fifteen pupils have

nine professors ; such is the *personnel* of that administration which costs annually more than 500,000 francs.

The mineral riches of the country are undeniable ; but, thanks to the absurd regulations and the meddling spirit of the administration, the mines are unproductive. Nobody can work a mine in his own estate, without the permission of the council ; and when, after years passed in soliciting for it, the permission is granted, or rather sold, then the mine must be worked according to the plans and under the direction of an official engineer. Many coal-pits would be opened, and would enable the iron-masters to reduce the price of their goods 100 francs per ton ; but the forest-owners and the administration are leagued together to oppose the working of those mines ; and France is tributary to all the world for coals, iron, copper, lead, and all kinds of mineral produce, which are found in abundance in all parts of her territory, but which she is not allowed to extract.

The harbours of France are also in the department of the minister of the public works ; and, as you may imagine, are much in the same condition as the roads, the canals, and the mines. It must be admitted, that the expenditure for these harbours is considerably less than that for the other part of the administration. Ten harbour captains, thirty harbour lieutenants, and one hundred harbour masters—in the whole, 140 officials, receiving altogether 150,000 francs, compose the harbour conservancy. The ordinary budget allows about 2,000,000 of francs a-year for the repairs of those harbours, a sum evidently insufficient ; but it is purposely done, as the maritime towns are thus compelled to court the ministerial good-will, to obtain supplementary credits. These additional sums granted to the towns amount to about 2,500,000 francs.

The light-houses employ about 300 officials, and cost annually 700,000 francs.

The total number of the official *employés* of the ministry for the public works is about 15,500; and the total of their salaries is not under 10,000,000 of francs. But this is only the smaller part of the ministerial patronage; millions are annually appropriated to the maintaining and repairs of the canals, and expended in alterations, and what they call improvements of the navigation, or in assisting the companies, when they can no longer keep their canals in good condition. So that the number of the persons depending on the ministry for the public works is more than 20,000; and the total amount of the annual expenditure is now 90,000,000 of francs!

Thank God that England has no such administration; no regiment of engineers educated at the expense of the country, and largely paid for doing nothing, or worse than nothing. For her private industry has done what the French government will never achieve. She has the very best roads that can be imagined; her canals so cleverly planned, so skilfully executed, are still the elements of her commercial prosperity. Her railways have now placed the remotest parts of the country at a few hours' distance one from another. And the working of her mines is 100 per cent. cheaper than those of France. Freedom has accomplished all this. But freedom, in France, is a dream.

CHAPTER VI.

MINISTRY OF TRADE AND AGRICULTURE.

ONE may probably imagine, that this ministry is somewhat similar to our board of trade. Allow me, kind reader,

to tell you, that our board of trade is a mere nothing compared to the French institution ;—

“ Verum hæc tantum alias inter caput extulit *boardes*,
Quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi.”

There they have a minister, with 100,000 francs a-year ; 100 clerks, at the annual cost of 300,000 francs ; a superior council of trade, composed of ten peers, eight deputies, four superior *employés* in the other ministries, two bankers, and only *two merchants* ; a general council of agriculture, similarly composed, comprising *three amateur agriculturists only* out of twenty-nine members ; a general council of trade, elected by the chambers of commerce, and reckoning fifty-four members ; a general council of manufactures, twenty members of which are elected by the consultative chambers of arts and manufactures, the other forty being nominated by the minister ; a council and committee of arts and manufactures, fourteen members, appointed by the same minister, *one of them only being a manufacturer* ; and last, a council of *perfectionnement*, of nine members chosen by the government. There is also a permanent commission of ten members for the registry of blood-horses ; and a superior council of health, of twenty-two councillors, three of them only being physicians !

Afterwards, we have general directors, general inspectors, ordinary directors and inspectors, a conservatory of arts and trades, three schools for arts and trades, in which 420 young men are educated at the expense of the state, two normal farms, three veterinary schools, three royal sheepfolds, four royal studs, and sixteen stallion dépôts. Now, good reader, what is our paltry board of trade to this wonderful governmental establishment ?

I am aware that our farmers, our manufacturers, and merchants will ask, what benefits French agriculture and trade derive from all these institutions, and what all these

councillors and other officials do to promote the prosperity of the country? In answer to these questions, I beg to say, that the preposterous mania of valuing offices by their usefulness, or of assigning duties to placemen, has long been done away with in France. Such notions might be entertained by the Constituent Assembly half a century ago; but governmental science has since made wonderful progress; and it is now generally admitted, that public offices are to be established only for the benefit of public officers; and that the sole qualifications for those offices are—to be in want of them, and to make oneself agreeable to the minister. As to the computation of the profits accruing from such institutions, that may suit a nation of shopkeepers, and it forms naturally a portion of their national prejudices; but it is beneath the notice of a grand and generous people; nay, for such a people, the greater the loss, the better the thing.

For example, I will take the studs establishment (*les haras*). I well remember, that, two years ago, when the untoward treaty of July stirred up the warlike inclinations of the French, it was found out, that their cavalry and artillery could be of little use for want of 20,000 horses, and that these could not be procured but from England and Germany, at a cost of 12,000,000 of francs. This, of course, was not the fault of the government, as is fully proved by the following official return of the expenditure incurred for promoting horse-breeding:—

	Francs.
1. Four general inspectors, a general secretary, a general commissioner for the <i>remontes</i> (buying new horses), and the ordinary inspectors, salaries, and extra expenses	100,000
2. Twenty directors of studs and dépôts of stallions, fifty clerks, and 180 grooms, salaries and wages	380,000

	Francs.
3. Keeping of 1,260 stallions and mares, costs for the year	1,125,000
4. Extra expenses, saddlery, shoeing, &c. .	200,000
Total	<u>1,805,000</u>

The receipts were—	Francs.
For the sale of horses	28,500
Ditto dung	12,200
From the stallions	155,600
Total	<u>196,300</u>

From this account, the completeness of which reflects great credit on the French accountants, it results, that the annual loss to the government, or, as they say, the yearly expenditure for promoting horse-breeding, is 1,511,500 francs.

To this expenditure we must add 550,000 francs for a general inspector, three directors, and about 600 professors, *employés*, and pupils of three veterinary schools, established at Alfort near Paris, at Lyons, and at Toulouse; 120 of the scholars being maintained at the expense of the state. From these schools emanate every year 100 veterinary geniuses; who, under ministerial patronage, and with a ministerial brevet, watch for the safety, and relieve the sufferings, of the equine race.

Is it not evident, then, that, if the government is compelled to buy horses for the artillery and cavalry in Germany, or in England, it is the fault of the people?

The case is the same with regard to sheep-breeding. The three royal shepherds at Rambouillet, Perpignan, and Lahayeveux, with their under-shepherds, cost 40,000 francs a-year. The total expenditure for the three establishments, is 100,000 francs; to which must be added, the emoluments of an inspector-general, 8,000 francs; agronomic missions

in France and other countries, 25,000 francs ; and the purchasing of sheep to varied amounts.

The normal farms, at which the government maintains some pupils, destined to be professors of agriculture, cost about 25,000 francs a-year. 19,000 francs were expended in 1837, in buying books of agriculture. 13,000 francs a-year are granted to the Royal Central Society of Agriculture ; and 12,000 francs for lessons on agriculture, delivered at the Royal Conservatory of Arts *et Métiers* (mechanics), where they have not even a garden ! As the last protection to agriculture, I must mention 150,000 francs distributed amongst sixty-four departmental societies of agriculture.

At the head of the establishments for promoting manufactures, is the before-mentioned Conservatory of Arts and Mechanics, with a director, nine professors, two librarians, and about fifteen *employés* ; the total expenditure is 75,000 francs. The two Schools of Arts and Mechanics, at Chalons and at Angers, cost 320,000 francs a-year. With so many schools and professors, one cannot but expect the most useful improvements in the industry of the country. So does the government ; and, in order to reward the authors of these improvements, it has established a general exhibition for their productions, which takes place every four years ; and which occasions an expenditure of 1,200,000 francs, for temporary buildings, and gold, silver, and bronze medals, to be granted to industrious *chef d'œuvres* in mechanics or manufactures. The mere printing of the report of the adjudicators on the exhibition of 1839, cost about 20,000 francs.

I am inclined to think that our manufacturers and mechanics must feel dreadfully anxious about the results of such magnificent encouragements. It is true, that, as yet, they have not produced anything worthy of high com-

mendation; but there is no doubt that they will soon wrest from England that monopoly of industry of which she is so justly proud. So says the Minister of Trade every year, and so say the French people. In expectation of that victory, and to forward it, rewards and honours have been bestowed beforehand. Two or three thousand manufacturers, mechanics, and merchants, have been made knights of the legion of honour. One can hardly walk into a workshop without being apprised by the red ribbon, that he has the gratification of beholding a *chevalier*. Can the humble English manufacturers and commercial men contend long against rivals so highly patronised?

So much being done for the manufactures and home-trade of the country, one will naturally inquire about the encouragement granted to foreign and transmarine trade; that is to say, to the export of the home-manufactured goods or natural products. The encouragements are of two kinds. The first is the granting of bonuses (*primes*) to ship-owners and exporters; but the system appears only to be in its beginning, and is now limited to the cod and whale fisheries. It is, however, applied on a very expensive scale. I find in the budget of the Minister of Commerce, the following items:—

	Francs.	Cents.
For the fitting of ships for cod-fisheries .	456,550	
<i>Primes</i> for the export to French colonies	2,344,971	12
<i>Primes</i> for the export to foreign countries	285,334	68
<i>Primes</i> for imports to France	34,515	
<i>Primes</i> for fitting up ships for whale fisheries in the South Sea	739,101	15
<i>Primes</i> for their import into France . .	238,646	97
Total	4,099,218	92

There remains a part of the administration of commerce with which I consider it most proper to conclude my observations. I was at first rather puzzled when I found a board of health and the watering-places under the superintendence of this ministry; but I am now perfectly reconciled to the system. An administration so well organized and conducted, very properly anticipated, that anxiety, distress, illness, and taking the waters of the spas, would be the consequence. Thus, there is a superior council of health, with about 150 inspectors of mineral waters, and I do not know how many directors.

The total of the *employés* or dependents of this ministry is about 12,000, and the expenditure is nearly 12,000,000 of francs.

CHAPTER VII.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE.

THE ministry of finance is the leviathan of the ministries. It comprehends all the branches of public revenue, all the various establishments for the assessment, the collection, and the expenditure of the taxes and duties of all sorts. The multiplicity of its branches, the division and subdivision of those branches, the classification and number of its *employés*, and the amount of their emoluments, are beyond any thing that one could imagine, even after having attentively observed the organization and the working of the other administrations; and the main difficulty I have to contend with, in my present attempt to expose the organization of this department, is the complexity, the intricacy of its different parts, and the very unsatisfactory returns, the purposely garbled accounts, annually presented to the cham-

bers by the ministers of finance. I, however, will endeavour to give a clear and accurate notion of this colossal establishment, if not in the official order, at least in a more natural and intelligible manner; and, for this purpose, I must first consider the sources of the revenue, next their collection (*perception*), and then their expenditure.

The sources of the revenue are, the *contributions directes* (assessed taxes), the *contributions indirectes* (excise), the manufacture (monopoly) of tobacco and snuff, the stamp and registry duties, and national *domaines*, the national forests, the customs, and the post-office. Some of these sources of revenue, I ought rather to say their management, are under the absolute direction of the minister of finance; but others are in some sort independent of him in their administration, except with regard to the payment of their proceeds. Thus, the customs duties are proposed to the chamber by the minister of trade and manufactures; and, when they are authorised by law, orders to levy them are issued by the same minister to the customs officers; and, although these officers are appointed by the minister of finance, it is plain that this minister cannot be answerable either for the amount of duty imposed, or for the mode of its collection.

The case is the same with regard to the post-office, although it cannot be so satisfactorily explained, or so plainly admitted, by the government; but the fact is, that, although a branch of the ministry of finance, so far as regards the accounts of money received and paid, the post-office is neither under the direction of that minister, nor managed by a director of his own choice, and according to regulations issued by him. I give this explanation, on account of the circumstance of a British courier being put on his trial and fined for unlawfully carrying despatches for the newspapers.

I will now successively expose those general administrations ; and I begin with the general direction of the post-office.

CHAPTER VIII.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE POST-OFFICE.

THE post-office in France has never been considered as a ministerial office dependent upon the minister of finance. The director has always been chosen for other purposes than for superintending the carriage and delivery of correspondence. Under Napoleon, during the Restoration, and since the Revolution of July, the principal duty of the director-general has been to discover and intercept seditious and revolutionary correspondence. The direction was and is under the control of the general police, and the private police of the head of the government, which they now designate *police du chateau*. M. Comte, the present director-general, is the man of the chateau ; and he gives so much satisfaction, that all the ministerial revolutions leave him undisturbed in the possession of his highly remunerated office, which he has held since the Revolution of July, and in which he rules in the most absolute manner.

Let us see now what that administration is. The director-general is a sort of minister ; he has under him two assistant general directors, a private secretariat, a general secretariat ; and his bureaux, twenty-four in number, are directed by seven chiefs of division, employ 228 clerks, and cost about 650,000 francs.

Then there are general inspectors, divisionary inspectors, and common inspectors ; and afterwards, we have the directors and the postmasters.

There is at least one post-office director in every canton ; and, in some cantons, there are two or three, or more,

according to their extent and the population. The salaries are also proportionate to the population, and vary from 600 francs a-year to 4,000 francs. The total number of directors or directrices of the post-office is above 4,000. The letter-carriers or postmen are about 9,000, who are paid from 300 to 1,000 francs a-year.

The post-office directors or directrices attend to the reception of the letters to be forwarded or delivered. The greater number of these places are filled by ladies, most of them young, some even under age. I know of some instances in which these employments have been granted, very deservedly, to young daughters of military or civil officers, who had been left unprovided for at the death of their parents. Thus, the eldest daughter of Lieutenant-General Guyot, grand cross of the legion of honour, has obtained a small bureau, with the profits of which she maintains her younger sisters; but I am sorry to say, many of those offices are granted to ladies of a very different character. This, unfortunately, is one of the seductions made use of by the government, not in the post-office only, but also in the stamp-office, and the tobacco and snuff administration.*

All the directors of the post offices can be removed or dismissed by the director-general; they can also be promoted to superior and more productive bureaux: but it has been observed, that political subserviency has always the best chance of promotion.

The postmasters are also appointed by the director-general. They alone have a right to supply horses for travellers. It is a complete monopoly. Some of the proprietors of

* Peers, deputies, prefects, and other high officials are enabled to reward the favours received from amiable ladies, and to get rid of them when they feel the want of change. More than 2,000 courtezans are thus provided for in those three administrations; and their children are educated in the royal colleges, at the expense of the country.

diligences (stages) cannot use their own or other horses, except with the assent of the postmasters, and on paying a large proportion of their receipts. The number of the postmasters is about 2,300, and their profits are very large; they are also subject to be deprived of their brevet, at the pleasure of the director-general; who can, besides, on the retirement of a postmaster, refuse to appoint the person the postmaster presents as his successor, and to whom he has sold his stock and the *materiel* of his establishment.

The mail couriers and guards are also appointed by the director-general, and are subject to dismissal, not only for any transgression or impropriety of conduct, which is a very uncommon occurrence, but also for political offences, such as being tainted with liberalism, and not voting at the elections for the government candidates. The number of these appointments is about 130, with about fifty supernumeraries. Their emoluments are not very considerable, (about 2,000 francs a-year,) but the perquisites more than double the amount; and these places are so much sought after, that the permanent list of candidates contains not less than 300 names.

The post-office packet-boats, which are built and managed by the administration, are much more expensive than if the service was done by contractors; but this is more than compensated, not to the public, but to the director-general, by an increase of patronage and authority. A contractor subject to fits of political independence, cannot be instantly dismissed; and, therefore, the system of contracts is never adopted by the French administration, except when it is absolutely impossible to avoid it.

Such is the administration of the post-office in France. The total number of the officials of all ranks is about 18,000; the expenditure, 22,000,000 of francs; and the profits of the

administration range between 16,000,000 and 17,000,000 a-year.

CHAPTER IX.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CUSTOMS.

A TREATY of commerce with France has been on the *tapis* for the last twelve years. The British government have spared neither expense nor labour, and even now are again engaged in negotiations, to put the commercial relations of the two countries on an equitable footing, which would greatly benefit them both. In this undertaking they will not and cannot succeed, because the matter in question, with regard to France, is misunderstood by the English ministers, who consider only the advantages which the adjustment of the commercial differences would confer on the community at large, and completely lose sight of the injury it would inflict on the French government.

In fact, the question is not, what will the people gain by the reduction of the tariff, by a removal of pretended protective duties, or by the dereliction of differential duties? which measures would at once withdraw all inducements to smuggling; but, what would the government lose in power and influence by the diminution of the receipts, and the reduction of the customs establishment, consequent upon the adoption of a new system? In order to enable my readers to resolve this important question, I proceed to the enumeration of the officers of the customs, and of their emoluments.

The head quarters at Paris, *l'administration centrale*, consists of one director-general, with a salary of 20,000 francs; four under-directors, at 12,000 francs each; twenty-eight chiefs and sub-chiefs of bureaux, receiving from 4,000

to 9,000 francs a-year; and, at the least, 100 clerks and *employés*, with salaries of from 800 to 3,500 francs. The total cost of the central administration, comprising 133 officials, is 400,000 francs.

Then comes the departmental administration, divided into two branches; the administrative service and the active service; the *bureaucratic* and the executive.

The frontiers of France are divided into twenty-four directions of the customs, and there are besides two directions in the interior.

ADMINISTRATION SERVICE.

	Francs.
The 26 directors receive altogether	260,000
84 divisionary and sedentary inspectors	420,000
90 sub-inspectors	285,000
150 clerks employed in the directors' office	260,000
122 principal receivers of the customs	400,000
650 visiting and searching officers	1,010,000
880 local receivers	1,080,000
40 commissioners, surveyors of the navigation	9,000
36 controllers in the <i>entrepôts</i>	99,000
Total—2,078 <i>employés</i>	3,906,000

ACTIVE SERVICE.

260 captains of brigades, controllers	540,000
140 principal lieutenants, and 350 lieutenants of the second class	520,000
640 brigadiers and sub-brigadiers of mounted and moveable brigades	535,000
1,960 men, forming the mounted and moveable brigades	1,440,000
4,950 brigadiers and sub-brigadiers of foot and stationary brigades	3,430,000

	Francs.
15,500 men, composing those brigades . . .	9,850,000
24 captains and lieutenants, and 360 masters and assistant masters of cruising boats . . .	390,000
1,200 sailors	760,000
Total—25,384 <i>employés</i> . . .	17,465,000

To this expenditure must be added 1,500,000 of francs, for the *materiel* of the administration, building, repairs, packing, and carriage expenses, printing and stationery, and travelling expenses of the inspectors; besides 500,000 francs for gratuities, and (still according to official estimates) 500,000 francs more for *secours* to disabled and otherwise incapacitated customs officers, to whom the retirement pension cannot be granted on account of want of funds.

Thus, the administration of the customs employs altogether 27,595 officials, at an expense of 24,571,000 francs. With this immense establishment, the yearly receipts of the customs are about 111,000,000 francs, and the value of the goods annually seized averages between 600,000 and 700,000 francs.

The administration of the customs has the monopoly of the salt trade; but, although the income derived from that monopoly is 56,000,000 francs a-year, the number of *employés* is only 800, and the salaries about 1,500,000 francs. This is certainly the most economical of all the French administrations. But it weighs on the poor people, who can hardly afford to pay for salting their meat. And such is the severity of the customs regulations, that, on the sea-shore, the taking of a bucket of sea water is prohibited and punished by fine and imprisonment.

There is, besides the government customs establishment,

a sort of local customs administration, called *octrois*, imposing duties on the several articles introduced in the territories of the cities, towns, and boroughs ; which duties are generally the only revenue of those places. Wines, brandy, cider, beer, bullocks, cows, calves, pigs ; in fact, provisions of all kinds are subject to that duty, which rises in proportion, not to the value of the goods, but to the population ; and, consequently, to the wants of the localities. The annual income derived from the *octrois* of Paris is about 40,000,000 of francs, more than the half of which is imposed upon wines, not according to the quality and value, but to the quantity. A good Burgundy *vin ordinaire*, which costs about thirty-six francs the hectolitre, pays a duty of forty francs ; the vinegar grown in the neighbourhood of Paris, and misnamed wine, pays the same ; as well as the most exquisite wines of Champagne, Languedoc, and Burgundy. So that the poorer class of the population of Paris come in for three-fourths in the payment of that duty.

The amount of the *octrois* for the whole of France, is not under 100,000,000 of francs. Although raised for the benefit of the towns, the receivers, directors, and *employés* are nominated by the government ; and the number of these officials is about 3,000. They are assisted in the service by the *employés* of the customs and the indirect taxes. The cost is about 9,000,000 of francs. Thus, the total expenditure for more than 31,000 officials in these administrations, under the head of customs, is above 35,000,000 of francs.

The indirect taxes (excise) next call our attention. We shall find this administration, in its organization, quite equal to that of the customs, and even superior in the regularity of its agency, especially for governmental purposes, which is the grand object of all the branches of the administrative

system; that golden tree, which incessantly provides the French ministerial Æneas with new means of silencing or propitiating the political Cerberus.

“ Uno avulso, non deficit alter.”

CHAPTER X.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIRECT TAXES.

UNDER this title are comprised the excise, and the monopoly of tobacco and snuff, and that of gunpowder, although divided into three distinct administrations, under three directors, each independent of the others.

I. EXCISE.

The excise, as it may be imagined, is one of the most expensive parts of the administration. The central bureaus are composed of a general director, with 20,000 francs a-year; three sub-directors, at 12,000 francs; twenty-eight chiefs and sub-chiefs, receiving from 4,000 to 7,000 francs a-year; and 170 clerks and subordinate *employés*. Total, 202 officials, whose emoluments amount altogether to 600,000 francs a-year, with about 150,000 francs, for extra expenses.

There is a principal director in the chief town of every department, and a director in the principal town of every arrondissement. The 360 directors, whose united salaries amount to 1,700,000 francs, employ, on an average, five clerks in their offices, which makes 1,800 *employés*, who cost about 1,100,000 francs. All this for the administrative service only!

The active service is performed under the inspection of head controllers, by mounted and moveable controllers, unmounted

and sedentary controllers, by mounted and unmounted principal and secondary excisemen, mounted and unmounted resident and moveable collectors, and by the regular host of agents. The number of the controllers, divided into six classes, according to their different offices, amounts to about 700; and the amount of their salaries is 1,620,000 francs a-year. The mounted and unmounted collectors, 1,450 in number, cost 3,100,000 francs. Then follow 1,300 mounted excisemen (*commis à cheval*), who receive 2,500,000 francs; and 3,000 unmounted excisemen (*commis aux exercices*), whose salaries amount to 3,400,000 francs; and about 2,000 subordinate *employés*, receiving altogether 1,200,000 francs.

The total number of the *employés* of the excise is, then, 10,800, who receive, in salaries, 15,220,000 francs.

Under the head of indirect taxes is comprised the collection of tolls on bridges, canals, and rivers, which employ only 120 controllers and 210 collectors; amount of salaries, 480,000 francs.

II. GUNPOWDER ADMINISTRATION.

The direction of the manufacture and sale of gunpowder has a central administration, composed of about forty officials, the salaries of whom amount to 130,000 francs, and 260 *employés* of all grades, receiving about 300,000 francs; besides about 1,200 licensed gunpowder *debitants*, appointed by the government, and who altogether receive 1,400,000 francs.

Besides their salaries, the *employés* of all the branches of the excise receive a per-centage on the receipts, which amounts to ten per cent. of their emoluments, as an inducement to exact as much as they can in the course of their operations, and at the same time to make them more subservient to their superiors. So that the 12,600 officials

above enumerated, cost the country almost 18,000,000 francs.

III.—TOBACCO AND SNUFF ADMINISTRATION.

The monopoly of these articles produces to the government about 44,000,000 francs; the expenditure is about 23,000,000 francs; 16,000,000 of which are for the purchases of home-grown or colonial tobacco, which is purchased and prepared by the government, and sold to the public by appointed agents.

A general director, one sub-director, eight chiefs of offices, and forty clerks and subordinates, compose the central administration; and the cost of these officials is 150,000 francs.

There are six general inspectors of the culture, at 6,000 or 7,000 francs each; twenty-six mounted inspectors of brigades, and sub-brigadiers, seventy mounted surveyors, thirty unmounted brigadiers, and 100 unmounted surveyors. Altogether, 232 *employés*; salaries, 300,000 francs.

The warehouses where the home-grown tobacco is deposited, are twenty in number. There are twenty store-keepers, twenty controllers, and about fifty clerks; total, ninety officials, who cost 220,000 francs.

There are ten tobacco and snuff manufactories, each of them with one *regisseur* (manager), one inspector of the manufacture, a controller and sub-controller of manufacture, one store-keeper, eight clerks of first or second class, an apprentice in fabrication, at 2,500 francs a-year! (all under the control of two general inspectors), and about 1,200 labourers. Total for the manufacture, 1,342 officials; receiving, 1,640,000 francs.

As to the sale, there are thirty-five general *entrepôts* of manufactured tobacco and snuff, with thirty-five directors, twenty controllers of first and second class, 150 officials of

first and second class, and 340 subordinate *employés*; altogether 505 placemen, of whom the salaries amount to 440,000 francs.

Then come the *debitants* (dealers) appointed by the government, and who are paid by a per-centage on the amount of the sales. Their number is not limited; and, for the whole of France, it is not under 5,500; so that the officials and dependents of the *direction des tabacs* amount to 7,790.

Besides the active officials and dependents, there are about 380 *ex-employés*, receiving an allowance or gratuity, not being entitled to a pension; and about 1,500 pensioners of the excise and tobacco administrations. The amount paid is 160,000 francs for the first, and about 800,000 francs for the others.

CHAPTER XI.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE FORESTS.

MORE than a seventh part of the French territory is covered with forests. The fourth part of these forests belongs to the nation, viz., about 1,900,000 hectares (4,700,000 English acres); about 1,000,000 of acres are the property of the crown; and 1,300,000 acres are either the appanage or the private property of the Orleans family. The rest of the forests belong to the highest classes of France and others of the nobility, or to some individuals who, like Count Roy, and the family of Count Jaubert, and others of the same stamp, bought for a trifle large tracts of forests, belonging to the emigrant families, when confiscated and sold by the revolutionary government. The revenue derived by the state from the forests is 34,000,000 francs.

At the head of the administration, is a director-general, with four under-directors, and a central administration of

chiefs and clerks, or subordinate *employés*; in all, 150, who annually cost 400,000 francs.

The country is divided into thirty-two conservancies of forests and fisheries (*eaux et forêts*). The thirty-two *conservateurs*, with about 128 clerks, cost 350,000 francs.

A general inspector (*verificateur*) of the survey and measurement (*arpentage*), 120 surveyors-measurers (*géomètres arpenteurs*), and 360 assistants, are estimated to cause an expenditure of 350,000 francs.

There is an *école forestière* for twelve pupils, at 1,000 francs each, paid by the state. The twelve pupils have seven professors and five male servants. The total amount, 40,000 francs.

The active service is under the direction of 125 inspectors and eighty-five sub-inspectors, whose emoluments and travelling expenses, with the salaries of about 200 clerks, amount to 700,000 francs.

Under them are 450 general guards, who are paid 720,000 francs; 130 mounted guards, receiving 1,000 francs each; and 2,800 brigadiers and simple guards, paid, altogether, 1,350,000 francs.

The management of the forests employs, but irregularly, about 3,000 persons, at a cost of nearly 1,800,000 francs. About 400 retired officials receive pensions, amounting to 325,000 francs; so that the total number of the *employés* and dependents of this administration is 7,900, who cost 5,455,000 francs.

The revenue of the King, from the forests of the crown, from the appanage of the duchy of Orleans and the duchy of Bourbon Condé, and from his private property and the forests of his sister, amounts to more than 17,000,000 francs a-year; and, as those forests are under a private administration, organised on the same footing as the forests of the state, and even require a greater number of agents,

as the collection of the revenue is made by his own receivers, I may safely estimate the number of his agents at the half of those employed by the state ; that is, 3,950, and the cost at 2,700,000 francs. Thus, the *Administration Forestière* of the state, and of the King, employ 11,850 officials, at a cost of 8,155,000 francs.

CHAPTER XII.

REGISTRATION, STAMP-OFFICE, AND DOMAINS.

ACCORDING to the French law, all contracts of all sorts, sale, transfer of property, wills, powers of attorney, deeds, conventions, marriage settlements, certificates of baptism, marriage, or of decease, legal or extra-legal notices, protests of bills of exchange, or of promissory notes, and all the decisions of the courts of justice,—in fact, all papers asserting or establishing a fact or a right, must be stamped and registered ; otherwise, they are considered as void, and cannot be produced as proof, by the interested parties ; nay, the deeds of mortgage must, besides, be literally transcribed in especial registers, and the date of the transcription is the only title of priority of the mortgages, if there are many on the same property. The deeds of sale and transfer of landed property or of houses and tenements, are also generally transcribed in a register kept for that purpose, although it is not obligatory ; and, if the contract mentions that a part only of the price has been paid, the registrar, on transcribing the deed, is bound, *ex officio*, to take a mortgage (*hypothèque d'office*) on the property so transferred, for the amount left unpaid, in the name, and for the benefit of the seller. The delay for the registration of all deeds is limited. The stamp duty and the duties on registration and transcription are in proportion to the sums specified in the contracts ; and they are much larger when the

registration has been protracted beyond the prescribed term. This explanation may be of some use to our readers.

The administration of registration and of domains (*l'enregistrement et les domaines*) is, therefore, a most important branch of the ministry of finance. The central administration is composed of a director, at 20,000 francs; four sub-directors, two at 15,000, and two at 12,000 francs each; forty-seven chiefs and sub-chiefs of bureaux, and ninety clerks and servants. These *employés* (142) cost 560,000 francs.

There are a director-general, two inspectors, and three or four verifiers, in every department, and a receiver in every canton. In every *arrondissement*, there is, besides, a *conservateur des hypothèques* (mortgages' registrar) except in some small towns and poor *arrondissements*, where the duty is performed by the receiver of the registration. The salaries are according to the population and wealth of the places of residence of the officials.

	Francs.
86 directors receive	900,000
900 clerks in the offices of the directors	680,000
150 inspectors	865,000
310 verifiers (<i>verificateurs</i>)	1,103,000
361 receivers of <i>arrondissements</i>	1,550,000
1,200 clerks in the offices of those receivers	980,000
190 mortgages' conservators	488,000
500 clerks in their offices	390,000
2,200 cantonal receivers	4,988,000
1,200 <i>employés</i> in the stamping establishments	450,000
1,200 distributors of stamped paper	750,000
Total, 7,397 <i>employés</i>	13,144,000

Besides the registration duties, the receivers collect the rents of the national estates, and the amount of the fines awarded by the police magistrates and the courts of

justice. The revenue derived from this administration is about 225,000,000 francs.

We are now coming to the principal part of the financial department, which comprises the assessment of the direct contributions, the collection, and the disbursement of the taxes. They are under the immediate control of the minister; and the central offices united, compose, according to the official accounts, the central administration of the ministry of finance and the public treasury, which may be assimilated to the *bouquet* in fireworks.

CHAPTER XIII.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE.

1 GENERAL secretary, at 20,000, and a private secretary, at 15,000 francs a year	Francs. 35,000
6 directors, at 20,000 francs, and 6 sub-directors, at 12,000 francs	192,000
1 general cashier, at 20,000, and a paymaster-general, at 15,000 francs	35,000
10 general inspectors of finance, at 12,000 francs; 12 inspectors of first class, at 7,000; 12 inspectors of second class, at 5,000; and 18 inspectors of third class, at 4,000 francs a year, besides 100,000 francs for travelling expenses	436,000
103 chiefs and sub-chiefs of bureaux, from 4,000 to 10,000 francs	598,500
640 clerks, from 1,000 to 3,600 a year	1,560,000
167 ushers, waiters, porters, and other servants	175,000
Subvention, bonification, <i>secours</i> to the <i>employés</i> of the finances	1,860,000
Indemnity to the cashier and <i>payeur-général</i> , for losses and responsibility	24,000
Total, 978 officials	4,915,500

I need not offer any comment upon this administrative head-quarter, though it is most proper to keep it in view, when so many pretended liberal economists, and amongst them a learned blockhead, publish volumes in praise of the French administration and its admirable account-antship (*comptabilité*). We now proceed to the active service.

The assessment of the properties to be taxed, and the repartition of the tax on these properties, are the duty of the board of direction of the direct taxes. There are a director and an inspector of direct contributions for every department, and two or three controllers in every *arrondissement*. In every commune (parish), there are four or more assessors, to make every year in the several parochial rolls of assessment, the alterations rendered necessary by the transfers of property, or its division, and by the decease or removal of inhabitants and new settlers. The assessors have no salaries, and are paid only for their trouble during the short time they are employed; but they have the opportunity, which they seldom neglect, of taking care of themselves in the assessment, which renders the office more valuable than one would suppose.

The *contributions directes* are divided under four heads:—
1. Land and house tax (*contributions foncières*); 2. Capitation tax and tax on moveables (*personnelle et mobilière*); 3. Door and window tax (*portes et fenêtres*); 4. Licenses (*patentes*). Nobody, in France, is allowed to enter into any trade, business, or manufacture, without first taking out a license.

The amount of the capitation, doors and windows, and licenses' tax is, in the several localities, proportionate to the population. The object of the last census was to increase, to a considerable amount, the rate of these taxes; and hence arose the general opposition to the mode of taking

that census, and the bloody conflicts which took place in many towns.

	Francs.
The 86 directors of the direct taxes have salaries	
amounting altogether to	600,000
1,290 clerks employed in the directors' offices .	800,000
86 departmental inspectors, with their travelling	
expenses	350,000
772 controllers of <i>arrondissements</i>	861,000
772 controllers' clerks	428,000
150,000 assessors (<i>commissaires repartiteurs</i>) .	2,895,000
For printing and extra expenses of the direc-	
tors	880,000
Total, 153,003 officials	6,814,000

The survey and measurement of the lands, and drawing the plans of all the communes, are under the control of the administration of direct taxes; and this branch of the administration is called *cadastre*. The cadastral survey, which began about forty years ago, and which, with an active and honest administration, would not have taken more than five or six years, is not yet, and probably never will be, completed. There are, in every department, an engineer-in-chief of the *cadastre*, with four or five clerks, and eight or ten of the geometers of the *cadastre*, with four or five assistants each. Total, 4,300 *employés*, who receive 4,000,000 francs.

The taxes, when assessed and enrolled by the directors of direct taxes, are levied by the *percepteurs* (collectors) of the communes every month. The *percepteurs* pay them to the receivers of arrondissement, who remit the amount to the general receiver of the departments, the most enormously paid of all the public functionaries.

	Francs.
86 receivers general fixed salaries, and per-cent- age on their receipts	6,500,000
280 receivers of arrondissements	2,400,000
1,680 clerks in the offices of the general and ar- rondissement receivers	1,100,000
23,600 communal collectors (<i>percepteurs</i>)	11,300,000
Total, 25,546 <i>employés</i>	21,300,000

There is only one *payeur* in every department, except in very few instances, when they have delegates. This is the only economical branch of the French administration. The eighty-six *payeurs*, with their delegates and clerks, amounting altogether to 398 officials, cost 900,000 francs.

Two establishments, although nominally independent of any ministry, are attached to the ministry of finance. They are the *caisse d'amortissement* (sinking fund), and the *caisse des dépôts et consignations* (deposits, securities, cautions). A committee of surveillance, a director-general, a sub-director, two cashiers, two chiefs of division, seven chiefs of *bureaux*, and fifty *employés*, compose the administration. Total, 69 officials, who cost 220,000 francs.

Having now successively surveyed all the branches of the administration of finance, let us recapitulate the number of its functionaries, and the amount of their emoluments.

	Employés.	Francs.
Central administration	978	4,915,000
Direct taxes and <i>cadastre</i>	157,303	10,814,000
Collectors, <i>payeurs</i> , and sinking fund	26,013	22,420,000
Registration and domains	7,397	13,144,000
Forests	11,850	8,150,000
Indirect taxes and tobacco	19,620	23,373,000
Carried over	223,161	82,816,000

	Employés.	Francs.
Brought forward . . .	223,161	82,816,000
Customs and octrois . . .	31,395	35,071,000
Post-office . . .	18,000	22,000,000
Total . . .	<u>277,906</u>	<u>145,168,000</u>

Thus, in the financial ministry alone, we find twelve times as many officials as in the whole of the government offices in England.

CHAPTER XIV.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE French foreign-office, although a less numerous establishment than the other ministries, is, comparatively, much more expensive. The minister's emoluments are 120,000 francs (40,000 francs more than those of his colleagues). He has under him four directors, six sub-directors, and sixty-six chiefs, clerks, and *employés* of all ranks. These seventy-seven officials' emoluments amount to 550,000 francs.

The diplomatic functions are necessarily subject to many alterations, with regard to the titles of the functionaries and their emoluments, which range between 100,000 francs and 300,000 francs, for ambassadors; from 45,000 to 100,000 francs, for plenipotentiaries; and from 25,000 to 45,000 francs, for resident ministers and *chargés d'affaires*. The number of these diplomatists is about thirty-four; and the amount of their salaries is 3,500,000 francs.

The secretaries and *attachés* to the embassies and legations, receive from 3,000 to 10,000 francs a-year. They are about eighty in number, and their joint salaries are about 500,000 francs.

The consular establishment is divided into four classes : the consuls-general, the consuls of first and second classes, and the vice-consuls and consular agents ; they amount altogether to 150, and they receive above 2,000,000 francs. There are, besides, chancellors of consulates, *élèves*, vice-consuls, interpreters, and dragomen and clerks, most of them paid by fees. Their number is about 200.

The total of the *personnel* of the ministry for foreign affairs is 640 ; and the expenditure, including 1,000,000 francs for secret and extra expenses, amounts to about 8,000,000 francs.

One would expect, that, with such an establishment, so liberally maintained, the French government would act a principal part on the political scene, and have a large share in the direction of the affairs of Europe.

Nobody would believe, if it were not proclaimed by the minister of foreign affairs himself, that the French government has not one single ally, and that the only policy to be adopted, is *isolement* and expectation. One cannot easily understand such a theory ; at least, one is apt to think that this system ought not to cost 8,000,000 francs a-year. But we have no notion of sound political doctrines. Let us import a few of the French *doctrinaires*, with their present leader, M. Guizot ; and they will show us, that the most enviable situation for a government, is to be equally obnoxious to its own subjects and to all foreign countries. Give them power ; and, before two years are elapsed, we shall see the English government equally distrusted, despised, and hated by the people, and by foreign powers, exhibiting the advantages of *la paix armée*.

This situation, so very like war, or so nearly leading to it, being that of France at the present moment, the organization of the war department naturally offers itself next to our examination.

CHAPTER XV.

MINISTRY OF WAR.

A MINISTER, two general directors, at 25,000 francs a-year, seven chiefs of divisions, twenty-three chiefs, and thirty sub-chiefs of *bureaux*, sixty-two head-clerks, 380 clerks and ninety subordinate *employés*; total, 495, compose the central war-office, which costs 1,850,000 francs; to which must be added, 460,000 francs as a subvention to superannuated agents, or gratuities to *employés* of the civil service of the ministry.

The staff of the administrative service is called the military *intendance*. There are thirty military intendants, seventy-two vice-intendants of the first class, and eighty of the second class; forty assistant intendants of first and second class, and about 800 clerks; altogether, 1,022 officials and clerks, the united salaries of whom amount to 2,215,000 francs.

The victualling service is attended to by twenty directors, having under their orders 180 accountants, 100 head-clerks, divided into three classes, and about 390 storekeepers, and other *employés*. Total, 700 officials; emoluments, 890,000 francs.

The armament, equipment, and camp stores, employ about 500 civilians, at a cost of 550,000 francs. Then come lots of contractors of all sorts, the number of whom cannot be ascertained; but whose influence in the elections can be judged by the fact, that, to conciliate a town to their candidate, Ministers promise that a regiment will be quartered in it, if the electors vote in favour of the government.

The medical establishment of the army employs, altogether, about 1,000 medical men and surgeons, of all

grades, whose united salaries amount to above 2,000,000 francs.

The military schools, six in number, the Polytechnic school, the school of application, the military school at St. Cyr, the military college at Laflèche, the school of Etat Major, and the school of Calvary, cost 2,200,000 francs, for 1,500 governors, officials, professors, and pupils.

The colony of Algiers is under the direction of the minister of war, even for the civil service. The central administration is on the same scale as the other central administrations in France, and reckons 120 *employés*, receiving altogether 400,000 francs. Then follow the active civil service; intendants, sub-intendants, commissioners, directors, inspectors, controllers, assessors, and collectors of direct and indirect taxes, of domains and customs; about 900 *employés* in the whole, whose salaries amount to 1,300,000 francs.

During the last twelve years, 80,000 French soldiers have perished in that ill-fated land; 450,000,000 of francs have been expended. Yet the conquest must be persevered in, as "*it is a practical school of war for our army*," says a military deputy to the chambers, "*and it affords the princes and generals the opportunity of displaying their warlike genius and their gallantry*." The statesman sees in it a still more valuable result,—the votes of thirty deputies are secured to the ministry; the government is safe. Can that be too dearly purchased? Answer, M. Laurence!

The *gendarmérie*, although under the administration of the minister of war, is no part of the army, and is really under the orders of the civil and judicial authorities, the prefects, the sub-prefects, the king's attorneys, and the commissioners of police; and, for that purpose, is divided into as many brigades as there are cantons in France. The

total number of this force is 15,500, and the pay amounts to 16,000,000 francs.

There is a numerous class of officers, above 2,500, who, having ceased to belong to the army, for various causes, without having obtained their retiring pensions, are still kept under the absolute power of the minister by a precarious allowance, dependent upon his good will, granted to them under the heads of *solde de non-activité, traitement de réforme, secours*. The total amount of the sums thus distributed is above 3,000,000 francs.

The recapitulation of all the officials and other persons, in the civil service, of the war office, or under the authority of the minister, without reckoning the contractors and the army, gives a total of 25,000 individuals, who share among them about 31,000,000 francs.

The military pensions to generals, staff-officers, commissioned and non-commissioned officers and soldiers, amount to 44,000,000 of francs; the number of participants is above 70,000. They cannot be deprived of their pensions; yet, as those pensions may be increased by the minister, they are always dependent upon him, and considerably add to the influence of the government in administrative and electoral matters.

CHAPTER XVI.

MINISTRY OF MARINE AND COLONIES.

THE minister, with a general secretary, four directors, three chiefs of division, sixteen chiefs, nineteen sub-chiefs of *bureaux*, and 160 clerks, and other *employés*, compose the central administration. Total, 204 officials, whose united emoluments amount to 870,000 francs.

The coast of France is divided into five maritime prefectures. The salaries of those maritime prefects are 25,000 francs each; but their pilferings amount to more than double their salaries. I have held in my hand, and attentively read, an entry carefully made, day by day, by a most honest *employé*, of all the articles abstracted from the maritime stores of the prefecture of Toulon, by order and for the private benefit of the prefect; and their value amounted, in one year, to more than 70,000 francs. These entries were entrusted to a liberal deputy, to be made use of in the chamber. The deputy, with such documents, could not be refused a general consulate, with 30,000 francs a-year for his brother; and the poor and honest *employé* was dismissed, with only 1,400 francs pension, having a wife and many children.

Besides the maritime prefects, there are general inspectors and inspectors, general commissioners, simple commissioners, and under commissioners, storekeepers, clerks, and *employés* of all sorts. Total, for the victualling and the administrative service, 2,400 officials. Salaries, 3,500,000 francs.

The dockyards are conducted by inspectors-general, engineers-in-chief, engineers, sub-engineers, assistant engineers, with about 150 clerks and foremen. Total 230 agents. Emoluments, 720,000 francs.

Ten thousand workmen and mechanics are employed in the building or repairing of ships, under about 360 *maitres entretenus* (permanent foremen), and are paid altogether 9,000,000 francs.

The medical staff and the *employés*, in the marines' hospitals, amount to 950, and they cost altogether about 1,000,000 francs.

There is, in the official estimates, an item of about 800,000 francs, under the head of *sciences et arts ma-*

ritimes; maritime school (cleverly perched on a mountain at Angoulême), inspectors, examiners, professors, masters, &c., &c. ; total, 280 *employés*.

I will not enter into the particulars of the civil service of the French colonies, the united population of which does not amount to 80,000 free inhabitants. The total number of the *employés* in the administrative, fiscal, judiciary, or ecclesiastic establishments, and in the public instruction, is above 2,700; and their cost to the country is about 3,700,000 francs.

Two thousand five hundred officers and men of the navy receive a half-pay, amounting to 1,900,000 francs; and the amount of retiring pensions, for about 7,000 officers of all grades, masters, mates, and sailors, or marines, is 5,600,000 francs.

The total of the civil *employés*, or dependants on the minister, in the navy department, without including the naval forces, is 26,629; and salaries, 27,119,000 francs.

IV. THE LEGION OF HONOUR.

This institution, by which Napoleon preluded to the establishment of an imperial aristocracy, and which he certainly maintained unsullied and respected, during the whole of his reign, by granting its decoration only to uncontested merit, to acknowledged civil services, and to the bravest of his brave, though misguided, army, has now lost all the *présti*ge with which it was surrounded. It is now principally the reward of unmentionable offices, and coveted only by narrow-minded persons, who, seeing the red ribbon so commonly sported, imagine that not to have it, is to rank below the common people. The army have long expressed the wish to have their services indicated by a different colour of the ribbon.

A Grand Chancellor, with 25,000 francs a-year, is at the

head of the order. The central administration, composed of a general secretary, three chiefs of division, seven chiefs of *bureaux*, and forty clerks and other *employés*, (fifty-one in the whole,) cost 216,000 francs.

The grades in the legion of honour are as follows: knights, officers, commanders, grand officers, and grand crosses. The army comprises about 21,000 knights, 2,800 officers, 650 commanders, 200 grand officers, and about 90 grand crosses; total, 25,340. The military knights receive 250 francs a-year; the officers, from 250 to 1,000 francs; the commanders, from 1,000 to 2,000 francs; the grand officers and grand crosses, from 2,000 to 4,000, or even 20,000 francs. The total amount is about 8,000,000 francs.

The members of the order in the civil service are above 30,000. I am assured that the government does not publish all the nominations, as it would raise a general outcry against the profusion of its appointments.

Schools for the girls of the poor members were established by Napoleon, and have been maintained by the succeeding governments. One, the first, is at St. Denis, the second is in Paris, and the third at St. Germain. But daughters of poor members have very little chance of admission. More than four-fifths of the girls at St. Denis belong to rich and fashionable people; Madame Laffarge was educated there.

The three schools cost about 1,000,000 francs a-year, which makes the total expenditure 9,000,000 francs. This is cheap enough for a knighthood of 65,340 members, one will say. Granted; but I believe that it is too dear, considering the little benefit, or rather the harm, done to the country by the institution.

The most ungrateful part of my task is nearly accomplished; and I am entering, for the last time, into political

and administrative statistics. This is a matter which seldom, if ever, affords to writers a chance of obtaining the reward of their labours. In the elucidation of such a subject, one must not think of complying with the precept of Horace: "*Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci.*"

Most of the daily papers have lately given a few statistical details on France; but they all walk on trodden paths; they only touch on particular points, and copy some already published statements. I doubt whether they can do more; whether they have the faintest idea of the French governmental, legislative, and administrative system. Viewed in its true character and results, the national organisation is but the renewal of the conquest and the taking possession of Gaul, not by the Romans, who respected the religion, municipal, and individual rights and franchises of the people; but by the Franks, who, seizing the lands and the cattle, reduced the inhabitants to slavery, and compelled them to work for the sole benefit of their conquerors. The only difference is, that the old conquerors were a race of people renowned for their independence and intrepidity, while the qualifications of the new conquerors are quite the reverse. The domination of the first lasted fourteen centuries: how long will the tyranny of the second continue? To answer this question, we must have a general view of their forces, an accurate idea of their discipline, and a complete knowledge of their strategy.

As to their forces, we have only to recapitulate the number of *employés* in the several ministries and administrations, with their emoluments, as exposed in the preceding chapters; and here is the result of the operation:—

A GENERAL TABLE OF OFFICIALS APPOINTED AND PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT,
 LIABLE TO REMOVAL, AND SUSCEPTIBLE OF PROMOTION, AND ANNUITANTS OR PENSIONERS, WITH THE AMOUNT OF
 SALARIES AND PENSIONS.

MINISTRIES and GENERAL DIRECTIONS.	UNPAID OFFICIALS.			Unemploy- ed Officials receiving gratuities, voluntary Annuities, <i>Secours</i> , &c.	Pension- ers, Retired Officials.		Total of the Salaries and Pensions.
	Amount of their Emoluments	Deriving an Income from their Offices, or Monopolies.	Exercising all the Municipal Powers under the Prefect, &c.		Amount Paid.	Total of the Officials.	
	Francs.				Francs.	Francs.	Francs.
Intérieur	114,600	32,000	113,000	3,450	11,800	12,980,000	54,297,000
Justice	14,100	12,000	—	270	1,100	1,530,000	17,724,000
Public Worship	40,000	41,000	—	—	2,700	1,300,000	35,280,000
Public Instruction	21,000	22,000	12,450	160	1,200	870,000	13,950,000
Public Works	6,780	15,200	—	80	650	395,000	10,190,000
Commerce and Agriculture	8,580	6,720	1,400	500	230	192,000	12,572,000
Foreign Affairs	640	—	—	—	180	290,000	8,290,000
War	22,500	1,900	—	4,500	70,000	44,000,000	75,000,000
Marine	7,100	9,700	—	1,500	7,000	5,600,000	18,000,000
Finances	36,200	—	121,000	380	2,400	1,700,000	40,125,000
Post-office	15,700	2,300	—	320	750	480,000	27,700,000
Customs	31,400	—	—	1,800	3,800	1,900,000	37,471,000
Excise and Tobacco	14,890	5,500	—	380	1,500	800,000	21,720,000
Forests	11,400	—	—	—	400	350,000	8,180,000
Registry and Domains	6,197	1,200	—	320	750	580,000	13,832,000
Legion of Honour	25,400	—	40,000	—	—	—	8,000,000
TOTAL	376,487	149,520	287,850	13,660	104,460	72,967,000	397,331,000

The exposition of the governmental and administrative system, and the enumeration of the government and administrative forces, are now complete. The result is, 932,000 paid or unpaid officials and dependants, with 400,000 soldiers and *gens d'armes*, and 60,000 marines. Total 1,000,392.

Here we have what, because it really is such, I call the army of occupation, which holds in subjection the beautiful country, which still retains the name of its old conquerors,—France. It is more than five times the number of the Franks who made the four successive invasions in Gaul, and finally kept possession of the country, which they ruled for centuries as lords and owners of the soil and of the inhabitants.

The discipline of the new conquerors is vastly superior to that of their predecessors, who prided themselves on their freedom, their equality, electing their chiefs, enacting the laws which they were to obey, and rising in arms against their elected leaders, when they acted in opposition to their will and interest. The reverse is the case with them and their present dominators. Instead of their electing their chiefs, they are appointed by the supreme chief, or, in his name, by subordinates. Instead of glorying in their freedom and equality, they compete in subserviency, as the only means of attaining superiority. Instead of having a will of their own, they must all submit to the will of their superiors, or be annihilated by being instantly dismissed from office. They have but one interest; and that is, to comply with orders, whatsoever they may be.

And such is the perfection of the system, that, in four or five days, at the utmost, the whole of their forces can be put in motion from one extreme point of the country to the other. The King enjoins a measure on one of his nine ministers. That minister sends his orders, by post or by the telegraph, to the prefect, who is a king *au petit pied* in his department, and has for his ministers the heads

of all the administrations under the several ministries, to whom he immediately transmits the order, commanding its immediate execution; to the bishop of the department, if the order refers to ecclesiastical matters; to the attorney-general, or the King's attorney, if it relates to judiciary measures; to the rector of the academy, if it concerns public instruction; to the chief engineers of the *ponts et chaussées*, if it relates to the ministry of public works; and in the same manner to the directors of direct or indirect taxes, of registry and domains, and of the post-offices. If any resistance occurs, or is apprehended, to the execution of the order, the prefect enjoins the general commanding the department (his minister at war), to dispose the military forces, and employ them in such a manner as to enforce submission, at any cost, to the obnoxious measure, and secure the domination of the rulers, or, as they call it, *l'ordre public*; for public order is the undisturbed exercise of their authority.

I have said, that, with the new conquerors, freedom and interest consist in complying with orders; but they are allowed to be over zealous in their obedience, to go beyond their instructions; and, by doing so, they entitle themselves to promotion and other pecuniary or honorary rewards. We may judge of the emulation which animates them all, when we consider the wide range of functions and emoluments, varying from 300 francs (12*l.*) to 100,000; and when we keep in mind, that there is not an office of any kind which is not divided into three or four classes, distinguished only by the increase of salaries. Nay, as the administration of justice, that is to say, the control of the government over the tribunals, might be endangered by the *inamovibilité* of the judges, they are ranged into seven classes, to stimulate the more their cupidity and their ambition.

The next thing, after such inducements to what they call a proper discharge of their duty, by the new Franks, is, to secure them against any responsibility for their official misdeeds, for their malversations with regard to the conquered Frenchmen. The case is provided for by the code of the former conquerors, which enacted that they could not be tried but by their fellows and companions in guilt, their *pares*, their peers; and such an enactment is too well adapted to the present circumstances not to be still the law. Nay, there is a modern improvement. Before any administrative official can be summoned before judiciary officials, the plaintiff must obtain the authorisation of doing so from the council of state, the nominees and dependants of the probable authors of the injustice complained of,—the ministers. So that there is small chance of obtaining the authorisation, and, if obtained, so little chance of redress, that one submits to injustice sooner than incur the risk of a series of prosecutions, by an imprudent attempt at a remedy for a previous wrong.

Yet, the charter of 1814, and the new edition of it promulgated in 1830, proclaimed the responsibility of the ministers and of the public functionaries, and promised that a law should forthwith be enacted to specify all cases of that responsibility, and the mode of enforcing it. Twenty-nine years have elapsed since that solemn promise was first made. Ten laws have been passed against the freedom of the press, three against individual liberty, five against public or private societies, four against public meetings or private assemblies—hundreds of measures have been devised for the protection of the government, of the ministers, and their subordinate officials; and as yet, there is no law for the protection of the citizens against the encroachments and tyranny of their oppressors.

And probably this omission, far from being complained

of, ought to be considered as beneficial to the country. This, certainly, is my opinion on this point. If the laws regulating the freedom of the press have chained the press, restricted it within the narrowest limits, and visited the overstepping of those limits with penalties, such as one, two, four, and ten years' imprisonment, nay, transportation for life, and fines amounting to 40,000 francs;—if the law-givers have transformed individual liberty into the liability of the citizen to be arrested, confined *au secret*, privately examined, morally and physically tortured, and, after many months of anxious expectation, put on trial before a packed jury, a court martial, or, what is much more merciless, the court of peers;—if, in short, all the legislation framed under the pretext of upholding rights, has had no other object, and no other result, than inflicting wrongs;—then a law of ministerial and official responsibility would be nothing but a legal contrivance the better to secure their impunity. Thanks to God! they have not yet been able to combine measures comprehensive enough to shelter all their misdeeds; and that is the only reason for the non-fulfilment of the promises of the two Charters.

On contemplating the deplorable situation of France, one naturally thinks such a state of things incompatible with an electoral body, with a representative assembly, with trial by jury, with a national guard, and with an intelligent and spirited population. This reflection is a fallacy resulting from an erroneous notion of these institutions in France. They must be accurately exposed, in order to explain how what are considered in England as the bulwarks of civil and religious liberty, form, in that country, the promoters and safeguards of oppression. This will complete the exposition of the French governmental and administrative system, or, as it ought to be called, the new monarchy of the Franks in now subjugated France.

, AGRICULTURE, &c. &c.

AL CONDITION.					
	Population.	Criminality.	Bastards.	Foundlings.	Taxes Paid.
44	Tarn	Puy de Dôme	Basses Alpes	Ariège	Loire
45	Vendée	Charente	Saône et Loire	Cozère	Morbihan
46	Ardèche	Loire	Arriège	Meurthe	Doubs
47	Marne	Allier	Aveyron	Nord	Jura
48	Lot et Garonne	Côte d'or	Charente	Aube	Charente
49	Ain	Basses Alpes	Jura	Puy de Dôme	Meuse
50	Haute Saône	Aude	Haute Vienne	Hautes Alpes	Mayenne
51	Var	Haute Saône	Moselle	Loire inférieure	Aube
52	Seine et Marne	Drôme	Eure	Drôme	Vosges
53	Ardennes	Haute Vienne	Corrèze	Oise	Haute Saône
54	Loiret	Dordogne	Mayenne	Somme	Nièvre
55	Jura	Indre et Loire	Meuse	Tarn	Aude
56	Allier	Vosges	Indre	Tarn et Garonne	Drôme
57	Gers	Doubs	Hérault	Ille et Vilaine	Tarn
58	Nièvre	Mayenne	Loire inférieure	Haute Loire	Haute Marne
59	Indre et Loire	Pas de Calais	Haute Marne	Loire	Ain
60	Drôme	Loire inférieure	Dordogne	Pas de Calais	Vendée
61	Corrèze	Corrèze	Yonne	Vienne	Vaucluse
62	Deux Sèvres	Lot et Garonne	Lozère	Orne	Loire et Cher
63	Haute Loire	Manche	Ardennes	Deux Sèvres	Gers
64	Cher	Orne	Lot	Yonne	Vienne
65	Vienne	Indre	Charente inférieure	Haute Marne	Aveyron
66	Lot	Nièvre	Seine et Marne	Gard	Deux Sèvres
67	Landes	Hérault	Orne	Vendée	Allier
68	Aude	Mayenne	Basses Alpes	Finistère	Haute Vienne
69	Eure et Loire	Aveyron	Deux Sèvres	Doubs	Cher
70	Cantal	Hautes Alpes	Côte d'or	Côte d'or	Ardèche
71	Creuse	Cantal	Corse	Lot	Indre
72	Doubs	Loire	Tarn et Garonne	Meuse	Lot
73	Indre	Indre	Nièvre	Ain	Cantal
74	Arriège	Mayenne	Loire	Ardennes	Haute Loire
75	Haute Marne	Meurthe	Puy de Dôme	Eure	Manche
76	Aube	Mayenne	Tarn	Morbihan	Corrèze
77	Loire et Cher	Deux Sèvres	Gard	Saône et Loire	Landes
78	Hautes Pyrénées	Loire et Loire	Ain	Seine et Marne	Creuse
79	Vaucluse	Haute Loire	Finistère	Ardèche	Tarn et Garonne
80	Tarn et Garonne	Mayenne	Haute Loire	Moselle	Hautes Pyrénées
81	Meuse	Hautes Pyrénées	Morbihan	Bas Rhin	Ariège
82	Corse	Landes	Vendée	Jura	Pyrénées Orientales
83	Pyrénées Orientales	Mayenne	Vienne	Côtes de Nord	Basses Alpes
84	Basses Alpes	Ardennes	Ardèche	Seine et Oise	Hautes Alpes
85	Lozère	Basses Pyrénées	Côtes du Nord	Vosges	Cozère
86	Hautes Alpes	Meuse	Ille et Vilaine	Haute Saône	Corse
Population ...	287	391,965	355,393	397,567	305,421
Agriculture...		558	583	550	591
Bad food		244	210	159	180
Manufactures		497	440	559	330
Pauperism ...		55	57	62	57
Longevity ...	3	37—6	36—10	37—8	37—3
Ignorance ...		518	539	474	555
Religious zeal		28½	30	30	33
Criminality...	9	11,829	8,983	8,717	9,728
Bastards		65	46	53	59
Foundlings ...		31	25	29	30
Taxes paid... 5,711		7,158,906	7,053,742	8,119,078	4,043,773

NOT FORTY-THREE DEPARTMENTS

PHYSICAL CONDITION.			
Age	Sex	Height	Weight
15	Male	5' 10"	150
16	Male	5' 11"	160
17	Male	6' 0"	170
18	Male	6' 1"	180
19	Male	6' 2"	190
20	Male	6' 3"	200
21	Male	6' 4"	210
22	Male	6' 5"	220
23	Male	6' 6"	230
24	Male	6' 7"	240
25	Male	6' 8"	250
26	Male	6' 9"	260
27	Male	6' 10"	270
28	Male	6' 11"	280
29	Male	7' 0"	290
30	Male	7' 1"	300
31	Male	7' 2"	310
32	Male	7' 3"	320
33	Male	7' 4"	330
34	Male	7' 5"	340
35	Male	7' 6"	350
36	Male	7' 7"	360
37	Male	7' 8"	370
38	Male	7' 9"	380
39	Male	7' 10"	390
40	Male	7' 11"	400
41	Male	8' 0"	410
42	Male	8' 1"	420
43	Male	8' 2"	430
44	Male	8' 3"	440
45	Male	8' 4"	450
46	Male	8' 5"	460
47	Male	8' 6"	470
48	Male	8' 7"	480
49	Male	8' 8"	490
50	Male	8' 9"	500
51	Male	8' 10"	510
52	Male	8' 11"	520
53	Male	9' 0"	530
54	Male	9' 1"	540
55	Male	9' 2"	550
56	Male	9' 3"	560
57	Male	9' 4"	570
58	Male	9' 5"	580
59	Male	9' 6"	590
60	Male	9' 7"	600
61	Male	9' 8"	610
62	Male	9' 9"	620
63	Male	9' 10"	630
64	Male	9' 11"	640
65	Male	10' 0"	650
66	Male	10' 1"	660
67	Male	10' 2"	670
68	Male	10' 3"	680
69	Male	10' 4"	690
70	Male	10' 5"	700
71	Male	10' 6"	710
72	Male	10' 7"	720
73	Male	10' 8"	730
74	Male	10' 9"	740
75	Male	10' 10"	750
76	Male	10' 11"	760
77	Male	11' 0"	770
78	Male	11' 1"	780
79	Male	11' 2"	790
80	Male	11' 3"	800
81	Male	11' 4"	810
82	Male	11' 5"	820
83	Male	11' 6"	830
84	Male	11' 7"	840
85	Male	11' 8"	850
86	Male	11' 9"	860
87	Male	11' 10"	870
88	Male	11' 11"	880
89	Male	12' 0"	890
90	Male	12' 1"	900
91	Male	12' 2"	910
92	Male	12' 3"	920
93	Male	12' 4"	930
94	Male	12' 5"	940
95	Male	12' 6"	950
96	Male	12' 7"	960
97	Male	12' 8"	970
98	Male	12' 9"	980
99	Male	12' 10"	990
100	Male	12' 11"	1000
101	Male	13' 0"	1010
102	Male	13' 1"	1020
103	Male	13' 2"	1030
104	Male	13' 3"	1040
105	Male	13' 4"	1050
106	Male	13' 5"	1060
107	Male	13' 6"	1070
108	Male	13' 7"	1080
109	Male	13' 8"	1090
110	Male	13' 9"	1100
111	Male	13' 10"	1110
112	Male	13' 11"	1120
113	Male	14' 0"	1130
114	Male	14' 1"	1140
115	Male	14' 2"	1150
116	Male	14' 3"	1160
117	Male	14' 4"	1170
118	Male	14' 5"	1180
119	Male	14' 6"	1190
120	Male	14' 7"	1200
121	Male	14' 8"	1210
122	Male	14' 9"	1220
123	Male	14' 10"	1230
124	Male	14' 11"	1240
125	Male	15' 0"	1250
126	Male	15' 1"	1260
127	Male	15' 2"	1270
128	Male	15' 3"	1280
129	Male	15' 4"	1290
130	Male	15' 5"	1300
131	Male	15' 6"	1310
132	Male	15' 7"	1320
133	Male	15' 8"	1330
134	Male	15' 9"	1340
135	Male	15' 10"	1350
136	Male	15' 11"	1360
137	Male	16' 0"	1370
138	Male	16' 1"	1380
139	Male	16' 2"	1390
140	Male	16' 3"	1400
141	Male	16' 4"	1410
142	Male	16' 5"	1420
143	Male	16' 6"	1430
144	Male	16' 7"	1440
145	Male	16' 8"	1450
146	Male	16' 9"	1460
147	Male	16' 10"	1470
148	Male	16' 11"	1480
149	Male	17' 0"	1490
150	Male	17' 1"	1500
151	Male	17' 2"	1510
152	Male	17' 3"	1520
153	Male	17' 4"	1530
154	Male	17' 5"	1540
155	Male	17' 6"	1550
156	Male	17' 7"	1560
157	Male	17' 8"	1570
158	Male	17' 9"	1580
159	Male	17' 10"	1590
160	Male	17' 11"	1600
161	Male	18' 0"	1610
162	Male	18' 1"	1620
163	Male	18' 2"	1630
164	Male	18' 3"	1640
165	Male	18' 4"	1650
166	Male	18' 5"	1660
167	Male	18' 6"	1670
168	Male	18' 7"	1680
169	Male	18' 8"	1690
170	Male	18' 9"	1700
171	Male	18' 10"	1710
172	Male	18' 11"	1720
173	Male	19' 0"	1730
174	Male	19' 1"	1740
175	Male	19' 2"	1750
176	Male	19' 3"	1760
177	Male	19' 4"	1770
178	Male	19' 5"	1780
179	Male	19' 6"	1790
180	Male	19' 7"	1800
181	Male	19' 8"	1810
182	Male	19' 9"	1820
183	Male	19' 10"	1830
184	Male	19' 11"	1840
185	Male	20' 0"	1850
186	Male	20' 1"	1860
187	Male	20' 2"	1870
188	Male	20' 3"	1880
189	Male	20' 4"	1890
190	Male	20' 5"	1900
191	Male	20' 6"	1910
192	Male	20' 7"	1920
193	Male	20' 8"	1930
194	Male	20' 9"	1940
195	Male	20' 10"	1950
196	Male	20' 11"	1960
197	Male	21' 0"	1970
198	Male	21' 1"	1980
199	Male	21' 2"	1990
200	Male	21' 3"	2000
201	Male	21' 4"	2010
202	Male	21' 5"	2020
203	Male	21' 6"	2030
204	Male	21' 7"	2040
205	Male	21' 8"	2050
206	Male	21' 9"	2060
207	Male	21' 10"	2070
208	Male	21' 11"	2080
209	Male	22' 0"	2090
210	Male	22' 1"	2100
211	Male	22' 2"	2110
212	Male	22' 3"	2120
213	Male	22' 4"	2130
214	Male	22' 5"	2140
215	Male	22' 6"	2150
216	Male	22' 7"	2160
217	Male	22' 8"	2170
218	Male	22' 9"	2180
219	Male	22' 10"	2190
220	Male	22' 11"	2200
221	Male	23' 0"	2210
222	Male	23' 1"	2220
223	Male	23' 2"	2230
224	Male	23' 3"	2240
225	Male	23' 4"	2250
226	Male	23' 5"	2260
227	Male	23' 6"	2270
228	Male	23' 7"	2280
229	Male	23' 8"	2290
230	Male	23' 9"	2300
231	Male	23' 10"	2310
232	Male	23' 11"	2320
233	Male	24' 0"	2330
234	Male	24' 1"	2340
235	Male	24' 2"	2350
236	Male	24' 3"	2360
237	Male	24' 4"	2370
238	Male	24' 5"	2380
239	Male	24' 6"	2390
240	Male	24' 7"	2400
241	Male	24' 8"	2410
242	Male	24' 9"	2420
243	Male	24' 10"	2430
244	Male	24' 11"	2440
245	Male	25' 0"	2450
246	Male	25' 1"	2460
247	Male	25' 2"	2470
248	Male	25' 3"	2480
249	Male	25' 4"	2490
250	Male	25' 5"	2500
251	Male	25' 6"	2510
252	Male	25' 7"	2520
253	Male	25' 8"	2530
254	Male	25' 9"	2540
255	Male	25' 10"	2550
256	Male	25' 11"	2560
257	Male	26' 0"	2570
258	Male	26' 1"	2580
259	Male	26' 2"	2590
260	Male	26' 3"	2600
261	Male	26' 4"	2610
262	Male	26' 5"	2620
263	Male	26' 6"	2630
264	Male	26' 7"	2640
265	Male	26' 8"	2650
266	Male	26' 9"	2660
267	Male	26' 10"	2670
268	Male	26' 11"	2680
269	Male	27' 0"	2690
270	Male	27' 1"	2700
271	Male	27' 2"	2710
272	Male	27' 3"	2720
273	Male	27' 4"	2730
274	Male	27' 5"	2740
275	Male	27' 6"	2750
276	Male	27' 7"	2760
277	Male	27' 8"	2770
278	Male	27' 9"	2780
279	Male	27' 10"	2790
280	Male	27' 11"	2800
281	Male	28' 0"	2810
282	Male	28' 1"	2820
283	Male	28' 2"	2830
284	Male	28' 3"	2840
285	Male	28' 4"	2850
286	Male	28' 5"	2860
287	Male	28' 6"	2870
288	Male	28' 7"	2880
289	Male	28' 8"	2890
290	Male	28' 9"	2900
291	Male	28' 10"	2910
292	Male	28' 11"	2920
293	Male	29' 0"	2930
294	Male	29' 1"	2940
295	Male	29' 2"	2950
296	Male	29' 3"	2960
297	Male	29' 4"	2970
298	Male	29' 5"	2980
299	Male	29' 6"	2990
300	Male	29' 7"	3000
301	Male	29' 8"	3010
302	Male	29' 9"	3020
303	Male	29' 10"	3030
304	Male	29' 11"	3040
305	Male	30' 0"	3050
306	Male	30' 1"	3060
307	Male	30' 2"	3070
308	Male	30' 3"	3080
309	Male	30' 4"	3090
310	Male	30' 5"	3100
311	Male	30' 6"	3110
312	Male	30' 7"	3120
313	Male	30' 8"	3130
314	Male	30' 9"	3140
315	Male	30' 10"	3150
316	Male	30' 11"	3160
317	Male	31' 0"	3170
318	Male	31' 1"	3180
319	Male	31' 2"	3190
320	Male	31' 3"	3200
321	Male	31' 4"	3210
322	Male	31' 5"	3220
323	Male	31' 6"	3230
324	Male	31' 7"	3240
325	Male	31' 8"	3250
326	Male	31' 9"	3260
327	Male	31' 10"	3270
328	Male	31' 11"	3280
329	Male	32' 0"	3290
330	Male	32' 1"	3300
331	Male	32' 2"	3310
332	Male	32' 3"	3320
333	Male	32' 4"	3330
334	Male	32' 5"	3340
335	Male	32' 6"	3350
336	Male	32' 7"	3360
337	Male	32' 8"	3370
338	Male	32' 9"	3380
339	Male	32' 10"	3390
340	Male	32' 11"	3400

d Financial Condition.

		Physical Condition.					Moral Condition.					Taxes paid.	
Depa		Agriculture.	Bad food.	Manufactures.	Pauperism.	Longevity.		Ignorance.	Religious Zeal.	Criminality.	Bastards.	Foundlings.	Francs.
						yrs	mths						
1	Ain	471	76	217	61	32	11	435	21	5,825	85	47	311,546,628
2	Aisne	650	108	493	50	40	8	732	34	8,334	47	16	8,826,007
3	Allier	531	48	248	44	45	8	522	17	10,556	66	42	4,339,722
4	Alpes bass	670	174	1	101	38	6	525	81	7,784	48	28	7,414,984
5	Alpes hau	495	122	251	44	36	11	608	27	6,660	67	48	2,056,716
													10,434,994
6	Ardèche ...	658	187	668	42	44	0	408	44	10,778	84	35	4,091,459
7	Ardennes	269	140	622	35	35	11	218	23	5,104	75	40	9,938,494
8	Ariège ...	380	47	1019	70	42	10	383	41	6,682	52	22	5,840,385
9	Aube	515	312	250	62	38	0	632	38	10,014	53	30	6,420,260
10	Aude	433	15	169	50	37	7	415	33	8,142	69	28	12,364,260
11	Aveyron...	250	22	419	55	39	7	228	24	6,602	53	16	6,656,734
12	Bouches d	654	460	131	60	32	2	780	19	7,083	29	14	6,918,985
13	Calvados	425	42	228	35	39	0	201	19	7,929	56	9	8,618,831
14	Cantal.....	411	113	332	34	31	8	778	15	11,329	40	35	5,995,483
15	Charente	433	6	2376	137	33	4	373	23	11,262	93	28	26,158,731
16	Charente i	395	28	949	57	40	5	281	26	8,134	69	25	11,906,704
17	Cher	376	85	362	57	49	2	480	30	10,971	46	23	8,714,014
18	Corrèze ...	324	16	1940	131	37	4	408	32	10,342	85	24	15,885,471
19	Corse	682	254	1035	39	37	8	678	33	8,447	38	27	9,164,881
20	Côte d'or	621	235	134	43	43	9	418	31	17,477	84	45	7,452,168
21	Côtes du l	604	110	252	70	45	8	422	45	14,847	84	35	3,106,532
22	Creuse ...	695	82	259	58	31	0	692	32	5,071	68	48	2,640,275
23	Dordogne	386	56	718	25	37	0	294	30	4,489	76	9	8,655,511
24	Doubs.....	402	80	961	26	31	2	219	24	3,404	71	49	8,655,511
25	Drôme ...	395	70	621	67	31	11	428	36	8,797	147	127	19,206,959
26	Eure	604	80	228	63	37	10	340	28	9,348	119	1	6,050,057
27	Eure et Lo	628	200	442	38	32	7	526	27	13,590	58	14	9,463,508
28	Finistère	379	130	193	58	40	2	640	28	12,738	72	40	8,954,071
29	Gard	43	25	450	75	38	8	195	6	2,033	313	159	84,238,042
30	Garonne h	586	14	1711	49	35	1	228	14	6,194	46	14	27,131,014
31	Gers	330	32	572	49	38	4	305	9	7,402	62	4	12,272,542
32	Gironde ...	109	20	1451	64	36	4	346	29	4,496	106	47	17,328,677
33	Hérault ...	689	180	292	58	42	0	491	24	8,359	44	23	5,280,635
34	Ille et Vila	180	34	610	75	40	6	425	22	13,424	72	25	13,131,823
35	Indre	597	127	310	50	37	2	659	47	5,133	38	25	5,906,630
36	Indre et Lo	590	26	310	74	41	6	634	24	8,177	41	25	3,328,580
37	Isère	539	15	1210	32	35	0	503	20	7,639	66	57	7,538,208
38	Jura	642	80	338	76	38	0	565	28	6,102	61	52	5,629,094
39	Landes ...	652	61	124	40	37	6	642	19	8,263	28	19	5,681,725
40	Loire et Ch	613	91	320	67	42	2	620	31	5,778	27	24	5,341,081
41	Loire	572	400	230	27	30	6	758	13	9,641	57	42	5,013,725
42	Loire haute	377	60	789	53	38	10	296	29	9,964	82	3	6,066,227
43	Loire infèr	552	46	1710	41	38	2	307	14	12,013	49	23	7,600,250
Total		526	174	495	56	37	5	501	29	9,104	66	33	768,865,860
													8,940,296

ORAL CONDITION.

1st Column. Selected young men, on 1,000, attaining their 21st year of age.

2nd Column. Destitute students, on 1,000 young men of 21 years of age.

3rd Column. Bastards, in proportion to one convict, in each department.

4th Column. Orphan children, on 1,000 births.

5th Column. Destitute children, on 1,000 births.

6th Column. Ration and stamps duties, and the excise.

ULATION, AGRICULTURE, &c., &c.

MORAL CONDITION.					Taxes Paid.
Religious Zeal.	Criminality.	Bastards.	Foundlings.		
1					
2					
3	Seine	Seine	Seine	Seine	Seine
4	Corse	Rhône	Rhône	Rhône	Seine et Marne
5	Haute Rhin	Haute Saône	Bouches du Rhône	Bouches du Rhône	Nord
6	Bas Rhin	Gironde	Gironde	Gironde	Rhône
7	Seine inférieure	Calvados	Gers	Gers	Seine inférieure
8	PyrénéesOrientales	Cher	Charente	Charente	Gironde
9	Marne	Seine inférieure	Var	Var	Pas de Calais
10	Tarn	Bouches du Rhône	Basses Alpes	Basses Alpes	Calvados
	Bouches du Rhône	Nord	Allier	Allier	Bouches du Rhône
11	Eure	Landes	Vaucluse	Vaucluse	Somme
12					
13	Finistère	Pas de Calais	Calvados	Calvados	Aisne
14	Ille et Vilaine	Loiret	Haut Rhin	Haut Rhin	Eure
15	Vienne	Hautes Pyrénées	PyrénéesOrientales	PyrénéesOrientales	Meurthe
16	Arriège	Isère	Maine et Loire	Maine et Loire	Seine et Oise
17	Ardèche	Basses Pyrénées	Loiret	Loiret	Oise
18	Calvados	Loire et Cher	Seine inférieure	Seine inférieure	Isère
19	Loiret	Bas Rhin	Aveyron	Aveyron	Côte d'or
20	Haute Garonne	Gers	Dordogne	Dordogne	Haute Garonne
	Aube	Indre et Loire	Basses Pyrénées	Basses Pyrénées	Maine et Loire
21	Vaucluse	Aube	Loire et Cher	Loire et Cher	Marne
22					
23	Seine et Marne	Marne	Haute Vienne	Haute Vienne	Loire inférieure
24	Meuse	Sarthe	Lot et Garonne	Lot et Garonne	Ille et Vilaine
25	Maine et Loire	Somme	Haute Garonne	Haute Garonne	Saône et Loire
26	Haute Marne	Haut Rhin	Charente inférieure	Charente inférieure	Charente inférieure
27	Eure et Loire	Cantal	Marne	Marne	Puy de Dôme
28	Rhône	Allier	Sarthe	Sarthe	Hérault
29	Loire et Cher	Meurthe	Indre et Loire	Indre et Loire	Finistère
30	Côtes du Nord	Eure et Loire	Cantal	Cantal	Loiret
	Morbihan	Oise	Manche	Manche	Côtes du Nord
31	Gironde	PyrénéesOrientales	Landes	Landes	Sarthe
32					
33	Seine et Oise	Maine et Loire	Nièvre	Nièvre	Orne
34	Gard	Doubs	Hautes Pyrénées	Hautes Pyrénées	Haut Rhin
35	Var	Var	Aude	Aude	Bas Rhin
36	Lozère	Lot et Garonne	Cher	Cher	Gard
37	Moselle	Aisne	Creuse	Creuse	Moselle
38	Charente inférieure	Haute Garonne	Aisne	Aisne	Eure et Loire
39	Aisne	Drôme	Isère	Isère	Dordogne
40	Oise	Seine et Oise	Hérault	Hérault	Yonne
	Meurthe	Aude	Mayenne	Mayenne	Var
41	Tarn et Garonnes	Vosges	Corrèze	Corrèze	Basses Pyrénées
42					
43	Vendée	Vaucluse	Eure et Loire	Eure et Loire	Lot et Garonne
	Lot	Creuse	Indre	Indre	Ardennes
	Deux Sèvres	Manche	Corse	Corse	Indre et Loire.
Populat					
Agricult	386,093	405,523	442,095	399,921	492,067
Bad foo	545	494	469	502	461
Manufac	181	104	138	189	88
Pauperis	466	493	550	431	660
Longevi	62	57	55	50	55
Ignorant	38—4	37—4	38—0	37—2	37—7
Religiou	517	484	463	528	447
Criminal	39	29½	28	28	25
Bastards	8,733	6379	9,225	9,491	8,477
Foundlin	64	67	84	79	73
Taxes pa	33	35	41	47	36
	7,556,926	10,721,686	10,826,850	9,741,514	12,984,069

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONDITION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE.

THE French, before the Revolution of 1789, were divided into six classes, the clergy, the nobility, the parliaments, the so called *haute bourgeoisie* (gentlemen, not nobles, but of independent fortune), the merchants and tradesmen, and the peasants. The only result of that revolution, and of all the other revolutions which succeeded one another, has been, the simplification of that division of the people. There are now but two classes; the persons employed and paid by the government (about 500,000), and the rest of the people, nearly 34,000,000. In the former state of France, which certainly was bad enough, each of the classes, having opposite interests and conflicting pretensions, acted as a check upon the others; and, with the exception of the peasants, who were the victims of all, knew pretty well how to resist the encroachment of rival classes. It must also be admitted, that elements of independence existed in every one of these classes, and that hostility to the court was the predominant feeling of all; so that, in fact, the absolute power of the King was confined within narrow limits, and the public liberties were in some sort secured by party rivalries. The great evil was, the pride of the aristocracy, which was principally felt and resented by the townsmen of every rank, and by the peasants; and the exemption of the privileged

orders from taxes. At present, nobility and titles are nothing in the state. The only acknowledged superiority is derived from holding office under government. All that are not employed, dukes, counts, plebeians, are equally crushed under the administrative despotism, and equally helpless in defending either public or private rights against the encroachments of the government. Thus, the anarchy of castes, existing previously to the French Revolution, has been succeeded by their annihilation under the tyranny of an irresistible and irresponsible power.

CHAPTER II.

STATISTICS OF THE FRENCH POPULATION.

THE population of France is, at present, above 34,400,000 inhabitants, who are disseminated over the country; not, as in England, congregated at many points in large masses. With the exception of Paris, there is but one city, Lyons, containing 100,000 inhabitants; eight containing from 40,000 to 70,000; and about twenty-five containing more than 20,000. According to the last census, 7,650,000 inhabitants live in 2,194 cities or towns (reckoning as such, places with a population of 1,500 or more individuals), and 26,600,000 live in 35,900 rural communes (villages and hamlets).

This obviously indicates, that agriculture is the employment of the greater part of the population, as will be seen from a division of the inhabitants according to their occupations.

1. Agriculturists of all ranks, with their families	18,260,000
2. Tradesmen of all kinds, with their families	6,980,000
3. Manufacturers, bankers, merchants, retailers; with their workmen, clerks, assistants, and families	4,190,000
Carried forward	29,430,000

Brought forward	29,430,000
4. Scientific and learned professions	760,000
5. People of independent property, without trade or profession, living on their income	640,000
6. Functionaries paid by the government . . .	1,095,000
7. The army, the navy, and state pensioners	620,000
8. Paupers	1,855,000
Total	<u>34,400,000</u>

With this view, I proceed to a subdivision.

The three first classes, the agriculturists, the tradesmen, and the manufacturers and merchants, are composed of masters and servants, or workmen. The following table will show in what proportion they stand.

Classes.	Masters.	Servants—Workmen.
Agriculturists ...	1,394,000	16,846,000
Tradesmen	1,168,000	5,812,000
Manufacturers, &c.	764,000	3,426,000
Total	<u>3,326,000</u>	<u>26,084,000</u>

The result of this subdivision is, that the three classes are now reduced to two. The first, composed of 3,326,000, devoting their capital and their intelligence to the pursuits of agriculture and industry, are, in some sort, independent. The second, amounting to 26,084,000, have no other capital than their bodily strength, which they let on hire to those who compose the first. This is the working class, owing their daily bread to their daily labour, and precluded by their poverty and their occupations from all participation in municipal or political action. Adding to their number the

poor, the indigent, estimated at 1,855,000, we have a total of 27,853,000 individuals completely shut out from civil life; in one word, the French helots.

Persons living on their income, and those engaged in scientific or learned professions, form the superior class, being more independent, either by their fortune or by their acquirements. Finally, by adding the state pensioners, the army, and the navy, to the paid functionaries, we obtain a complete classification of the population of France, as follows:—

1st class: The working classes, the poor, the helots	27,953,000
2nd class: Agriculturists and <i>industriels</i>	3,342,000
3rd class: Learned and scientific professions, and people living on their income	1,390,000
4th class: Paid officials, army and navy	1,715,000
Total	34,400,000

We now begin to perceive the causes of the power of the French government, and of the lethargy of the people, under the uncontrolled absolutism of their rulers. We see that the government has not to contend against 34,000,000 subjects. 27,953,000 of these subjects are of necessity helpless. They have no means of influencing the legislative or ministerial measures; they have no time to attend to them; nay, they cannot know them. They can, indeed, feel them; they feel them, in the view of a scanty meal, surrounded by famishing children, or at the sight of the tax-gatherer and of the gendarme. The only right they have, is that of being satisfied with their half ration. Pay they must, or go to prison. A curse, many curses may swell their bosoms, but there they must remain entombed. Resistance is impossible; they are isolated—they are disarmed. *Furor arma ministrat?* True; but, poor fellows! they

know that three glorious days and a day of magnanimous triumph leave their families without bread during four days, and, besides, may afterwards leave themselves without work during many months.

The government has to contend only with the second and third classes, amounting to 4,732,000 individuals; but, besides being supported by 1,700,000 functionaries, with 500,000 well-loaded muskets, and thousands of cannons always prepared for wholesale murder, the French rulers have many other means of preventing all resistance on the part of those classes. On that head no fears can for an instant be entertained.

We must remember, that it is from amongst the members of these classes that the government choose the honorary officials, as well as those who, although unpaid by the treasury, derive a good income from their offices or monopolies. More than one-third of these two classes must be deducted from that numerical force, and be enrolled in the opposite ranks. The conflict, then, is between 3,132,000 independants and 3,295,000 dependants, the government having a majority of 153,000.

That majority must still be increased by the addition of all those candidates for office who, knowing that their only chance of getting anything is, by outstripping the holders of office themselves in their zeal for the support of the government.

Besides this, many of those belonging to the second class are very little, if at all, above those of the lowest, the helots. What is a poor country baker, or smith, or grocer, or joiner? Yet they form the half of the second class, with the retail dealers and small shopkeepers: so that more than half a million must again be deducted from the independent portion. They, of necessity, are dependent on the mayor and the clergyman of the village.

As to the rest of the two classes, there is nothing easier than to prevent their being arrayed against the government. The French rulers know that well, and they act accordingly. By custom duties, protective taxes, and premiums, they have set the agriculturists against the manufacturers; the manufacturers against the colonial interest; the colonial interest against the tradesmen and merchants; and each against all the rest. The merchant of Havre is intent upon the annihilation of the sugar manufacturers of Arras. The iron master of the *Haute Marne* knocks down the wine-grower of the Gironde; and the royal forester levels his gun at the coalheaver. This is, according to the doctrine of *la pondération des forces*, the political equilibrium of the popular classes. Such is the political science of the new conquerors of the Gauls.

Here again occurs the question: how can an intelligent and enlightened people allow themselves to be misled by such doctrines, and trampled upon by such *doctrinaires*? Let us, in answer to this question, consider the intellectual condition of the people.

The official returns of particular classes of the population, such as the recruits (*conscripts*) and the convicts, recognise three degrees of ignorance, and three of instruction. Taking these returns as the basis of our calculations, we find the following results for the whole of the population.

1st. Unable to read and to write	16,855,000
2nd. Able to read, but not to write	7,097,000
3rd. Reading and writing but incorrectly	6,968,000
4th. Reading and writing correctly	2,430,000
5th. Having the elements of classical education	735,000
6th. Having completed their classical studies	315,000
Total	34,400,000

Thus it appears, that, notwithstanding, or, as I believe, on account of having a ministry and an administration of public instruction, France is one of the most ignorant countries in Europe; two-thirds of her population are in a complete state of ignorance; one-fourth is in a comparative state of ignorance; one-fourteenth part only can read and write correctly; and not one in a hundred has completed a course of classical studies.

A point, which appears to me of the utmost importance, is to ascertain, as far as possible, in what proportion the four classes of the population participate in the six degrees of ignorance or of instruction, as it may lead to the discovery of the real causes of the moral weakness, and of the consequent violence of the government. The following table will answer the purpose:—

Degrees of Ignorance or Instruction	Population of France in 1831				Total Population
	Complete Ignorance	Comparative Ignorance	Can Read and Write	Completed Course of Studies	
1. Complete Ignorance	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	4,000,000
2. Comparative Ignorance	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	4,000,000
3. Can Read and Write	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	4,000,000
4. Completed Course of Studies	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	4,000,000
Total	4,000,000	4,000,000	4,000,000	4,000,000	16,000,000

Degrees of Ignorance and of Instruction.	CLASSES OF THE POPULATION.					Total.
	1st. The Working Classes, Helots.	2nd. Agriculturists and Manufacturers.	3rd. Learned Professions and in-dependent property	4th. Paid Officials, Army and Navy.		
IGNORANCE.						
First . . .	15,271,000	881,000	282,000	421,000	16,855,000	
Second . . .	5,935,000	758,000	185,000	219,000	7,097,000	
Third . . .	5,852,000	620,000	156,000	340,000	6,968,000	
	—	—	—	—	—	
INSTRUCTION.						
First . . .	875,000	789,000	330,000	436,009	2,430,000	
Second . . .	19,000	248,000	246,000	222,000	735,000	
Third . . .	1,000	46,000	191,000	77,000	315,000	
Total . . .	27,953,000	3,342,000	1,390,000	1,715,000	34,400,000	

The first observation which the foregoing table suggests is, that, in the distribution of instruction amongst the four classes of the population, the governmental and administrative class is far from having any advantage. The third class, although less numerous, reckons 436,000 individuals, having received a classical or complete education, and only 625,000 ignorants, (the children of that class,) whilst the governmental class includes only 299,000 individuals completely educated, and the number of ignorants amounts to 980,000.

The second class, the agriculturists and manufacturers, is also much superior, with regard to instruction, to the governmental and administrative class. Besides 789,000 individuals having received a good general education, there we find 294,000 men having the advantage of a classical and scientific education. Finally, the governmental class does not include the fourth part of the educated portion of the people, and therefore the *doctrinaires* are not justified in saying that their government rests upon *l'aristocratie des lumières*.

But to have the condition of the people still better understood, and to appreciate with still greater accuracy how France stands with regard to her government, we must again proceed to another sub-division of the population.

Of the 34,400,000 inhabitants, more than the half are excluded, by their sex or their age, from all civil or political action. We therefore must withdraw them from our calculations.

The number of females in France is	.	.	17,232,000
Under 21 years of age	.	.	8,287,000
Of 21 years of age or above	.	.	8,955,000
The total of the male population is	.	.	17,168,000
Under 21 years of age	.	.	8,252,000
Of, or above 21 years of age	.	.	8,916,000

Thus the active part of the French population, *les citoyens actifs*, those who are entitled to civil rights, amount to 8,916,000; and those really compose what we call *the French people*.

These "*citoyens actifs*" belong to the four classes in the following proportion:—

1st. The working classes and paupers	6,585,000
2nd. Manufacturing, Trading, and Agricultural capitalists	927,000
3rd. Learned professions and independent incomes	425,000
4th. Paid officials, army, navy, and pensioners	979,000
Total	8,916,000

It is of some importance to know in what proportion general education is diffused amongst the four classes of *active* citizens; and it is shown in the following table.

Classes.	Active Citizens.	Educated.	Uneducated.
First	6,585,000	894,000	5,591,000
Second	927,000	882,000	45,000
Third	425,000	1,087,000	*
Fourth	939,000	637,000	302,000†

The superiority of the third and second classes, with regard to instruction, over the class of placemen, is now evident. In these two classes, therefore the faults, the

* In this class not only every one is educated, but also 672 women or youths under twenty-one years of age.

† The state of the army and navy accounts for this ignorance. It appears that of every 1,000 *conscripts*, 500 do not know their alphabet.

abuses, the misdeeds of the government cannot pass unobserved, unresisted, or unresented. The only resource of a bad government is to weaken resistance, and to prevent resentment from becoming rebellion ; and that is done, as I stated before, by giving about 280,000 honorary offices and monopolies of professions and trades to their favourites in those two classes. This gives them a numerical majority of 280 over their opponents ; and then every thing is carried on as it pleases the ruling party.

Yet it is not so much on account of their intellectual qualifications, as on account of their property, that the government favours or disregards the members of the several classes. Property is every thing, and therefore I must try to give an idea of the distribution of property, and of the supposed incomes, in the following table of the direct taxes.

Taxes paid.		Supposed Income.		Proprietors.
From	to	From	to	
1,000 f.	any amount	9,000 f.	any amount	19,900
500	1,000	4,500	9,000	28,800
300	500	2,700	4,500	52,500
200	300	1,800	2,700	116,000
150	200	1,350	1,800	155,000
100	150	900	1,350	197,000
80	100	720	900	254,000
60	80	540	720	345,000
40	60	360	540	637,000
20	40	180	360	1,195,000
10	20	90	180	2,315,000
Under	10	Under	90	3,850,000

Total of the proprietors . . . 9,165,200

The total number of the tax-payers being 9,165,000, whilst the number of "*active citizens*" is only 8,896,000, it follows that among the tax-payers there are at least 500,000 females, or minors, to make up the difference, and to account for the indigent adult who do not pay.

The first class of the population, the working class, pay almost the whole of the taxes under forty francs. Every individual of that class in the country fortunately has a house; a most miserable one, perhaps, but still a house of his own, and a small plot of garden attached to it, where he grows vegetables in sufficient quantity for his family. Many have an orchard, and some have half an acre, an acre, or even more, of arable land, to grow corn or to feed a cow or a few pigs. The average amount of their earnings is 450 francs (£18) a year. With this, a labourer keeps his family, and saves a few francs every year to purchase a small parcel of land.

The taxes, from forty to 200 francs, are principally paid by the second class, and by the fourth. A small part of them only is paid by the learned or scientific gentlemen belonging to the second class, who pay the highest rate of taxes: and thus the third class, the least numerous, has the greatest share in the distribution of wealth and of education.

We have now a complete idea of the state of the French population, with regard to its division according to sex, age, education, and property; but we have something more to say on the condition of the 8,896,000 adult individuals really composing the French people, and called "*active citizens*" because they exercise their civil rights.

The rights of a Frenchman, when he becomes a citizen by completing his twenty-first year, are the following:—

1st. To draw lot for the conscription, and, if the chance is against him, to be made a soldier, and pass the best part of his life, if he does not lose it, in scouring Europe under

a Napoleon; and, under the Citizen King, in a career of butchery, pillage, and devastation in Africa, or even in France. Nearly a third part of the young men who arrive at twenty-one years of age, are annually compelled to exercise this right. Those who draw a good number have the right of composing the moveable national guard, and of being called to active military service, if the exigencies of the government require it.

2nd. The right of paying the capitation tax (*la contribution personnelle*), and the licence duties (*les patentes*). The right of paying all the other taxes is enjoyed by all persons, without regard to sex or age, when they have any property. The former is a privilege.

3rd. The right of acquiring or disposing of property by sale or mortgage; of contracting binding obligations of any sort; of suing or being sued in any court of civil law; of being appointed trustee to orphan or lunatic relations; in one word, of conducting his own and his family's business as he thinks proper, subject to the legal and fiscal, or other regulations imposed by the government.

Such are the civil rights of the French citizen. They are more properly called individual rights, as they refer only to the private acts of individuals, and not to their conduct as citizens, as members of a community, or of a political body. As members of a community, the citizens have, or at least ought to have, communal (or, as they are called, municipal) rights; and, as members of a political body, they ought to be allowed to exercise political rights. This is not the case. The municipal and political organization of France, having for its object only to strengthen the influence of the government, cannot be founded on a popular basis. That organization now demands our attention, and we will begin with the municipalities.

CHAPTER III.

THE MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION.

A COMMUNE, as has already been stated, is either a city, a town, a village, or a group of small villages or hamlets.

The communal or municipal authorities are, a mayor, one adjoint, or assistant, in communes containing less than 2,000 inhabitants; two adjoints in the communes having from 2,500 to 10,000 inhabitants; and one adjoint more for every 20,000 inhabitants above 10,000, in all the other communes; together with a municipal council, composed of ten members for 500 inhabitants; twelve, for from 500 to 1,500; sixteen, for from 1,500 to 2,500; twenty-one, for from 2,500 to 3,500; twenty-three, for from 3,500 to 10,000; twenty-seven, for from 10,000 to 30,000; and thirty-six, for above 30,000.

The municipal councils are elected not by all, but by a part only of the "active citizens" of the commune, in the following proportion.

There are ten electors for every 100 inhabitants in the communes under 1,000 inhabitants. Above 1,000, there are, for every additional 1,000, five electors for every 100 inhabitants, till the population is above 5,000; when the proportion is four electors per cent. for 15,000, and then three per cent. for above 15,000 inhabitants.

The electors are the highest rated people of the commune. This does not imply, that they are the rich of the country—quite the contrary; most of them are hardly above the working classes, or are confounded with them, for the greatest number of these electors belong to the rural communes under 1,000 inhabitants. The number of those

communes is 34,500, and their population is about 24,800,000 inhabitants; and, in many of those communes, the highest tax-payer could not be a communal elector in a more populous locality or in a town.

The municipal electors of the rural communes not only belong to the poor classes, but also to the ignorant classes! as it is principally in the villages that education is most neglected, 17,800 of them having no communal schools.

There, then, the government has not to fear meeting with much opposition from the electors. Being poor, they are dependent; and, being ignorant, they can be imposed upon, and therefore their number may be large without any danger.

But, in the towns and in the cities, where there are wealth and education, independence and knowledge, there is need of precaution; and the number of the electors must therefore be reduced, in proportion to the importance of the place; not, as it is said, because they would be too numerous, but, in order to be enabled to influence a majority of them. The proof is, that, without any qualification, most of the functionaries, and any one having a retiring pension of 600 francs, are, *ex-officio*, municipal electors.

The municipal electoral body being thus constituted, it is plain that the government has no reason to fear much for the composition of the municipal councils. Liberals, oppositionists, may be elected; nay, in some cases, the majority of the councilmen may belong to the opposition; but the government is always certain to obtain the election of five or six of its supporters, and that answers all its purposes, since it enables it to choose a mayor and the adjoints from amongst its own partisans.

In the towns of 3,000 inhabitants, or more, the mayors and the adjoints are nominated by the King. In all the other places, they are appointed by the prefects; and these

officials, although unpaid, are, particularly in the rural communes, the most subservient of all the functionaries.

The government well knows how much a half-educated peasant is jealous of his authority, and fond of exercising it over his betters. So the mayors and their assistants are generally chosen, not from amongst the old lords of the manor, who are, for the most part, Legitimists; or from amongst the best educated, these being generally Liberals; but from that class of men, who, conscious of their personal inferiority, are always inclined to make their superiors feel their official power. There is hardly an example of the mayor chosen by the King or the prefect, being the member of the council who has obtained the greatest number of votes. By such means, the communal administration is reduced to a very simple process. The minister transmits his commands to the prefects; the prefects transmit them to the mayors; and every one obeys and submits.

The municipal councils have no means of opposing the execution of these commands.

These councils cannot meet but when called on, or allowed to do so, by the prefect; and they cannot discuss, in their assembly, any other matter than that specified in the instrument of their convocation. If they act contrary to this, all their deliberations are void; and, as they cannot legally meet without having first asked permission from the prefect, and at the same time announcing the object of their meeting, it is evident that the prefect, by refusing the necessary authorization, is always able to defeat their objects.

This is not all. If one of these municipal councils, assembled by order or permission of the prefect to discuss a question, comes to a decision contrary to the views of the prefect and of the government, the prefect is authorised to quash and annul that decision; and, if the council persists in its opposition, a royal ordinance, on the demand of the

prefect, pronounces its dissolution. There are, at this present moment, many municipalities without councils, on account of their having opposed the mode of *recensement* (the census) ordered by the minister of finance.

The communal electors, in such circumstances, are generally disposed to side with the municipal councillors; and to re-elect them, when dismissed for having done their duty to their fellow citizens. To guard against such re-election, the King is authorised to suspend the municipal elections, and to appoint mayors, adjoints, and councilmen of his own choice. Such is the law passed in March, 1831, eight months after the Revolution of July!

We must not imagine that it is only when interfering in political matters, that municipal councils are exposed to the rebukes of the prefects, to suspension or to dissolution. They have no occasion, no opportunity for considering political questions, and they do not attempt to transgress the prohibitions. They attend to the interests of their localities. The maintenance or the establishment of a school; the repairing of a church, of a bridge, of a road, at their own expense, and according to their own views; the regulations for keeping the streets in proper order—are the only subjects which they can discuss, and that only after having first asked permission of the sub-prefect, who refers the demand to the prefect, who grants or refuses the authorization to summon and assemble the council. Not a franc can be expended for any purpose without that authorization.

The communes, before the Revolution, had some property in woods and lands; but that property has generally been taken from them, and their only revenue now is a percentage (*centimes additionnels*) on the direct taxes. That revenue not being sufficient to cover the expenses, in the large communes and the towns, they provide for the deficiency by the *octrois*, the duty imposed upon the provisions

introduced into the place, and by more additional *centimes*; but they cannot do that—they cannot even meet to consider the necessity or the practicability of the measure, without the assent of the prefect.

Of course, the representatives of the prefects, the mayors, scarcely ever fail to execute the orders transmitted to them, and often go beyond their instructions. The municipal councils cannot prevent it. They have no authority but when assembled; and the mayors are not inclined to propose their convocation, in order to have their own misconduct inquired into.

The prefects can order the assembling of the councils when they want their approbation to carry any measures; but those measures being frequently not for the interest of the communes, but profitable only to the government, are accordingly rejected by the councils, which is generally the cause of their suspension or dissolution. At their regular quarterly meetings, the municipal councils have no other power than to receive and pass the accounts, presented by the mayor, of the authorised expenditure of the commune during the preceding three months. Most of the councilmen, in the rural communes, know very little of reading and writing, and still less of arithmetic. Nay, many thousands of the mayors themselves belong to the uneducated class. We may infer then, that those accounts, however unsatisfactory, are hardly ever found fault with.

In the towns and in large cities, this is not the case. There the members of the councils do not so easily submit to the discretion of the mayors, and to the will of the prefects. They at least resent the abuse of authority on the part of those functionaries, and seize every opportunity of stigmatising their acts, when they can do no more. The fact is, that, of the 2,200 town councils, more than sixteen hundred are in opposition to the system of the government;

and it is principally on that account that the government has so completely crippled the natural authority of those municipal bodies.

The municipal councils are renewed one-half every three years; and every three years, after the election of the new councilmen, the mayors and adjoints are appointed. All, however, may be, and generally are, re-elected.

I conclude the exposure of this mockery of a municipal administration by an enumeration of the electors and agents.

The number of the "active citizens" is . . .	8,896,000
The communal electors amount to . . .	2,795,000
The communal councilmen . . .	426,000

In this new division of the population, we have, 1st, 6,101,000 active citizens debarred from all participation, even in the communal concerns; 2nd, 2,795,000 whose interference is limited to the election of councilmen, who are professedly chosen to manage the affairs of the commune; 3rd, 426,000 communal councilmen, who are, by law, prohibited doing any thing, under any circumstances, but what pleases the King, the ministers, the prefects, the sub-prefects, the mayors, and the assistants.

Yet is this the only institution which really proceeds from any considerable portion of the people, and which can be said to belong to the people, from the condition, the habits, the occupations, the interests, the feeling, the amount of property, and the degree of instruction or of ignorance of the electors and the elected. Bad as the law is, it does not answer all the purposes of the government. In almost every one of the municipal councils, there are, at the least, three or four morally independent men, who lead their colleagues; and, if they cannot propose and pass any of those measures which they consider beneficial to their localities, they oppose, as far as speaking and voting can do it, the

official measures which they deem injurious or obnoxious to their fellow citizens. They feel their impotency; they claim a real municipal authority; and, almost every where, the councils are arrayed against the authorities which they are bound to obey. Before long, then, the law of 1831 must be altered; the number of communal electors and councilmen must be considerably reduced, so as to ensure the submission of all.

CHAPTER IV.

THE COUNCILS OF ARRONDISSEMENTS AND OF DEPARTMENTS.

THE departmental organization of the people is no better than the communal administration. The councils of *arrondissements* and the general council of the departments are much further removed from the mass of the people in their origin than the municipal councils, and they are as much under the absolute control of the prefects and the sub-prefects, instead of being a check on those high officials.

The law organising those councils was proposed and passed in 1833, when the influence of the Revolution of July, which was still felt in 1831, during the discussion of the communal law, had almost completely subsided. The civil, municipal, and political rights of the citizens were very little thought of at the latter period, except with the view of restricting their exercise, and of making that exercise the privilege, the monopoly, of the smallest possible number.

The effects of the municipal law had also been experienced. The municipal councils proved to be decidedly Liberal, and the mayors themselves were not less so. They had formed the national association, they claimed all kind of Liberal institutions, and especially the proper limitation of the administrative authority; that is to say, of *the despo-*

tic centralization of all the interests of the country in the hands of the ministers and their agents. These pretensions sufficiently proved that the election of the general councils, and of the councils of *arrondissements*, could not be entrusted to the same constituencies, without danger for the governmental despotism : and having, in the same period, experienced that the electoral law for choosing the deputies had been productive of a most tractable and ductile chamber, the government concluded that the same electors would give the very best councils of *arrondissements* and of departments, and a law for that purpose was proposed to the chambers and adopted, almost without opposition.

I am under the necessity of explaining that law, since it is the only available means of appreciating the results.

The Restoration, when compelled to assume the appearance of a constitutional government, had taken care that the electoral and representative system should not endanger the prevalent ascendancy of the will of the government. The *doctrinaires*, who were then in power, found out that, by imposing as qualifications for the representative privilege the payment of 1,000 francs in direct taxes, and to be above forty years of age, they would reduce the eligibles to the small number of 15,000, and that, by restricting the electoral franchise to citizens thirty years of age and upwards, and paying 300 francs direct taxes, the number of electors would be under 80,000. Comparing this number of 80,000 with the number of places at their disposal, the ministers found themselves safe enough, and they framed their first electoral law on these principles.

In the course of a few years, they found that the law did not answer their expectations; that the electoral colleges were exceedingly tainted with Liberalism, and returned Liberal members. They therefore resolved to alter the law; they increased the number of the deputies, and the additional members were to be elected by the highest class of

electors, those who, paying 1,000 francs in direct taxes, were also eligible by the new electoral system ; these gentlemen, besides being eligible and continuing to be electors in their *arrondissements*, formed another electoral college for the department, and thus voted twice in the election of deputies.

This plan succeeded for some time ; but Liberalism gradually penetrated the higher electoral colleges, and Radical deputies were sent even by those double-voting electors. Villèle was turned out of the ministry ; and Martignac would have experienced the same fate, if he had not been ousted by a court intrigue, to make way for Polignac, who was overthrown with the legitimate dynasty.

Some persons may be led to infer that a law producing such effects, and sending patriotic deputies, must have been a good law, while the Legitimists proclaim that it was altogether a bad law. The fact is, that neither the second nor the first law had anything to do with the event ; the same consequences would have attended any electoral law whatsoever. The government alone was answerable for the events which dethroned the feeble-minded, but honest and kind Charles X.

Since the expulsion of the *doctrinaires* from power, the government had been more honestly and less cruelly carried on, and especially after the accession of Charles X. It was Villèle and the late King who abolished the censorship of the press, and established the trial by jury for all the offences committed by it ; instead of retaining in force the laws of the *doctrinaires*, the censors and the judgment by a tribunal of officials. Since 1824, under the royalist ministries, no police conspiracies, no entrapping of Bonapartist officers, no attempts against the life of the King or any of the members of his family had ever been thought of, much less had they been made a part and parcel of the governmental system. No periodical execution and wholesale massacres after a con-

cocted rebellion, were considered indispensable for keeping up a popular persuasion of the abilities of the ministry and a fear of their power. The government was bad, was anti-national; but it was neither treacherous nor cruel.

Charles X. and his ministers might have been both, and still have succeeded, had they been as void of principle, of feeling, of religion, as either their predecessors or their successors. They were quite the reverse, and they fell. They fell, because, as old monarchists, they thought that they ought to employ the faithful adherents of the old monarchy. They fell, because they considered that those who had participated in the same dangers, in the same misfortunes, suffered the same persecutions, and wandered in the same exile, were entitled to a share in their actual prosperity; and the public offices were given to them, as a compensation for their long sufferings and the loss of their property. They fell, because, sincere Catholics, standing by the church-and-state principle, *le trône et l'autel*, they made Catholicity an indispensable qualification for office. Governing, as they did, for the interests of a class, of a party, this was honesty and consistency; but honesty and consistency cannot support, nay, they must ruin a dishonest and inconsistent cause. In the attempt to recover absolute power, and to preserve it along with a representative body, they ought to have acted differently. Instead of asking the candidate for office or promotion—Do you deserve it? are you a monarchist? have you suffered for us? are you a Christian?—they had only to ask—Are you an elector, and will you vote for our candidates?

Such were the principles of the *doctrinaires* in 1814, and during their continuance in office; such they are still. The Royalists, having to deal with 80,000 electors only, could not master them, and thereby justified the judgment of their rivals, *les Royalistes sont incapables*.

Villèle, however, gradually became a proficient in the

political science, as taught by the *doctrinaires*; and he proved it, when, in 1826, he prepared, with Peyronnet, the law for the organization of the jury. He first settled, that the 80,000 electors should compose the lists of jurymen; he then added to the lists the unpaid functionaries appointed by the King, the members of the learned societies acknowledged by the government, the notaries, the attorneys practising in the courts of justice, and the doctors and licentiates in the faculties. I mention the composition of the general lists of the jurymen, because the citizens inscribed in those lists are the electors of the councils of *arrondissements* and of departments.

But the electoral law of the Restoration was modified in 1831. After the Revolution of July, it was impossible to maintain in force a privilege enjoyed by so small a proportion of the population. The general opinion was in favour of the electoral law of the Constituent Assembly; and, had not the King taken advantage of his popularity and of other circumstances, to postpone the presentation and the discussion of a new law, there is no doubt that the law of 1791 would have been re-established in the political code of France. The *doctrinaires* and the King knew it too well; and when, under the ministry of Lafitte, the present law was proposed, corruption had already done its work, and Lafitte himself was at the same time the subject and the promoter of that corruption.

He proposed to reduce the electoral qualifications from 300 francs to 200, and from thirty years of age to twenty-five; and, as to the eligibility, the age was reduced from forty years to thirty, and the amount of contributions to the taxes from 1,000 to 500 francs. Everybody was indignant at so barefaced an attempt to continue that abominable system of exclusion of the people from the electoral colleges; and, even in the chamber, such as it was, the majority expected that the electoral census would be reduced to 100

francs. Thus the number of electors would have amounted to more than 550,000 ; and it would not then have been in the power of the government to secure, by the places at its disposal, a constant majority in the electoral colleges.

To guard against such a danger, the King, the new court, and the ministers, had recourse to an expedient which, although almost worn out, is always successful. The majority of the commission to which the examination of the law had been referred were bribed ; and their chosen reporter, Béranger, one of those wily politicians called most honourable men—because it is their plan, as it suits their interests to be now and then in opposition, proposed to fix at 750 francs the qualification of the eligibles, and at 250 francs the qualification of the electors. Thus the ministers, by combating those alterations and defending their own projects, got the credit of fighting for popular rights, while they were annihilating the popular energies.

They carried their point ; and, according to their law, the payment of 200 francs direct taxes, and the age of twenty-five years, are the present electoral qualifications. By a subsequent law, similar to that of the Restoration, the electoral list, with the addition of about 15,000 officials, appointed by the King, compose the list of jurymen. Thus, a small proportion of the citizens are, at the same time, the electors of the councils of *arrondissements*, and of the general councils of the departments ; the electors of the deputies, and the judges of the rest of their fellow citizens.

The number of the persons entitled by their age and their property to share in the electoral monopoly, is under 200,000. We have seen, in the administrative statistics, that the paid officials, and those who, although not paid by the state, derive their income from the offices bestowed upon them by the government, are above 500,000. It

follows that the government has the means of seducing and bribing the whole of the electoral body.

Four hundred of those officials are paid from 20,000 francs to 400,000 francs (the allowance of the French ambassador in London). Two thousand nine hundred officials receive from 10,000 francs to 20,000 francs. Seven thousand obtain from 4,500 francs to 10,000 francs. Forty thousand offices are worth from 2,000 francs to 4,500 francs. Seventy-five thousand range between 1,200 francs and 2,000 francs: 125,000 wards, from 800 francs to 1,200 francs. All the other offices produce less than 800 francs. In short, here we have 245,000 places at the disposal of the government, with a salary of 800 francs for the lowest offices, and gradually rising to 100,000 francs.

We have stated that a direct tax of 200 francs supposes an income of 1,800 francs. It may easily be conceived that a gentleman with so small an income is not unwilling to add even the insignificant sum of 800 francs to his annual revenue, by accepting an employment. If he is not willing to accept of it for himself, he may be induced to procure it for a son, a brother, or for a son-in-law, as the marriage-portion of a daughter. An elector in easier circumstances will decline an office so niggardly remunerated, but will be pleased with another producing 1,800, 2,000, or 3,000 francs. To the superior class of electors, the bribes are the highest and the best paid places. Thus it were easy to imagine an electoral body entirely composed of placemen, who would unanimously elect, as deputies, the ministerial candidates. Then the 459 deputies, and the peers being provided for in the same manner, the same unanimity would prevail in the two chambers. The laws would be passed by acclamation as soon as introduced. Would not that be a capital order of things?

No! The statesmen of France are too cunning to commit such a fault. They very properly consider that it would be overdoing the thing; that an opposition is necessary, and cannot be dispensed with, in the electoral colleges, as well as in the chambers. Without an opposition in the chambers, the ministers could not remain six months in office. The court would be too much for them. But an opposition affords them the opportunity of displaying their political genius, of pouring forth their eloquence, of humbling their rivals, of restraining factions, of crushing demagogues, of annually saving the state, and, in short, of becoming great men. This is the principal, the constant object, the *grand œuvre* of a French ministry, since the Revolution of July; and they accomplish it by means of a simple but certain majority.

To secure that majority is, then, the only thing absolutely necessary. Two hundred and thirty members form the absolute majority of the deputies; they must have a few more. Two hundred and sixty would be enough in the minister's opinion; but the opinion of the court is in favour of 300. The total number of electors, in 350 poor electoral *arrondissements*, is, at the utmost, 100,000. Sixty thousand places, granted to as many electors of those *arrondissements*, give to the minister of the day a majority of 20,000 votes in the colleges; and he obtains this object at a sacrifice of only one quarter of the good things at his disposal. The large towns, the industrial and enlightened departments, can vote as they please; it is a matter of perfect indifference.

Such is the electoral science, as professed and openly practised by the *doctrinaires*! There is no difficulty in anticipating the results with regard to the councils of *arrondissements* and of departments, as well as with regard to the chamber of deputies, when the minister of the inte-

rior, the grand elector of France, has nothing else to do, in order to secure success, but to send a circular to the prefects and the sub-prefects, threatening a dismissal, not of themselves only, but also of their subordinate agents in all the branches of the public administration, if the ministerial candidates are defeated in the electoral colleges.

Let us now successively examine the organization of the councils, and see how they interfere in the administration of the country. Both councils are composed of as many members as there are cantons in the *arrondissements*, or in the departments; with this exception, that the general council of the department is limited to thirty members, whatever may be the number of cantons. By this provision of the law, the superiority of one department over another, in population, education, industry, and wealth, is completely disregarded. The department of the *Nord*, with a population of above 1,000,000 of inhabitants and seventy cantons, and the departments of the *Seine inférieure* and of the *Pas de Calais*, with almost 700,000 inhabitants each, better educated, more industrious, and more wealthy, than those of any other part of France, are on the same footing with the departments of the *Hautes Alpes* and of the *Basses Alpes*, neither of which contains 200,000 inhabitants. The reason is obvious. Education, industry, and wealth, are conducive to independence; and all the government wants is, subserviency, which is rather scarce in those departments. Therefore, to prevent the introduction of too many independent gentlemen into the general councils, they must not be in proportion, with regard to number, to the population and the riches of the department.

The councils of *arrondissements* are renewed by one-half every third year, and the general councils, by one-third at the same periods. The principal, the only object of their establishment is to give to the administration of the prefects and

the sub-prefects in the departments and in the *arrondissements*, the support of a supposed departmental representation; like that which the ministry receive from the chamber of deputies; and they have nothing to do, as a matter of business, but to apportion the direct taxes between the *arrondissements* and the communes. For this purpose, they are annually convened after the session of the legislative chambers. The prefects communicate to the general councils the assessment of the taxes made by the ministry of finances amongst all the departments. The councils have no right to object to the amount charged on their respective departments. They are called only to approve of the allotment of the share of their departments amongst the *arrondissements*, which is made by the prefects. Then their session is at an end; and the councils of *arrondissements* are summoned in their turn to approve of the apportionment of their share in the communes of the *arrondissements*.

We are told, and we should naturally believe, that these councils have a right to take into consideration and to propose any measures they may think useful to their *arrondissements* or their departments. But it is not so. It is true that, during their session, they are allowed to express an opinion, and even a wish, upon the matters which are proposed by the prefects and the sub-prefects, and especially upon the employment of a small part of the taxes for the benefit of the department, and even to augment the departmental taxes, or to reject any additional burden which the prefects and the sub-prefects may demand. But they can go no further; and, after their session, they are practically non-existent. They cannot meet again without being called together by the prefect, and authorized by a royal ordinance. Nay, during their session, they are prohibited from entering into any subject not referred to them by the authorities.

They are prohibited from issuing any protest, from publishing declarations for or against any measure. Correspondence between the members of the general councils and the councils of *arrondissements* is interdicted. The transgression of these prohibitions is punished by the suspension of the councils, which the prefects are authorized to pronounce, or by their dissolution, which is ordered by the King. Such is the import of the 16th and 17th articles of the law organizing these councils.

These legal precautions sufficiently prove how anxious the government is to restrict the authority of the councils, and to limit their power; and some, perhaps, will wonder at the manifestation of such fears, when, besides being elected by a majority of placemen, the members of councils can be conciliated by other means. The number of general councilmen being but 2,300, and of councilmen of *arrondissements* 3,200, there are offices enough to bring the majority to a perfect compliance with ministerial wishes as is done with the deputies.

All this is very true. The government acts on this principle, and most of the councilmen are placemen: and yet they cannot be relied upon in every thing, and for a very obvious reason. They live, they deliberate, they act in the midst of their acquaintances, their friends, and their relations. They are, therefore, to a certain degree, under the influence of local affections and local interests, generally opposed to governmental tendencies and ministerial interests. Their votes, their acts cannot remain a secret, and they can be made answerable for them. They may suffer in their private relations, in the estimation of their neighbours, for their too marked subserviency and for their misdeeds. The fear of this militates against the desire of ministerial favours. Under some circumstances, they may be overcome by the sound arguments of some patriotic colleague, or by the pressure

from without. All this accounts for the precautions taken by the government. The case is different with the deputies. When in Paris, they lose sight of their constituencies, of their local connexions; and they imagine that they themselves are also out of sight. They frequent ministerial dinners, the theatres, the court galas, where they are in no fear of being reproached with their baseness. They associate with their accomplices only, and they are sure of approbation and encouragement. Their votes are secret; and, if they can but be silent during the parliamentary session, they may go back to their departments, and assert that they are and have been in opposition to the ministry.

We must not say more on the subject of the general councils, and of the councils of *arrondissements*. We have fully demonstrated that they are of no use whatever for the defence of the rights and interests of the people, and that they are but the instruments of the administrative despotism.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

WE have shown, in the preceding pages, the composition of the electoral body, and how, by bestowing all the public offices at its disposal on electors only, or on their families and relatives, the government has the means of securing from the electoral colleges the return of any candidates introduced by the prefects and the sub-prefects. It is ascertained that two-thirds of the electors in France are at this moment dependent on the government by the places they have obtained for themselves or for their children and other relatives. During the last two years, more than 45,000 places or promotions have been granted in this manner, by the present administration, in addition to those previously

bestowed on 70,000 electors; and, as the practice in every ministry has been, to grant plans only on the demand or on the recommendation of ministerial deputies, it follows that the electors are interested in re-electing the same deputies, to whom they are already indebted for their situations, and from whom they expect promotions, or some other snug appointments for the younger members of their families. Thus the deputy of an *arrondissement* is in some sort irremovable. Some of them make a traffic of their influence, and receive a per-centage on the value of the emoluments, or other ministerial favours, preferring that to being employed themselves, as they can pretend to be independent and disinterested in their support of the ministry.

Lest the fact should be doubted, I must explain it. I know, not one only, but twenty deputies who possess little more than the qualification, 4,500 francs a-year (180*l.*), and who cannot live six months in Paris on that income; but they are legislative and administrative jobbers. To promote the bills for the two Versailles railways, many of them received from 40 to 100 shares. They were largely paid, three years ago, by the contractors for supporting the law on the fortifications of Paris. Three of them, to my knowledge, are in the practice of charging from 40*l.* to 60*l.* for the appointments obtained through their influence, and they derive a tolerably good income from that source. The ministers know this; they assist in it; nay more, they themselves do the same. Two years ago, one of them introduced a railway bill, for a *douceur* of 4,000*l.*; which railway bill was rejected, because the co-peers of the minister were without 1,000 francs to begin with, and were besides so discreditable that nobody would join them in the undertaking.

The general principle of the electoral and representative system now firmly established in France is, that to obtain

any thing of any kind, at the hands of the government, from which every thing proceeds, the electors must return deputies ready to do every thing for the government, and to make the most they can of their functions. The house of deputies then, filtered through every process that policy and corruption could invent to minimise, as Jeremy Bentham would have said, the operation of national feeling, and to maximise the governmental preponderance, has completely answered the sinister purposes for which it was established, and cannot but continue to act, as it has done for the last twelve years, against the opinions and the interests of the French people.

I cannot without disgust look on the personal composition of the present house. A more ignorant, more despicable, more venal, more unprincipled, more villanous and cowardly set of people never was collected in any country, than the mountebanks who periodically assemble at the *Palais Bourbon*. It is quite in accordance with the origin of the name of their place—it is a *bourbier*. If you take out from them about twenty members, and amongst these De Tracy, Dupont de l'Eure, Cormenin, Arrago, De Corcelles, Isambert, de Thiers, George Lafayette, Lanjuinais, Allier, Corne, and, amongst the legitimates, Blin de Bourdon, La Roche-jacquelin, and a few others, you will not, by any possible process, extract from all the others united, one particle of political or, indeed, of private honesty, of patriotism, of any refined or manly feeling, of regard for the rights of the people; of concern for their interests, of commiseration for their distress. They are nothing better than a ravenous crew, hoaxing, fighting, pilfering one another's nests, and agreeing on only one purpose, *to feed and breed on the national corpse*. Such they were from the beginning; such they are, and such they will continue to be, so long as the present system of government stands.

My judgment will no doubt be deemed exceedingly severe; but I beg to say, that it is conformable to the general opinion, and the few honest deputies themselves confirm it on every point. Let us quote one fact, in confirmation.

M. Thierry Poux, a medical man, of good property, had for years been a sort of Providence to the poor of Montauban, while at the same time his upright character, his science, his modesty, and his kind benevolence to all, had gained for him the respect and the love of every class. Immediately after the Revolution of July, he was unanimously appointed mayor of the town; and, at the first general election, his fellow citizens, with the same unanimity, Catholics as well as Protestants, chose him for their deputy. He reluctantly accepted the mission, and went to Paris fully determined to do his duty. That was the time of the seductions and apostasies of the deputies: offices, money, crosses of honour, ministerial and royal dinners and balls, were then the governmental tactics. Poux refused every thing, and, when urged to accept a place at the royal table, answered, "that he could not with consistency meet at a convivial table persons with whom he differed on almost every point, and that, if the invitation were meant as a favour, he could not accept favours from those whom it was his duty to control." He said this without arrogance, and with that mild simplicity of manner characteristic of all his conduct. He could not long be a witness of the administrative and representative depravity. Six months after his election he went back to his poor Montaubanese, and wrote to the president of the chamber of deputies the following letter:—

Chambre des Députés.

28 Fevrier, 1832.

Monsieur le President,

Voulant répudier toute solidarité avec la majorité d'une chambre qui se rend complice du système disastreux et des actes déplorables d'un ministère anti-national, je donne ma démission de député.

THIERRY POUX.*

It was but eighteen months after the Revolution of July, that this honest and unpretending man found that he could not conscientiously remain any longer in connexion with perjured and corrupt colleagues, who already formed the majority. It was during the ministry of Casimir Perrier, who despised the *doctrinaires* as a set of sophistical pedagogues, hated them for their treacherous and sanguinary deeds during the Restoration, and would not, on any account, admit them in his ministry. Ten years have since elapsed, ten years of *doctrinary*, that is to say, barefaced, impudent, and systematic corruption, of cruel intimidation, and savage executions, and perpetual misrule; all with the approbation of the majority of the deputies, who benefit by it.

Their intellectual capacity is on a par with their integrity: any 459 persons taken at random from amongst the people passing the barriers of Paris, would prove more intelligent,

* CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

28th February, 1832.

Mr. President,

Desirous of repudiating all joint-responsibility with the majority of a chamber which renders itself an accomplice in the disastrous system and in the deplorable measures of an anti-national ministry, I resign my functions as a deputy.

THIERRY POUX.

as well as more honest. Three hundred of those deputies know nothing of the real principles of social and political economy ; they do not even understand the *doctrinarian* system itself, to the maintenance of which they are instrumental, except so far as they individually benefit by it. They do not generalise—they do not understand the *ensemble* of corruption and tyranny of which their individual corruption and baseness form a component part. Political mechanics, they do their part at the machinery, without knowing, without inquiring about the total result. I beg pardon of the English mechanics ; they know better than that ; I must find another similitude—I have it. You see, in brick-fields, the dumb animals, which, blinded and attached to the shaft, turn round and grind ; so it is with the majority of the French deputies. But here again, my comparison is in part faulty, and I must also beg pardon of the poor blinded beasts ; they grind because they cannot help it—they are whipped to their work ; but the rational brutes willingly do it, and do it with pleasure.

Most of them know nothing of France but the chief towns of their departments ; the road to Paris, studied from the inside of a diligence ; and, in Paris, only the way from their lodgings to the Thuilleries, to the ministries, to the chamber, and to the theatres. As to Europe, there are not fifty amongst them who could write accurately, on a sheet of paper, the names of the several countries in their proper positions ; and, as to the statistics of those countries, not one in twenty could answer the very simplest question relative to them.

As to reasoning, or discussion on any subject of internal or external policy, except with regard to matters immediately affecting their localities, they are generally quite unequal to the task ; and they themselves know it, but they do not wish it to be known by others ; and, in order

to save their *amour propre*, deputies are allowed to read their speeches. It is a trade in Paris to compose speeches for the deputies; who then successively shine at the tribune, and, during a fortnight, dissert on general questions without answering one another. But unfortunately for the trade in speeches, though fortunately for the public and for public questions, many of the deputies cannot even read correctly the speeches written for them; and they would be doomed to perpetual silence, if the ministerial strategy had not provided a most important employment for their lungs. At a signal given by one of the ministers, bravos, cheers, interruptions, murmurs, cries of order, all in a gradation beginning with No! No! and rising to savage yells, resound in the assembly. This is the order, the regulation of the debates, on important occasions; it generally secures the triumph of the ministry; then the sheep-headed Jacques Lefebvre cries, "*Vive le Roi!*" which is immediately re-echoed by the whole party, and the assembly adjourn and walk off in triumph.

Such being the general composition of the house, it follows that ready and extempore speakers pass for geniuses among their partisans; but, with the exception of one really great orator, and two or three sensible *polemists*, there is not one of those geniuses that would not either be coughed down, or silenced, by a universal explosion of dissatisfaction, or left speaking to empty benches, in the British House of Commons.

These ready speakers, always excepting three or four, have no other merit than the practice of public speaking and the utmost confidence in themselves, which, however, varies according to the habits and professions of the parties, who may be divided into three classes, the professors, the king's attorneys and judges, and the barristers.

The professors, (and there are half a dozen of them, with

Guizot at their head,) accustomed to speak to young men, to be listened to, without any contradiction, to convince an auditory bound to *jurare in verba magistri*, have the greatest share of self-confidence. It really amounts in them to a conviction of their own superiority, and of the immense inferiority of their auditors. Indeed, there is all this and more; there is a sort of contempt in the posture, in the tone, in the gesture, nay, in the very words, which nobody could stand, but a mass of unintelligent and degraded varlets.

The king's attorneys and other magistrates have a good deal of this, but to a less extent. They are, in their judicial functions, subject to be contradicted, and they often must argue, while the schoolmaster needs only to assert. Yet they have one advantage over the advocates, who come next, since they cannot be interrupted, and are always listened to with attention, which is not the case with the latter, who, however, in political as in judicial discussions, consider themselves privileged to say all they can in defence of their clients.

Beyond this self-confidence and practice of speaking on any subject, there is nothing that deserves to be mentioned as eloquence and talent, if we except Berryer, and, though very inferior to him, Mauguin, Arrago, and Lamartine. Berryer is really an orator, a grand orator. His intelligence is of the first order; and, on hearing him, one feels the truth of the remark of Cicero, "*Pectus est quod disertum facit.*" There is no affectation of superiority, no self-prepossession in his manners; but there is feeling in his countenance, in his words, in his voice, in his gestures. It is to be lamented that he belongs to a party which can never be national. He is the Mirabeau of legitimacy; but he will never rebuild what Mirabeau has destroyed, since Mirabeau himself could not do it.

I would not mention Odillon Barrot, if a sort of engou-

ment, so common in France, had not made a great man of him. He himself shows his conviction of his own importance in all his deportment. On seeing him walk, stop, sit, or make the slightest movement, self-conceit is the only visible faculty of the man. Ignorance of the first principles of social order is manifest in all his speeches. Common-place ideas, presented without order, declamatory sentences, and a dull, heavy, thick, monotonous delivery, characterise his oratory. A French friend defines him thus : "*Cette tête n'est qu'une balle de gros son* ;"* and I do not know a more appropriate definition.

The liberals, taking him at his own valuation, have made him their leader. I ought rather to say, that they accepted him, as such, from the past and present ministers, who, having taken measure of him, treated him as a leader ; quite sure that they had nothing to fear from a party marching under such a guide. They were not disappointed in their expectations. The political acts of Odillon Barrot are as absurd and as harmless to them as his oratory.

The son of a member of the tribunat who had boldly opposed the march of Napoleon to the throne, having married the grand-daughter of l'Abbé de Pompières, (another of those few who have always been true to the cause of the people,) Odillon Barrot was introduced by them both as their intended successor. This accounts for his rising as he did, and his being placed in the first rank of the liberals. Though his mind was not equal to the task, his heart was at first a sound director ; but the heart and the mind have long since been at par.

Mauguin is, in many respects, very superior to Odillon Barrot. But his probity is suspected by the liberal party, and nobody confides in him. Arrago, who seems destined to be the chief of the small band of patriots in the chamber, by the ascendancy of his talents, by the extent of his poli-

* *Son* is French for *bran* as well as *sound*.

tical views, and by his sincerity, is sometimes equal to Berryer in eloquence ; he is now the only one who has obtained popularity. De Tracy, one of the best citizens in France, and a man of first-rate abilities, has, during the last twenty-five years, constantly and bravely fought all the battles of liberty in the chamber ; and, but for his modesty, would long since have been acknowledged as the leader of the national party ; no one deserves it better. But, satisfied with doing his duty to his country, he never thinks of popularity. He has no newspaper at his command, like Mauguin, Odillon Barrot, Thiers, Guizot, and others.

Cormenin, the first political writer of the day, scarcely ever ascends the tribune. Isambert, the best of the French jurisconsults, is no orator. The same must be said of some others. Their principles are sound, their logic is conclusive, their arguments are unanswerable. They do not attempt to be eloquent ; they think it better to be reasonable. They disdain big words and well turned sentences ; they prefer plain common sense and clear and simple language.

In a chamber of deputies, so completely devoid of honesty and of intelligence, principles, logic, common sense, are quite thrown away. They understand no other language than that of their interests and of their passions. They understand the word of command, and they obey. If they appear to hesitate, they are told that the monarchy is in danger, that the national honour is tarnished, that public order must be supported. They very well know that monarchy, national honour, and public order, mean nothing but themselves, their functions, their emoluments, their honours ; and they immediately fly to the rescue of their patrons, whoever and whatsoever they may be.

Persons who are unacquainted with the working of the system, will not fail to object, that there must be something overstrained or inaccurate in my representation of the facts ; since, if the electors and deputies were as corrupt, as sub-

servient as I pretend they are, no ministry could ever be left in a minority, and that the ministerial revolutions would not be so frequent as they are in France. This apparent inconsistency will soon be explained.

The system of corrupting the electors, of securing their votes by giving to them the public functions, began under Casimir Perrier; but his illness, followed by his death, in May, 1832, did not allow him to go to any great length in the accomplishment of that project. The succeeding ministry, composed of Soult, Broglie, Guizot, Humann, Thiers, Barthe, Rigny, and d'Argoult, could not immediately set to work on that plan. The *doctrinaires*, with Thiers and Humann, had first to provide for their friends, who had constantly been rejected by Perrier; but afterwards they acted upon the principle, and they soon had an opportunity of ascertaining its results.

The abominable chamber elected in 1831, and so justly stigmatised in the letter of Poux, began, in 1834, to be afraid of the responsibility they had incurred by their approbation and support of a system of government which had excited the indignation of the whole country; and, as their zeal relented, the chamber was dissolved.

The elections were against the ministry; and the first act of the new chamber was to declare to the King, in their address, that "*une politique libérale et modérée est la seule digne du gouvernement que la France a choisi et que nous avons juré de maintenir.*" This condemnation of the ministry was followed by a prorogation of the chambers, in order to attempt a reconciliation with the most influential deputies. Not succeeding in the attempt, the ministry resigned. The King, according to his practice in such circumstances, called in men whom he knew to be unable to weather the coming storm,—Bassano, Bresson, Bernard, Dupin, Passy, and Teste. They were, in fact, laughed out

in eight days ; and the former ministry was re-installed, with the exception of Soult and de Broglie, who dared not face the chamber.

The persuasive arguments of the ministers soon convinced the majority of the new deputies, that their system was the very best possible. De Broglie joined his former colleagues after the death of Maréchal Mortier ; and they had all their own way with the chamber. But, in order to guard against any future condemnatory address of a new chamber, they assiduously worked on the electoral body. Thus they went on until 1836, and would have gone on for ever, if, having no opposition in the chambers, they had not taken to opposing one another.

Humann, in order to promote industrial and commercial enterprises, wanted to reduce the rate of interest of the national debt. De Broglie, (a *grand seigneur*,) and the court, could not comprehend the necessity of industry and commerce taking twenty per cent. of the revenues of gentlemen and noblemen. The deputies divided on the question, and decided, by a small majority, that Humann was right ; and then decided, by an equally small majority, that de Broglie and the court were right also, in delaying the conversion until they found it convenient. Certainly, no chamber could show a more accommodating disposition ; but Humann would not be thus accommodated, and sent in his resignation. During the four years he had been at the head of the ministry of finances, he had disposed of at least 60,000 offices or promotions : he had therefore his party in the electoral body, as well as amongst the deputies ; and they were dissatisfied.

Some of those deputies, after the retreat of their patron, pressed de Broglie to state when he would find it convenient to reduce the interest of the debt. He answered with a ducal insolence, which the chamber, debased as it

was could not but resent and punish by its votes. The Duke de Broglie was turned out, and his administration broken up.

Duchatel, Persil, and Guizot, having taken the part of the Duke and of the court, and being moreover odious to the people, could not be admitted into the new cabinet formed by Thiers, who was desirous of popularising his administration. Persil had been about two years in the ministry, de Broglie three years, and Guizot four years and a half. The first had disposed of about 1,200 places; the last two of about 10,000. Thus there were electors and deputies Persil, and electors and deputies Guizot and Broglie, who were then in opposition to the governing party.

Thiers went on to the satisfaction of the majority of the chamber, and without any strong opposition from the partisans of Humann, Persil, and Guizot. But he had been induced to attach great importance to the British alliance, to the execution of the quadruple treaty, and to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. On that question only he completely disagreed with the King, who, to pacify the autocrat, was breaking faith with England. Thiers, unable to keep the King to the terms of the alliance with Great Britain, resigned, and his ministry was dissolved.

During the six years he had been a minister, he had disposed of at least 60,000 places, and therefore he had a strong party, both amongst the deputies and amongst the electors.

An anti-British alliance cabinet was now formed. Molé took into it Guizot, Persil, Duchatel, Rosamel, Martin, and Gasparin, with a king's aide-de-camp for minister at war. The chamber was evidently dissatisfied. The British alliance had the majority in it; therefore, the dissolution of the chamber was ordered. Molé, thinking that the unpopularity of the *doctrinaires* was the cause of his defeat, got

rid of Guizot and Persil, and, indeed, formed an entirely new ministry, and proceeded to new general elections. Then it was that the result of the system appeared in all its perfection. To the coalition in the chamber between the deputies of Humann, of Thiers, of Guizot, of Persil, of Duchatel, succeeded the coalition of the electors of the same parties; and Molé was left in such a minority that he was obliged to resign.

The ministry of the 12th of May, under the presidency of Soult, was a return to the British alliance. But, as the ministers were not chosen from amongst the leaders of the coalition, those leaders were dissatisfied. Yet the chamber did not show any hostile feeling; quite the reverse; and, had not the ministers lent themselves to the gratification of the King's avarice, by asking a dotation for the Duke of Nemours, they would have kept their offices; but, the coalition meeting them on that ground, they were routed, after having committed the mistake of sending Guizot as ambassador to England.

Thiers was again called in to form an administration, and, in his very first speech in the chamber, proclaimed, to the great satisfaction of all, the determination of the King to adhere to the British alliance. Of course, he had the majority in the chamber, until the untoward treaty of July.

Here, again, I cannot help pausing to remark upon the singular fact, that the man who left the ministry in 1838, sooner than abandon the British alliance, who, re-entering the ministry in 1840, proclaimed his determination to maintain that alliance, should have been left in ignorance of most important negotiations; while the man who had formed a part of the Anti-English cabinet, to whom the British minister for foreign affairs had said, "we cannot believe you," is considered as the friend of England!

The chamber of deputies, which had been produced by an electoral coalition, and which, after upsetting the ministry of Molé, had supported and abandoned, in turn, the ministries of Soult and Passy, and of Thiers, had, in the same manner, given a majority to, and, on several important occasions, routed the ministry of Guizot, had now accomplished its destinies, and the electoral colleges were summoned to a general election. A new coalition was formed between the electors of all parties, against the electors that belonged to the present administration. The Legitimists, the Moléists, the Thiersists, the Passyists, and the Barrotists, were arrayed against the Guizotists; and, to complete the *mêlée*, the King's electors were themselves against all the others. As to the French people, they had nothing to do with the elections; they had not even the temporary privilege of looking on, and of hooting, hissing, and pelting the base men who were trafficking in votes, and selling to profligate factions the liberties and the honour of the country. The government, that is to say, the system such as I have represented it, obtained a majority willing to monopolise all the places, all the emoluments, all so-called honours. They will continue unanimously to resist the claims of the nation for a free government, for the restitution of popular rights, for the economical administration of the public wealth; but, after having done so, they will again quarrel and fight amongst themselves for the larger shares in the privilege of enslaving and robbing the people, and of distributing to their friends a part of their robberies. They all agree, that, for that purpose, nothing, or almost nothing, must be altered in the electoral law!

The utmost liberalism of Odillon Barrot, and of his party, goes no further than the paltry addition of 25,000 to the present number of electors, and the enactment of a few incompatibilities, which would exclude from the

chamber ten or twelve placemen. But, in all other matters relating to the administrative system, and the number, the graduation, and the distribution of offices, they all agree; that plague of the country must be firmly maintained; and they all proclaim, that, without it, to govern France is impossible.

The opposition in the chambers, therefore, is nothing but a conflict between rival ambitions, personal affections or animosities, and, on many occasions, the result of some courtly intrigues. Such has been the case in the last thirteen years; and it will continue to be so for many years longer, even if another revolution should take place: for, in that case, the triumphant party will do, what has constantly been done since 1814, take possession of the offices and patronage, and keep the people in their present exclusion from all participation in the management of public affairs. Nay, the same members of the chambers of peers and deputies, at present so devoted to Louis Philippe, will desert his cause, and sentence him and his family to a perpetual exile. It was the *Corps Legislatif* and the *Sénat*, appointed and so well paid by Napoleon, who first decreed his *déchéance*, recalled the Bourbons, and accepted the Charter of Louis XVIII.: and all the public officers immediately gave their adhesion to that revolution, in order to be maintained in their offices. In 1830, these same deputies, called by Charles X., and who, a very few months before, had sworn allegiance to him and his family, expelled him and his family; and, after giving his crown to the Duke of Orleans, resumed their habitual course of subserviency and rapine. In every part of France, every one submitted to the orders received from Paris; and very few of the functionaries resigned the offices to which they had been appointed by the preceding government.

Such is the explanation, by facts, of the apparent incon-

sistency between the dependency of placemen, electors, and deputies, and their insubordination. Of course, every one of the factions must dissimulate its object, and they all sail, like pirates or slavers, under false colours. "*The honour and independency of the country*," is the motto of Thiers; "*Public order and peace*," that of Guizot; and the other factions adopt the one or the other, with some modifications; so that they may, according to their interests, act in concert with or in opposition to one another.

Such is the chamber of deputies! Such is the representative system in France! Such is the participation of the people in the management of their affairs! The municipal councils, the councils of *arrondissements*, the councils of departments, are entirely under the power of the administration; and tyranny, legal and unbounded tyranny, is the character of the government of the country.

That discontent, general discontent, universal hatred of the government, should be the result, may easily be conceived; and nobody can be astonished, not merely at the expression of that discontent and hatred, but also at the attempts at resistance by main force, on the part of a people who have no other means of resenting the wrongs inflicted upon them by the legislature and the agents of the administration.

Some may ask, Have not the French the trial by jury and the courts of justice? I will give the answer in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

THE COURTS OF JUSTICE AND THE TRIAL BY JURY.

THE organization of the *administration judiciaire* has been so fully detailed in the first part of this volume, that

very little needs to be added to prove that the ministry of justice might more properly be called the administration of injustice.

We have seen that the fourteen thousand officials to whom the miscalled administration of justice is intrusted, are all appointed by the government; that the irremovableness of the judges is rendered nugatory by the scale of emoluments and the graduation of the courts; since, although a judge cannot be dismissed without a trial, he can be promoted to a higher or a more lucrative post. We have seen that, in order to render them more dependent, and make them constantly feel the desire, nay, the want of promotion, the courts of first instance are divided, with regard to the salaries, into seven classes, the lowest of which cannot yield to its members more than thirty-six pounds a-year; which, by subserviency and a consequent translation to higher tribunals of first instance, may be raised to one hundred and twenty pounds; that, when they are promoted from the tribunals of first instance to the royal courts, the same scale of emoluments necessarily continues to act in the same way, and with the same success, on the judges; and that, even in the supreme court, the Court of Cassation, when all judicial promotion stops, the peerage, or what they prefer, the title and the emoluments of councillor of state, afford inducements to new sacrifices of principles and honesty. The consequence is, that, in any lawsuit in which the government or any public authority are concerned, the case is always decided in their favour, or in favour of a party patronized by an influential personage.

In cases in which private parties are concerned, there is no better chance for a sound and equitable decision, on account of the ignorance or the venality of the judges. One may easily imagine that very few gentlemen of merit, of good families and connexions, of independent property,

or enabled by their legal knowledge and their talents to rise at the bar, and to derive a competent income from their practice, will condescend to accept a judgeship with between thirty-six and forty-eight pounds a year. It follows that most of the judges in the courts of first instance, are taken from among the young barristers, who either have just sense enough to know that their abilities are not likely to gain much of the public confidence; or who, having been unsuccessful in their attempt to form a *clientelle*, and preferring the paltry pittance of a judgeship to the independence of a barrister without causes and without fees, apply to the deputy of their *arrondissement*, or to some influential elector, to obtain from the ministry of justice one of the vacant places, and afterwards, if successful, do their best to deserve promotion.

Some few, having a little property, are also induced to follow the same course, and to accept a small judgeship, as a stepping-stone to higher preferments, which they are sure to obtain if they are electors. But they generally prefer those functions called public ministry, as king's attorneys, general advocates, or attorneys-general, as they afford a more frequent opportunity of displaying their zeal. They therefore solicit the office of substitutes to the king's attorneys, which more rapidly leads to all the others; and, besides that, they have the advantage of being better paid than the judges.

Tribunals thus composed cannot be expected to shine in a perfect knowledge of the law. The fact is, that the bar of the tribunals of first instance, or of the royal courts, is very superior to the judges and other officials, in science and in talents. This is the natural consequence of the system; but a more prejudicial consequence results from the smallness of the salaries. Is it not evident that a gentlemanly educated man, filling judicial functions, cannot live

in a style becoming his station, with a salary which can hardly provide for the first necessities of life? Is it not plain that a judge, so circumstanced, cannot but be accessible to the seductions with which rank and wealth can surround his seat; that, in one word, he cannot be impartial between the rich and the poor?

Thus, in civil cases, when the government is concerned, or when rank and fortune are interested, very little justice, if any justice at all, can be expected from the judicial bench, by any one who has nothing in his favour but his right. In criminal causes, that is to say, in the affairs subject to the decision of a jury, the case is still more hopeless.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, when speaking of the elections, that the electoral lists of the departments are, at the same time, those of the jury for the same departments, with the addition of state pensioners, retired officers, persons filling public offices, and graduates of the universities. These lists are made out every year by all the mayors of the communes, assembled at the chief town of their canton. They are then given to the sub-prefect, who sends them, with his observations, to the prefect. The prefect revises those lists, and is authorised to erase the names of those whom he considers improperly inserted, although no complaint should have been made against their insertion. The lists are then published.

Parties whose names have not been inserted in the lists, or erased, may claim their insertion; and other parties may claim the erasure of electors improperly admitted; but the prefects and the councils of prefecture adjudicate on their claims. The law, however, allows the interested parties to appeal to the royal courts from the decisions of the prefect; but the trouble, expenses, and loss of time attendant on those appeals, deter most of them from defending their rights. In case the number of the electors of an electoral

college should be reduced under 150, the prefect may supply the deficiency by inserting the names of persons paying less than 200 francs of direct taxes.

But all the persons entitled to serve, and inscribed on the lists, are not called in turn at the assizes. The prefects select every year from the general lists a certain number of the electors, according to their known opinions, carefully excluding the Legitimists and the Liberals; and thus secure the judgment of their political adversaries by their friends. This has been fully proved by the correspondence communicated by M. Isambert to the chamber of deputies, twelve months ago, in which a prefect recommended the postponement of a trial, in order to have the benefit of his improved list of electors and jurymen. Thus, the minister seems to have nothing more to fear from the courts of justice than from the representative body; and his subordinates can rely not only on his support and on promotion, in proportion to their zeal in executing his commands, and keeping the people in due subjection, but also on the severity of the jury in case of any prosecution instituted by them against any one who dares question their authority, resist the execution of their orders, or publicly censure their measures.

The general lists of the jury, so reduced by the prefects to one-fourth of their former number, are then forwarded to the presidents of the royal courts, who, every month, take from those lists the names of the jurymen who are to form the jury during the following assizes. The forty names are drawn by lot, at least so the law orders it, and, afterwards, the twelve jurymen who are to try the case are chosen in the same manner by the judge, in the presence of the attorney-general, who prosecutes, and of the prisoner.

It might seem, that, after the careful reformation of the lists by the prefects, the public prosecutors ought not to be

afraid of what they call scandalous acquittals, and to claim an extensive right of challenge. Such, however, is the case. They are by law entitled to the half (twelve) of the challenges, and the parties accused have the same number, and no more, however numerous they may be. I have seen, in a political prosecution, twenty-eight prisoners tried by ten placemen, and only two independent men, the attorney-general having challenged all the others. Of course, they gave a good verdict.

Yet, there were still two dangerous practices in the course of the deliberations of the juries. First, the jurymen expressed and debated their opinions; and it sometimes happened that one or two honest, intelligent, and courageous jurymen convinced their colleagues, by the force of their arguments, or awakened in their minds a sense of duty—a feeling of mercy. Secondly, it was easy to know the votes of every one of the jurymen, and to let the public know to whom were due the horrid sentences so frequently pronounced. To get rid of these inconveniences, the law was altered; and by the new act, every jurymen, on retiring to consider the case, receives from the president of the court a card (*un bulletin*), on which the question relative to the guilt of the prisoner is written; and the jurymen are requested to write secretly and in their turn, yes or no, under the question, and to put their cards in a box prepared for that purpose: afterwards, the foreman of the jury, in the presence of his colleagues, takes out the cards, examines them, and declares the majority for or against the accusation. By such process, all discussion is precluded, and every one may condemn without fear of the consequences, on the part of the public; whilst an acquittal exposes them all to the vengeance of the government.

And that is what is still called trial by jury!

CHAPTER VII.

THE NATIONAL GUARD.

THE institution of the national guard seems peculiar to France ; not, as some will have it, on account of the military character of the people, but on account of the military character of the governments, which succeeded one another for so many centuries, and which, acknowledging no law but their own will, and always ready to support that law by physical force, compelled the people to resist by the same means.

So early as the reign of Louis le Gros, we see the beginning of the national guard. The government of France was then a feudal anarchy,—a nominal king, with powerful vassals constantly employed in making war against their sovereigns, or against one another; that is to say, plundering and murdering one another's subjects, through the whole territory of France. The poor and defenceless villagers, and the rich inhabitants of the towns, at last grew tired of such a government, and resolved to submit to it no longer, but to take measures of self-defence. The burgesses first fortified their towns, and organised companies of *hommes d'armes*, to resist the attacks of the noble or royal brigands, and to protect their own property. The Kings soon perceived that their rebellious vassals were likely to be considerably enfeebled by these measures, encouraged the citizens, and promoted, in their own towns, the establishment of similar companies, not for the King's service, but for their own defence ; and, from their establishment to their dissolution, under Louis XIV., they have been true to their

cause, even when misled, as was often the case during the League and the Fronde.

In 1789, when it became evident that the King, in concert with the nobles and the high church party, was determined to dissolve the general estates (now the national assembly), and that household troops and foreign regiments were collected in and round Paris, and at Versailles, for that purpose, the people immediately resolved to resist the attempt. The result of the attack of Prince Lambesch was, a general insurrection, the destruction of the Bastille, and the formation of the national guard in all the provinces of France, for the avowed purpose of destroying the despotism of the sovereign, and the unjust privileges of the nobility and of the clergy, and of supporting the national assembly in their efforts to establish a constitution which should guarantee the liberties of the citizens, public order, and national independence.

Consuls, Emperors, and Kings, well aware that a national guard, if effective for any purpose, must act as a defence of the rights of the people, did not like the institution, and would willingly annihilate the very name of it; but that is impossible; and Charles X. lost his crown for having attempted it. Had the national guard been in existence in 1830, the revolution of July would not have turned out, as it did, in the exile of himself and his dynasty.

Dissolved in 1827, by a royal ordinance, in Paris, and disorganised in the departments, the national guard reappeared, and more numerous than ever, at the revolution of July, to assist that portion of the inhabitants of Paris who had begun the insurrection, and afterwards to secure the results of the popular victory. The general opinion entertained of the liberal principles of the Duke of Orleans, his conduct during the first revolution, and his opposition

to the policy of the Restoration, since the return of the Bourbons, had induced every one to believe that, with such a chief, the French people would be free at home, and respected by foreign governments ; and, in consequence, the national guard rallied round Louis Philippe. In Paris, they were the first and only supporters of his throne ; and, in the departments, they, after due consideration, resolved to send deputations from their own body, to acknowledge him as a King, and to promise their allegiance to the new institutions of the country.

It must be admitted, that the unanimity which prevailed amongst all the national guards throughout the country, was owing to the confidence and the respect which Lafayette had inspired ; and it is to be lamented that, under those circumstances, that best of citizens, who had been unanimously proclaimed by the people general-in-chief of the national guard of France, should not have exercised his authority in opposition to the very first measures of the new government, the restoration of the charter and the choice of the ministers. But all this will be explained hereafter.

The new King, of course, was grateful to the national guards, and most gracious towards every one of them ; he invited all the officers, of all ranks, to the Palais Royal, presented all the battalions with new flags, assumed their uniform, and was seen constantly accompanied by Lafayette. Having thus ingratiated himself with them, he gradually relaxed in his attentions to their venerable general, for whom he had, during his whole life, entertained the most violent hatred. Nor had he ever entertained any better feelings towards the national guards ; but no man knows better how to dissimulate, and, as he himself expresses it, “ how to keep terms with necessary evils until you can part company.”

Lafayette and the national guard were necessary evils; so much so that, in the first weeks of his reign, nothing could be done, without considering whether the national guard and Lafayette were satisfied. They appeared dissatisfied with the new charter, which they found too much like that of Louis XVIII., not to lead to the same abuses on the part of the government. To allay those fears, an article was inserted, by which "the maintenance of the charter and of public liberties is entrusted to the patriotism and courage of the national guards." After such a declaration, the national guards could no longer manifest their suspicions and their anxiety, for they were immediately answered: "It is impossible for the King to act like the government of the Restoration, and to make an attempt upon your rights, since no doubt can be entertained of your courage and patriotism."

At the same time Louis Philippe and his worthy ministers were meditating the means of reducing the national guard to the same state of passive obedience as the regular army; nay, were aiming to manage its direction in such a manner, that it could be employed, with less danger than the army, in supporting the anti-national system and the despotic measures which the government was resolved to adopt. For this purpose, six months after the revolution of July, when grants of money and of the highest offices had completely *monarchised* the revolutionary chamber, a law for the organization of the national guard was proposed and passed.

The first article of that law runs thus. "The national guard is instructed to defend the constitutional royalty, the charter, and the privileges which it has consecrated; to enforce obedience to the laws; to maintain or re-establish public order and peace; to assist the army in the defence of

the frontiers and of the coasts; and to insure the independence of France and the integrity of her territory."

"All deliberations of the national guard on the affairs of the country, of the department, or of the commune, are attempts against public liberty, and offences against *la chose publique*."

Here we have a convincing proof of the mendacity, the servility, and the absurdity of those deputies. Had they spoken the honest truth, they would have said: "The national guard, which, forty years ago, was established to contend against the despotic royalty of Louis XVI., and which has just destroyed the constitutional royalty of Charles X., must henceforth have no other object than to defend the royalty of Louis Philippe." They were not instituting the national guard, since it already existed; they were trying to change the object of the institution; and, so far as it can be done by law, they have done it. The second paragraph of the article is a complete nullification of the real object of the first institution of the national guard, and in direct violation of the article which entrusts the maintenance of the charter and of the public liberties to the patriotism and courage of the national guard. Now, national guards deliberating on the violation of their rights, and on attempts on public liberties, on the part of the government, of the prefects, or the mayors, are declared guilty of an attempt against public liberty, and of an offence against the republic; for I know of no other translation of those words, *chose publique*, but *res publica*.

Can there be any thing so preposterous as such a combination of orders? Yet this is the law! and, according to this law, the patriotism and the courage of the national guard, to whom the law entrusts the defence of public liberties, must either defend them without considering, without

deliberating, or not defend them at all, or make a very poor defence.

Every Frenchman aged twenty-one years, and under sixty, and paying the capitation tax (*contribution personnelle*), is inscribed on the registry of the national guard.

The national guards are formed into companies, battalions, and legions. The national guards of a company elect their officers and non-commissioned officers; the officers of each company, with an equal number of non-commissioned officers, elect their chiefs of battalions, and ten candidates for the grades of colonel and lieutenant-colonel of the legion, who are appointed by the King. The King also appoints the adjutant major of every battalion. These officers are paid by the government.

The national guard cannot assemble for any purpose, with or without arms, unless they are authorised by the mayors, the sub-prefects, or the prefects, even when summoned by their officers. They are bound to obey the orders of the mayors and of the prefects, to attend in arms, and to march and act according to these orders.

The prefects are authorised to suspend the officers, and even the companies, battalions, and legions, for disobedience to their orders, or to the orders of the mayors, either in meeting without leave, or in not attending when called on any duty; and the King is empowered to dissolve the national guards, subject to their re-organisation within six months from their dissolution.

Such are the essential dispositions of the law, concocted by the ministry of Lafitte.* No wonder that Lafayette and the

* The mischief done by this man, during the Three Days, and when at the head of the ministry, is incalculable. Ruined in character as well as in fortune, he well might beg pardon of God and of men, as he solemnly did. I do not pretend to know what God will do; but men cannot forgive the treachery of one who sold his country to repair his fortune.

national guards should have expressed their dissatisfaction during the debates. The Court, however, was not yet satisfied. The King knew, that, so long as Lafayette was general-in-chief of the national guard, he would be the living law of that body; and therefore it was of the utmost importance to deprive him of his command. That was not an easy matter. To dismiss him, was what nobody dared think of; a new revolution would have been the immediate consequence. After many consultations, the royal camarilla resolved that another disposition should be added, to this effect: That, considering the immense influence which the functions of general-in-chief gave to an irresponsible individual, and the many opportunities that influence gave him of embarrassing the conduct of the government, so as sometimes even to endanger the institutions of the country, it was desirable that those functions should be abolished after the demise of the holder of that dignity. Charles Dupin, the scientific baron, undertook to be the mover of the proposition, which was heard with astonishment. Lafayette, disgusted at the duplicity of the real author of the motion, immediately sent in his resignation; and the law was adopted, with the addition proposed by Dupin.

If the law had been carried into execution, 5,000,000 of citizens would have been inscribed on the rolls of the national guard, arrayed and armed. With such a civic force, in spite of the law, the administrative despotism would have been impracticable. It was found convenient, therefore, to limit the operation of the law, in 36,000 rural communes, to the inscription of the individuals liable to be called on in case of an emergency, such as a foreign invasion, or a civil war.

In most of the small towns and cities, where the national guard was established, a part only were provided with muskets, and the mayors were instructed to deliver these arms to those only who would not use them but in support of

the administration. In many of the towns, even where a sort of military service is performed by the national guard, most of the men have neither uniform nor arms. A few muskets are kept in the guardhouse, where they are used by the detachment on duty; and the others are carefully kept by the local authorities. In larger towns, where there is a sub-prefect or a prefect, the object of these officials has constantly been to reduce as much as possible the number of the national guards, in order that those men only that could be depended upon should be provided with arms. In the populous cities only, where the municipal police requires a more active service than could be performed by the garrisons, a larger proportion of the national guard are armed and equipped: but their number does not amount to the half of what it was in 1830 or 1831. Even in Paris, where, in October, 1830, 80,000 national guards in uniform and armed were reviewed in the *champ de Mars*, there are now no more than 35,000, or, at the utmost, 40,000, who keep their regimentals; and two-thirds of that number would not do so, if it were not for the sake of retaining their muskets.

Every where, the national guards were and have been, for the last eleven years, dissatisfied with the political system of the government. They say that they were deceived; and that, instead of defending public liberty, they never were employed but in upholding the despotism of the King, and the most cruel measures of his ministers. They soon got tired of this. In the principal cities of France, such as Metz, Strasbourg, Lyons, Grenoble, Toulouse, and other places, the national guards were disbanded, because, when summoned by the prefects and the mayors to act against their fellow-citizens, they not only refused, but also, in some cases, finding that their fellow-citizens were justified in their opposition, took their part against the administration.

Some others were disbanded only because they elected officers opposed to the government; and, last year, one of the battalions of a large town, that is to say, the principal inhabitants, the officers and non-commissioned officers, to show their feelings towards the government, elected as their chief, Barbès, then under sentence of death, commuted for perpetual imprisonment, as the leader of the insurrection of May, 1839.

Although not so violently expressed, the opinion is the same in almost every town; and even in Paris, notwithstanding the immense number of officials who are in the ranks of the national guard, and the secret-service money employed in making proselytes, or paying spies. The government knows this, and would like nothing better than to dissolve the national guard of Paris. That, however, would not be safe, as the officers and soldiers of the regular army are determined never to act against the people, unless in concurrence with the national guard. Therefore, the national guard must be maintained.

Not that the national guard are or have been for a long time disposed to grant that concurrence. Quite the reverse. They have long listened unmoved to the *rappel* and the general alarm of their drummers. That was the case in 1832, at the funeral of General Lamarque; and the troops would not act. The prefect of police, Gisquet, had immediately 200 or 300 ruffians of his establishment dressed like national guards, armed and sent out to march at the head of the foot regiment. Since that time, all the *employés* of all the administrations in Paris, amounting to 12,000, have had orders to present themselves under arms at the first signal, and to march with the troops, who then do not hesitate to execute their orders, thinking that they have only to contend against the rabble. This will explain the necessity for the

government's maintaining the national guards of Paris and the neighbouring places. At Lyons and Grenoble, there are fortresses where 10,000 soldiers can in a few hours reduce the towns to ashes, without the aid of the national guard. Until the fortifications of Paris are completed, their assistance cannot be dispensed with; but, in two years, every thing will be finished, and then the national guard will be dismissed.

In the present state of the institution, we may conclude that it can do nothing for the maintenance of either public or private liberties. The law, a law to which they are compelled to submit, prevents them from doing any thing for their own defence. If they do not join the party of the oppressors, if they venture to object to any public measure, they are disbanded; and, notwithstanding the article of that same law ordains their re-organisation, nothing can compel the government to compliance; and they remain disbanded.

As an example, I may refer to the late national guard of Metz. In 1831, Louis Philippe, passing through that city, received a deputation of the national guard with an address. The beginning of the address, being complimentary, was well received; but, when it began to remonstrate on the political system of the government, the King interrupted the orator by telling him that the national guard had no right to busy itself with political matters, and left the deputation. The national guard, dissatisfied, as one may suppose, elected for officers the citizens most adverse to the system of the government. Some of these nominations were annulled; and, the same persons being re-elected, the result was, the dissolution of the national guard, which, since that time, has not been re-established.

Thus, like all the other institutions, framed for the apparent purpose of protecting the rights and the interests

of the people, like the *communal* councils, like the councils of *arrondissements* and departments, like the chamber of deputies itself, the national guard has been made an instrument of oppression.

The last of the guarantees of public freedom we have to examine, is the press: let us see what has been done with the liberty of the press.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PUBLIC PRESS

THE existence of a free press is incompatible with that of a bad government. To impart knowledge, to elucidate the truth, to uphold what is right, to impugn what is wrong, are the objects and the general effects of a free press. Knowledge, truth, and right, are, on the contrary, the objects of the hatred of bad governments determined to do wrong: therefore they must destroy the press, in order not to be destroyed by it.

In all avowedly despotic governments, the hatred entertained towards the press is openly manifested. In constitutional governments, so called, that hatred must be disguised, since one of the first principles of constitutional government is the freedom of the press; but the necessity of dissimulating renders the hatred more intense, and it constantly increases in proportion to the wrongs inflicted, and the mischief done by the government.

Since the French Revolution of 1789, no government has been bold enough to take away from the constitutions successively given to the country, the principle of the freedom of the press; and yet there is not one of those governments that has not virtually and effectually nullified the principle, and enslaved the press, by laws *regulating* (as

they said) the use of its freedom; much in the same manner that a strait waistcoat regulates the use of a man's limbs.

Charles X. had loosened the strait waistcoat of the press on ascending the throne: he had abolished the censorship, and it was the first governmental act of his reign. The last of his acts, as a king, was the re-establishment of the censorship. The press gave not only the signal, but also the example of insurrection, and was the main instrument of the overthrow of the old dynasty.

Having effected so much, the press was entitled to the gratitude of the country and of the new government; and, during three months, it remained completely free. All the fiscal and administrative restrictions established during the Restoration, were considered as abolished. New daily papers and periodicals were started; other political publications were printed, distributed in the streets, stuck up on the walls, or sold by criers. The acts of the chambers and of the government were freely canvassed; and, as most of those acts were found in direct opposition to the principles of the Revolution, and in manifest violation of the promises of the new king, severe blame and wholesome advices were expressed, without any reserve, as is done in this country. Molé, Broglie, and Guizot, who were then the active members of the ministry, were the objects of severe and deserved attacks; and they foresaw that it would be impossible for them to continue in power, if the freedom of the press were not immediately checked. They consequently proposed laws for that purpose.

One of the most important questions warmly discussed at that time, was the right of deputies who had been elected for the sole purpose of maintaining the charter of 1814, and of being loyal to Charles X. and his lawful heirs and successors, to make a new charter and elect

another king. Public reason and common honesty decided the question against the deputies, and consequently invalidated all their measures and the new institution. Public reason and common honesty were silenced by the following law.

“All attacks against royal dignity, against the order of succession to the throne, against the rights which the King holds from the national will, against his constitutional authority and the inviolability of his person, and against the rights and authority of the chambers, were to subject its author to imprisonment for from three months to five years, and to a fine of between three hundred and six thousand francs.”

By a second law, criers and bill-stickers were prohibited from crying or sticking any papers until after having submitted them to the inspection of the police authorities, and obtained their approbation.

A third law re-established the fiscal restrictions invented by the ministers of the late government against the newspapers. In doing this, however, Guizot took care to obtain the support of the old established journals, by interesting them in the success of his measures. He reduced the *cautionnement* (security) from two hundred thousand francs, as it was during the Restoration, to fifty thousand francs, or the title-deed of an annual income of two thousand francs, for a provincial daily paper; of eighteen hundred francs, for newspapers published twice a week; and of twelve hundred francs, for weekly papers. By these means, the few old established papers received back a part of the security they had given, while at the same time they were protected against the establishment of rival newspapers. Thus began the renewal of the monopoly of the press.

At the same time, no means were neglected to corrupt the Parisian press. The leading daily papers were literally bought and paid for, in money, or in well remunerated offices. The *Journal des Débats*, which had constantly been the paid organ of all the factions that had ruled over France since its establishment, was the property of Bertin. Bertin was made a councillor of state, and was promised, besides the continuation of the bribe formerly paid by the Restoration, four hundred and eighty pounds per month. The principal proprietors of the *Constitutionnel* were Etienne, St. Albin, and Jay. The son of Etienne was made a councillor (*referendaire*) in the Court of Accounts; the son of St. Albin was made a judge in the Court of First Instance of Paris; and Jay had, I do not know how many places at his disposal. The same course was taken with the *Courrier Français*. Keratry, one of the proprietors, was admitted into the council of state. The writers in these papers were made prefects and sub-prefects. The proprietor of *Figaro* was made a prefect also, and, it is said, received a large sum. All these facts are notorious; and they account for the support given, immediately after the Revolution, to the illiberal and anti-national measures of the government. The *National* and the *Temps* themselves, which had been the first promoters of the insurrection, lent their support to the re-establishment of the despotism which they had so powerfully contributed to overthrow.

Two Liberal papers only, the *Revolution* and the *Tribune*, defended the true social principles, and continued to claim the institutions which had been so solemnly promised. A law was passed in April, 1831, authorising the seizure of the newspapers at the post-office, and allowing the King's attorneys to indict the editors, without the formalities of an inquiry before a court of instruction.

I do not intend to follow the progress of the government in its legislative hostilities against the press; it is enough for my purpose to show the present state of the law.

All mention of the King with regard to any political measure, except in praise, is prohibited; all blame directed against the government; all attacks upon any class; all censure against either of the chambers; all criticism of the institutions of the country; all vituperation of any law, how unjust soever in principle, and injurious in its consequences, are declared *délits*, or crimes; and the penalties extend from 600 francs to 50,000 francs, and from six months to ten years' imprisonment; nay, the judges are empowered to double the *maximum* of the penalties, and to sentence to imprisonment for life and to transportation. To secure the payment of the highest fine, the security has been raised to 100,000 francs, and the responsible editor must be *bond fide* proprietor of one-third of that sum. The security must constantly be made up to its original amount after every penalty, or the newspaper cannot be published. Nay, more; after two condemnations of a newspaper, the judges can interdict its publication.

From what we have seen of the composition of the courts and of the juries, we can believe that there are few acquittals. Yet, from fear of any, the law empowers the court of peers, all appointed by the King, to judge the writers in the papers, or others; and, to encourage and protect the jurymen and the judges, the newspapers are prohibited from giving their names or reporting their deliberations; and, finally, they are prohibited from opening subscriptions for the payment of the fines, and publishing lists of donations on their own behalf for the same purpose.

This is not all. The printers and booksellers, who are

all under the control of the ministry, can be deprived of their licenses even without a trial; so that very few of them dare publish an Opposition paper, or any work in which the government is in any way censured.

With such laws against the press, the establishment of a newspaper is difficult and expensive—a dangerous and almost a ruinous undertaking; particularly if it is to be conducted on Liberal principles, and devoted to the popular cause. The necessity of paying 4,000*l.*, which must be considered as forfeited, when the government, acting at the same time as plaintiff, prosecutor, jury, and judge, can so easily take possession of the whole, is a powerful preventive in a country of limited capital. Yet, the difficulty might be overcome by a union of patriots, subscribing the amount and taking a share in the enterprise. It is to guard against such a combination that the law requiring the responsible editor to be the possessor of a third part of the security, has been passed. Thirty-three thousand francs is a considerable sum in France. A gentleman of independent, but not large income, does not like to adventure such a portion, most probably the best part of his fortune; and a gentleman of large property, who would readily make the sacrifice of that sum, is either unable or unwilling to devote the whole of his time to the arduous and unceasing task of a responsible editor. The establishment of such a newspaper is thus rendered almost impossible.

A party having a special purpose, may be induced to make the attempt. Louis Napoleon, for instance, established the *Capitole* in 1839. The responsible manager was indemnified against any loss by the young madman's supporters in England,—stock-jobbers, who, having access to the Exchequer-office, cared nothing about thousands of pounds. The French government had nothing to fear from Napo-

leonic principles; the journal occasioned a daily loss to the party, without gaining a single partisan; and, after languishing for two years under the secret protection of the police, expired from inanition.

Before its decease, the same jobbers, seeing that the public would not take to the *Capitole*, and imagining that they should better promote their cause by advocating it in an old established paper, which could not be suspected, bought the *Journal du Commerce* from the deputy Mauguin for, it is said, 14,000*l.* (350,000 francs). But the *Commerce*, instead of being of any benefit to the cause, lost a good deal of its circulation, and was re-sold, if not to Mauguin himself, at least to some of his friends, for 6,000*l.*

A newspaper, under the present system, can be but a speculation, not even of a party, but of a faction of the governing party; and the Paris press is divided between these factions. The *Moniteur*, the *Débats*, and the *Messenger*, are in the pay of the ministers, whoever they may be, and uphold them; the *Presse* is the Camarilla's mouth-piece; the *Constitutionnel* and the *Temps* are devoted to Thiers; the *Courrier* belongs to Thiers and to Odillon Barrot; the *Siècle* to Odillon Barrot alone; the *Commerce* is still purely Mauguin; and the *National* is against every thing and every body; having, however, no objection to the same tyranny as at present exists, provided it be exercised by a committee of public safety, chosen from among themselves. Of course, the ministers know how not only to keep the editors within proper bounds, but also to gain over some of the principal writers. Thiers, during his last administration, succeeded, with the assistance of his secret service money, in conciliating almost all of them. The Legitimist papers only, the *Gazette* and the *Quotidienne*, were inaccessible to his seductive practices: and it must be

avowed, that they alone have been for the last twelve years honest and consistent in their principles, and in the advocacy of their doctrines. Nay, the *Gazette* has been the only paper which has taken up the cause of the people, and claimed a true representative system by the extension of the elective franchise to all the active citizens. But all the other newspapers were opposed to the principle of such an extension of the suffrage.

The departmental press is not so generally corrupt as the Parisian press; but it is more exposed to the persecutions of the government, and has but little influence. In most of the departments, there is but one paper, edited under the patronage of the prefects, who, every where, have done all they could, and with too much success, to annihilate the Opposition journals. One of the best of these newspapers, the *Progrès*, superior in talent, courage, patriotism, and political knowledge to any of the metropolitan journals, has been for the last fourteen years, and continues to be published in the Pas de Calais, notwithstanding fifty legal prosecutions. But it cannot continue much longer, now that more than two-thirds of the jurymen of the department are placemen, and that an indictment is certain to be followed by a verdict of guilty, and the most heavy penalties.

Such is the freedom of the press in France! The laws of the Restoration, already so severe against both authors and editors, have been overstepped since the Revolution of July to such a point, that the judges now often dare not carry them into execution, and the cases are referred to the merciless house of peers. Dupoty is now expiating in a dungeon the crime of having made use of that safeguard of public liberty, pursuant to the sentence of that ignoble house.

CHAPTER IX.

RESUMÉ OF THE SECOND PART.

THE reader who has followed with attention the preceding statements, will now understand the meaning, in France, of such phrases as constitutional institutions, representative system, liberty and equality of the citizens, impartial administration of justice, trial by jury, and freedom of the press; and he will naturally conclude that an experiment has been made, how far words could be perverted from their true signification, and applied to the most opposite objects. Such is the fact. The experiment has been fully made; and we are now called on to witness the results.

The constitutional institutions are the rules established by the new conquerors and their elective leader, to maintain their domination over the people, and their unrestricted *exploitation* of the country, for their own benefit. They are *the act of their settlement in the nation*, by which they reserved to themselves the absolute right, the monopoly of the electorate, of the general representation, and of legislation; of the formation of the local representation, in the councils of *arrondissements* and of departments; of being the enactors, the expounders, the executors of the laws, the judges and the juries in all and every case; of organising or disorganising, as it suits their purposes, the national forces, the army, the navy, and the national guard; of levying, collecting, and expending public taxes, in any manner and for any object of their own; of making, and fulfilling or violating treaties made with foreign governments; and of declaring war, or nego-

tiating peace at their pleasure; and, lastly, of silencing, prosecuting, imprisoning, exiling, and putting to death, any one bold enough to dispute those rights, or to resist their abominable tyranny.

Such were the liberal and constitutional institutions imported into Gaul by the Franks, fourteen centuries ago, now completely re-established, with all the additions that experience in wrong-doing and sophistry could desire, to insure their continuance; with all the precautions that could be taken, in case some individual of spirit, excited by personal injuries and insults, should at last wake up the nation.

As under their barbarian predecessors, the disarming of the conquered people has been considered of paramount importance; and there are laws inflicting most severe penalties, on the manufacturers and the possessors of military arms, and of gunpowder. There are laws prohibiting associations, societies, and public or private meetings for political purposes. There are laws against collective petitioners. There are laws even against charitable associations. Such is their sense of the hatred they deserve, of the desire with which the people must be inspired to put an end to their domination, that they cannot consider themselves safe, unless they have isolated every Frenchman, and prevented all communion of feelings, all interchange of ideas.

And such is the helplessness of the people at large, as well as of private individuals, that, whatever injury may be done to them by the ministers or their agents, there is no possible remedy. The responsibility of the ministry and of its subordinate officials is, like all the other promises of the government, a nugatory formula. There is not an example of a public functionary having been dismissed or punished for any act of injustice, how flagrant soever,

either against the public or against an individual; while many are the examples of these acts being rewarded with promotions or honorary distinctions. Public functionaries are punished and dismissed only when they hesitate to obey unjust or cruel orders, when they venture to take pity on the people, when they dare to show any mercy. To remonstrate is a crime on their part. To execute their orders, is their first duty; to go beyond them, when possible, and profitable to despotism, is political science and administrative virtue, for which rewards are always in store. The more a man has rendered himself unpopular in any office, the more fit he is considered for higher functions, and the more entitled to the confidence of the government.

What can be the consequences of such a system? This will be examined in the Third Part.

In the First, we have exposed the mechanism, and presented a complete enumeration of the forces of the government and of the administration.

In the Second, we have displayed the condition of the people, dissected its organization, and examined in turn all the institutions which, apparently intended for its protection, have each and all been transformed into irresistible instruments of governmental and administrative despotism.

In the Third part, we shall exhibit the working of that mechanism and of those institutions, the perpetual struggle, the desperate conflict, between the governmental and administrative forces and the people; and their constant inroads on public and private liberties and on the national welfare.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

THE WORKING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM.

PUBLIC writers who, unfortunately, are in the habit of judging by appearances, proclaim, every day, in reviews and in divers papers, that the French deserve more than ever the reproach of "inconsistency and light-headedness" which has so often been brought against them; that every experiment of giving them a constitutional form of government has completely failed; and that they are unfit for constitutional liberty.

A Frenchman might retort and say, that the people of Great Britain and Ireland, equally dissatisfied with Catholic Emancipation, with the Reform Act, with the Municipal Corporation Act, with the New Poor Law, for which they have so long contended, display inconsistency, by still claiming and contending for something else, and something better; and prove themselves unworthy of the blessings conferred upon them by a progressive administration. But, instead of opposing an absurd recrimination to an absurd accusation, I prefer exposing the fallacy which leads to these erroneous and prejudicial conclusions.

The fallacy lies, as is always the case, in the misapplication or misconception of words. A precise, definite, and special signification is given to that most vague, inde-

finite, and general formula, *constitutional forms of government*. A wrong definition is the basis of a wrong principle, and leads to a wrong consequence.

Every government has its constitutional forms. Despotism itself has its own rules of conduct towards the people. The constitutions of despotic Russia, Austria, and Prussia, differ, in most important points, one from another, and still more from the constitutions of Sweden, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and England; which also are very dissimilar in their respective forms of government. Those words, then, *constitutional forms of government*, mean anything, and therefore, applied as they are, they mean nothing.

Representative government would not be much more appropriate, although implying a sort of control over the rulers of a nation; because there are many sorts of representative governments. In some, the representation is limited to a class, or to two or three classes of the people. In some others, there is no political distinction of classes, and the right of being represented belongs to a small portion of the people, whose only qualification is property. Are the representative systems of Hanover and of France, the same as the representative system of England? And because the Hanoverians and the French are dissatisfied with a representative system so inferior to that of England, does it follow that their discontent proves their unfitness for a better system?

Yet such is the logic of a would-be Liberal journalist, who exerts himself at the same time to prove, that, the reforms in the English representation not having produced all the good results which were expected, new and more extensive reforms must be effected. Ten years' trial is deemed to entitle the British to a character for steadiness, and to the benefit of new improvements in the institutions

of the country; whilst a struggle maintained during half a century, under seven kinds of government, instead of being considered as a sign of the perseverance of the French in the same principles, is given as a proof of their fickleness!

The truly Liberal party, the popular party in France, faithful to the Revolution of 1789, and to the institutions promulgated by the Constituent Assembly, in 1791, disavowing and abhorring the excesses of the Convention, deplored and opposed the military despotism and ambition of Napoleon; and, during the reigns of Louis XVIII. and Charles X., never ceased to seek the re-establishment of those institutions conferred by the wisdom of the National Assembly. It is more than a party, it is the nation almost entire. And such was the object of the insurrection and of the Revolution of July, 1830.

The *Programme* of the *Hotel de Ville*, those patriotic conditions proposed, insisted on by Lafayette, and assented to by Louis Philippe, prove the fact. Not only were they immediately violated, but even their existence was attempted to be denied by the perjured parties, in order to escape the responsibility of their guilt. They, therefore, must find their place in this volume, as given by Lafayette himself.

“The Revolution of July, so noble, so pure, so generous, has traced for us all the course we have to follow for the happiness and the glory of the country. To reject what the Revolution has rejected, to maintain what it seeks to establish, and to perform what it demands, such should be our triple rule of conduct.

“To consolidate, by founding it on the broad basis of the general interest, the popular throne, which the Revolution is about to re-establish; to destroy monopoly, wherever and in what form soever it may appear—in trade, in

public instruction, in public worship, or in the distribution of political power.

“ To insure to every district a *bona fide* local representation; to the people, the means of subsistence and instruction; to all, the peaceful and legitimate enjoyment of their faculties and of their rights.

“ To unravel the chaos of our legislation; to simplify and combine, or expunge, the innumerable provisions which have been confusedly handed down to us, by the Republic, the Empire, and the Restoration.

“ To extirpate, by great retrenchments, the hideous disease which the thirst of places and sinecures has engendered.

“ To pursue, in the public expenditure, all reductions compatible with the good of the public service, and, above all, with the safety and the dignity of the nation; and to aim, in the mode of assessing and proportioning the taxes, at the utmost possible alleviation of the burdens of the working classes.

“ Finally, to give to our glorious regeneration all its legitimate consequences, by realising all the ameliorations of which our situation is susceptible.”

Such were the results expected to follow the victory of the people; and the solemn engagement of devoting all his life to promote and uphold these results, caused the actual enthronization of the new King, by the acclamations of a too confiding people.

Royal and aristocratic virtues have been lauded to very weariness. Here let me demand some admiration for the virtues of the people. The most intense feelings of indignation had been roused by the ministerial attempts against all the liberties of the country, and by the obstinacy of a king whose existence was but a vibration between the woods where he shot and the altar where he knelt. The

people rose for no purpose of outrage, for no love of plunder, for no gratification of revenge. Thinking only of their country, their sole object was to free it, for ever, from that abominable tyranny—a degrading compound of kingly, aristocratic, priestly, and foreign domination. They achieved their grand and sublime deed; and no sooner had they secured their matchless triumph, than, confident in the promises of another Bourbon, they laid down their arms, and returned to their daily labours.

Then began the work of plunder, not of the rich by the poor, by the people, but of the poor by the rich; who, to hush all suspicions, lulled the people into a confident repose by unceasing hymns to their valour, to their magnanimity, and to their love of order. The *doctrinaires* of all creeds, the royalists of the defection, and the Bonapartists, whose liberalism had never had any other object than the holding of liberally paid functions, rushed on all the public offices, and took possession of them; and, to render impossible all constitutional reforms, the deputies who were bound, by their oaths, to Charles X., and to his charter, the representatives of 80,000 privileged electors, assumed the rights of sovereignty, in order to sanction all the usurpations, and maintain the governmental and administrative system, which we have exposed, with this only alteration, that the monopoly of electoral, representative, legislative, and administrative power, should be extended to about 190,000, instead of 80,000 only. This extension is easily accounted for, by the necessity, for the usurpers, of strengthening themselves, and of increasing, as far as was consistent with their own advantage, the number of the shareholders in their usurpation; and, at the same time, of enfeebling the people, by withdrawing from their ranks the wealthiest of them, by separating them from the people's cause, by enlisting them in the governmental service.

Such was the translation into facts, of that part of the *Programme* of the Hotel de Ville, which refers to *founding the popular throne, on the broad basis of general interest*. And the Revolution of July, in the hands of its self-appointed managers, became a *quasi-legitimate monarchy*, as Guizot styled it, and the remodelling of three articles of the old charter, in such a manner as to ensure to about 100,000 partisans of the quasi-legitimacy a participation in the *exploitation* * of the country, till then the privilege of 80,000 only of the elected of legitimacy.

That a people should be dissatisfied with such a result of their dearly-bought triumph, that they should entertain a deep and violent resentment against the treacherous apostates, who have made such a use of the authority which public confidence had intrusted to them, is nothing more than what every one could expect: and, if that resentment, rapidly extending through all classes of the people, has long since been transformed into a deadly hatred, it is because, after having restored the odious system which had been overthrown in July, the usurpers of the popular rights have rendered that system more oppressive and more odious in its application and in its results. It is because, during the twelve years of their administration, there is not one of their measures which has not been in direct opposition to the national feelings, to the national interests, to the national honour. It is because, duplicity, corruption, and violence being their only means of government, they have distracted, impoverished, and tortured the country; and now they can do nothing else: they are doomed to persist in that deplorable course; they are doomed to deceive, because nobody has faith in them; to

* This word means the working of a concern, of a farm, of a mine, to its utmost extent, in order to derive from it the greatest possible amount of profits.

entertain, to feed the corruption they have engendered; because, if not satisfied, it will devour them; to be merciless, *impitoyable*, as Guizot says, because they have been cruel.

That is their destiny, and that is the only possible result of their governmental and administrative system, in all its branches. By making property the only qualification for political power, they have arrayed the poor against the rich, 8,000,000 men against 200,000; they have kindled the very worst passions, cupidity, egotism, and thirst of domination; they have condemned themselves to govern by these passions, and for their complete gratification; and, as avidity increases in the same proportion as its exactions, the sole purpose of a government which has no other support, nay, the only office it can perform, is to increase, constantly, and to the utmost extent, the burdens of the people, in order to satisfy the imperious demands of its supporters, and to make holocaust of all the public and private liberties, to allay the fears of the rulers, and render all resistance impossible. This is the task of the constitutional government of France. All the institutions of the country, the legislation and the administration, have alike tended to this end, with a deplorable success, which it is now our duty to expose; showing, at the same time, the part taken by the respective ministers and their subordinates in completing the slavery, the distress, the ignorance, and the demoralization of the people.

CHAPTER II.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND JUSTICE; TENDING ONLY TO ENSLAVE
AND OPPRESS THE PEOPLE.

THE individual liberty of a French citizen consists in a perpetual vassalage to all the delegates and hirelings of the minister of the interior and of his police, and in a perpetual fear of the officials of the minister of justice. There is not a single act, except working and eating, that does not fall under the control of some administrative authority, which, in some way or other, interferes in his own private or family affairs, by municipal or general regulations of all kinds.

A Frenchman cannot enter into any trade, without having first obtained a license; and some of the most important trades are monopolies granted by the authorities; such as of bakers and butchers, and even porters, the number of whom is limited. The workman, in all trades, must be provided with a book, (*livret*), which is obtained from the police, and in which all his employers are bound to enter their names, and a statement of the services of the bearer.

A Frenchman cannot be a member of any company, society, or companionship, except such as may be authorised by the government, which authorises none but such as are entirely unconnected with civil, moral, religious, or political matters: if any such exist, they are merely tolerated, and the government is empowered to prohibit their meetings, or to dissolve them, even though they have been authorised.

A Frenchman cannot call or assist in public meetings to consider or discuss any question relating to general or

local interests. Even private meetings of more than twenty persons are prohibited, if in any way connected with political matters.

A Frenchman cannot keep in his possession military arms of any sort, unless such arms are entrusted to him by the government; so that the partisans of the government alone are armed, throughout the country.

Any transgression of these regulations subjects the offending party to severe penalties.

A Frenchman is confined within the narrow limits of his district, and cannot go beyond, without a passport from the municipal or general police. He is bound to exhibit this document at any time, when ordered so to do by a gendarme or any other authority; and, in case of his not complying with the order, or of not being provided with the permit, he is subject to arrest, prosecution, fine, and imprisonment.

Lodging-house and hotel-keepers are enjoined to give lists to the police, of the passengers or lodgers who resort to their houses, on the day of their arrival; and their neglect is visited with fines, and sometimes with loss of license.

A Frenchman is constantly subject to the *surveillance* of the police. The commissioners of police are instructed to inquire and report to the superior authorities on the character, opinions, and doings of the inhabitants of their localities. Ladies themselves are not exempt from this *surveillance*. Besides the general police, there is a secret police *surveillance*, which is exercised over the higher classes in the departments, by confidential agents of the ministry of the interior, who correspond with the minister himself. A special office, with only three or four confidential clerks, carefully transcribes the particulars obtained by these means in registries prepared for that purpose. In order to show in all its turpitude the working of this secret police, I translate one of the accounts transmitted during the ad-

ministration of Thiers, and which was kindly communicated to me, as I happened to be a friend of the party alluded to.

“ M. de *** persists in his sarcastic opposition, and, as a leader, is the more dangerous, as he possesses a large fortune, and an uncontrollable spirit. He has long patronised the projected canal of ——— : let him sink there his property, while the coquetry of Madame de ———, skilfully managed, will soon bring about a fracas, and turn the laughs on our side. Her lover has chosen me for his confidant : he has not succeeded, but I give him hopes ; and he assiduously continues his courtship. You shall know the results.”

Thanks to the benevolent indiscretion of an *employé*, the results were, the flight of the ministerial spy, after a sound castigation ; but how many others have succeeded in their plans ! This system, not merely of observation, but of seduction, of demoralisation, forms the principal part of the business of the ministry of the interior ; and the fact I have just related, is not extraordinary, but a case of common occurrence.

By this system of *espionage*, the government and its superior agents soon become acquainted with all the relations and affairs of any and every one of those who are opposed to them ; and they make the best use of the particulars thus obtained. One principle of the government of July, proclaimed and put in practice immediately after its establishment, is, to ruin or to dishonour those who declare against it ; and the revelations of the police, on the affairs of men in business, have reduced many to bankruptcy and beggary. The men who had taken the principal part in the Revolution, Audry de Puyraveau and Lafitte, when they would no longer lend themselves to the anti-national system of the King, were reduced to sell all their property to wind up their concerns. The honest Puyraveau died an

insolvent, and all sorts of calumnies were circulated against him. The King himself set the example of slander. Benjamin Constant was poor and had debts; his lady had prevailed upon him to accept about 6,000*l.*, offered to her by the Queen in the name of the King, and as a mark of respect for his disinterestedness and his patriotism. Benjamin Constant was the first to oppose the political direction of the new dynasty; and, notwithstanding the assurance of secrecy which had accompanied the offer, the King, incensed at his opposition, divulged the fact, and represented it as a bargain. The poor patriot could not bear up under the feeling of degradation, and died five weeks afterwards, saying to his friends, "That bad man has killed me."

That success encouraged the court and the ministry, and the most abominable calumnies assailed all the patriots who preferred their principles and their self-esteem to the favours, the employment, and the honours offered to them. Up to the present moment, this tactic is persevered in, and the reputation of every citizen is at the mercy of the government and of its police.

Most of the *employés* of the several administrations are compelled to perform the office of spies, and to report to their superiors on the conduct, principles, opinions, and connexions, not only of their colleagues, but also of their own relatives and friends; and, for that purpose, they are allowed, and even induced, to frequent the company of either Legitimists or Liberals, to profess apparently the same opinions, and to be of some service to them, if necessary to gain their confidence.

The result of these reports and denunciations is, to enable the government to form a sort of muster-roll of its enemies, and then to get acquainted with their views and their plans. For this purpose, the post-office director-general is enjoined

to open and read the letters addressed to such persons as are indicated. An especial office is devoted to this service. There are the first-rate men in the art of opening letters and resealing them, translators of all languages and copyists. Thus, nothing escapes the vigilant eye of the police; and, when the opportunity occurs, (in a political trial, for example,) they know where to go to seize a letter which may implicate an individual, and make an accomplice of him, as they did with Dupoty.

The existence of such an office is denied, of course; but, in spite of such interested denials, it is certain that it had been abolished for some time during the Restoration, but has been revived in full activity since February, 1831. The services of this nature performed by the director-general, M. Conte, accounts for his continuance at the head of the administration, notwithstanding all the ministerial revolutions. Such a man cannot easily be displaced; he knows too much, and it requires a long time to be able to know what governments call the demagogues of a whole country.

A Frenchman can be arrested, imprisoned, and detained on the order of the mayor or of his deputy, or on the denunciation of any paid spy, or of an enemy; he may be kept without any communications with his family and his friends, without being taken before the examining judge, for many days, for many weeks, nay, for many months. His examination is always secret; he is not allowed to call in his relations, his friends, the witnesses of the fact, nor even counsel; he is alone with the judge, who endeavours to extract from him any thing in support of the accusation, which is immediately put in writing by the clerk. He is not confronted with his accusers; he is not allowed to hear the evidence against him. When his innocence is evident,

many days, and, in political cases, many months elapse before he is set at liberty; and he can obtain no redress from any body for an unjust and, very often, illegal detention, nor for the damage done to his character or his property by his imprisonment.

If there are any means, how doubtful soever, of supporting the accusation, the case is sent to the assizes; and, from what we have previously seen of the composition of the jury-lists, by the prefects and the presidents of the royal courts, the accused party has but little chance of escaping condemnation. The verdict of the jury needs not be unanimous; if eight only of the jurymen agree in the same opinion, that is enough.

An Englishman can have no idea of the proceedings of the French courts of justice, in criminal, and especially in political cases. The president of the assizes, who regulates the pleadings, is not a permanent judge; he is chosen at every assizes from amongst the councillors of the royal court of the department, by the attorney-general, and the first president; and, as there are perquisites attached to the service, besides the emoluments of the councillor, to be selected for that duty is considered a favour. If, in the discharge of their functions, they do not answer the purposes of the government, they are considered unfit for that service; but, if, on the contrary, they direct the proceedings in such a manner as to obtain a condemnation, not only are they again chosen, but they also obtain honours and promotions. A most outrageous partiality is the consequence of this system; and you see these gentlemen, intimidating, threatening the accused and the witnesses, examining and cross-examining them in favour of the accusation, refusing to receive evidence when favourable to the prisoner, interrupting and silencing the council for the defence; nay, claiming

the interdiction of a barrister daring enough to resist such iniquitous proceedings.

The conduct of the attorneys-general and the solicitors-general, is still more outrageous. There is not a more unprincipled, more violent, more impudent class amongst all the French officials. The most furious party feelings and a wild declamation, is their only merit. They scarcely ever argue; they accuse, they insult, they inveigh. On seeing and hearing them, one is forcibly reminded of the revolutionary tribunals. *Persil* and *Martin* have certainly outstepped *Fouquier Tainville* and *Hébert* in their savage ravings; and, while national justice, in republican France, sentenced the latter to a well-deserved punishment, the royal gratitude of a citizen King promoted the former to the ministry of justice!

The French citizen may appeal from his sentence to the court of Cassation; but it is only another mockery of justice. That court is nothing but a sort of sewer of the inferior tribunals. It is now composed of the most profligate politicians of all *régimes*.* There are the first presidents and the attorneys-general of the Restoration, and of the present government, who, by their long judicial prevarications, have deserved the honours of supreme judicature. There, under their first president, *Portalis*, the degraded son of a high-minded father, under *Bastard de l'Etang*, his worthy competitor in baseness and apostacy, and under the attorney-general *Dupin*, the type of cupidity, arrogance, and inconsistency, the sworn interpreters of the laws unblushingly falsify the laws, and make them sub-

* *Isambert* is now almost the only exception. The most profound jurist of our age, he is at the same time a most upright man, and a most conscientious judge: he was placed in the court of Cassation, by honest *Dupont de l'Eure*, immediately after the Revolution of July; and his pertinacity in upholding what he thinks just, is a great bore to his colleagues, and sometimes awakes the somnolent conscience of *Merilhou*.

servient to the passions and to the vengeance of the rulers. The only occasion in which they pronounced against the government was in 1832, when they declared against the legality of the martial law established in Paris ; and it was owing to the legitimist members, who wanted to have the western departments exempted from the operation of that law, for the benefit of the Duchess of Berry, who was preparing for her expedition. Since that time, that court never disappointed even the most sanguine or sanguinary expectations of the government.

It might seem, that, with so many means at their disposal for keeping within bounds individual liberty, the rulers ought to be perfectly satisfied ; and that, relying on the zeal of the public prosecutors, of the judges, of the juries, and of the court of Cassation, they might entirely confide in the ordinary course of justice : but such is not the case, and for very obvious reasons.

Public trials, whatever may be the results, however severe the sentences, are generally attended with some most unpleasant circumstances. Some unpalatable truths are elucidated, some great principles established or defended during the trial, notwithstanding the authority of the tribunal. Sometimes the accused party becomes the accuser, and proves, to the satisfaction, if not of the court and jury, at least of a numerous public, that what is charged as a crime against the state, is no more than a legitimate exposure of, or a legal opposition to, the acts of a perverse, tyrannical, and anti-national administration. The courts of law thus become normal schools of opposition, foci of propagandism, and very often the arena for splendid exhibitions of intellectual superiority and political courage, which excite the sympathy, and draw forth the applauses of all the spectators. In such cases, public prosecutions become a triumph for the accused parties,

and a moral defeat to the government, the frequent renewal of which is destructive of its authority.

Other means, therefore, must be employed to get rid of the disaffected. Conspiracies, riots, and insurrections are the very best resources of the administration, because, in such cases, there is no reasoning; the sticks and the swords of the policemen, and the firing of the soldiers, are the only arguments, according to the gravity of the circumstances. When public opinion is strongly against a measure, proposed or adopted, mobs are collected; *rassemblements* are skilfully distributed, and are allowed to parade the streets during two or three days; the public are alarmed, the obnoxious measure is lost sight of, and then a display of military forces on the *boulevards* disperse the multitude. In case of a strong opposition in the chamber, a riot, and a mock attempt at a conflict, are got up; and, if the ministry thinks that its existence is really in danger, an insurrection is immediately planned and breaks out just in time to enable them to work on the terrified minds of the middle class and of the deputies; and then 60,000 soldiers begin the re-establishment of order. Such was the case in June, 1832, and in April, 1834. At the funeral of General Lamarque, the inoffensive population were provoked, and attacked by order of the government; in April, the first barricades were erected by policemen in disguise.

It may easily be conceived, that, during these various movements, there are many opportunities of knocking down, of stabbing, or of shooting and slaying the individuals obnoxious for their opposition to the system. Such murders are the most convenient way of getting rid of them, as every thing is accounted for and justified by the circumstances. No inquiry is allowed as to either the fact or its causes. Nineteen persons, all the inhabit-

ants of one house, old people, women, girls, and children, were butchered by soldiers, in April, 1834. The relatives and neighbours, and the press, were loud in their demands for an investigation, which was refused. *The army had done its duty; and the ministry had saved the country;* and the modern Scipios ascended the capitol.

I am conscious that many of my readers will find it difficult to believe in the systematic practice of such governmental principles; but, if they attentively consider all the events of the sort that have occurred in France during the last twelve years, and the circumstances under which they took place, their incredulity will soon give way to conviction. The *doctrinaires* avow the policy, and the answer of their leader to the remonstrances of an honest, though misguided ministerial deputy against such doings, deserves attention. "Inoculation, which brings about the small-pox at a convenient time, and easily conquers the disease, is preferable to the old system of leaving nature to its own course. Such is also the case with political diseases."

The first consequence of these disorders and conflicts is to excite the middle classes, the tradespeople, against the leaders of the Liberal party, who are represented as the promoters of rebellion, as the instigators to murder and pillage. By this means, instead of the sympathy which a public prosecution is sure to obtain for them, instead of the general approbation which follows the public exposition of their principles, the Liberal leaders, if they survive, are considered as enemies, and abandoned to the tender mercies of the government, which immediately summons the house of peers to sit as a judicial court upon the accused parties.

There, the prisoners have no chance whatsoever. None of the formalities observed in the ordinary courts of justice are binding upon those judges. There is no public, no appeal, no responsibility. They try and condemn as they

please. They have gone so far as to give a verdict without examining the prisoners, without hearing their defence, without admitting their counsel. Such a tribunal is, therefore, the best adapted for ensuring the award of the most severe penalties; and, as prisoners cannot be delivered up to that court, but for an armed attempt against the government, the government does not hesitate to concoct conspiracies which can be turned to such useful state purposes.

Such is the condition of the French people as regards individual liberty! Such is the protection afforded by the institutions, the laws, and the public authorities, to their freedom, their property, and their persons! Nor have they any remedy whatever for the wrongs inflicted on them by the agents of the government. Irresponsibility is the privilege of office. No action can be brought against them for any of their official misdeeds, however flagrant and prejudicial to individuals, unless the council of state, composed of placemen, and entirely dependent on the ministers, has granted permission to sue the parties. That permission is almost always refused; and, when obtained, it generally turns out that the action cannot be maintained against the culprit, but only against his superiors, the ministers, who are backed by the chambers.

As an instance, I may refer to the case of the postmaster of Boulogne, charged with detaining a letter directed to the agent for the English newspapers. The fact is against the law, against the regulations of the general administration, and can be accounted for only by neglect or breach of duty on the part of the postmaster or the postman. Yet, when the action is brought against the postmaster, the director-general of the post-office interferes, pretending that the suit must be against the administration, and not against its *employé*; and the tribunal adjudicates in his favour.

Instead of throwing away its money, the *Morning*

Chronicle would have better served its own cause and that of the public, by ascertaining and plainly stating a few facts like the following.

M. Gabriel Delessert, the then prefect of police, and a counsellor of state, was bound to know everything, and of course took an interest in the correspondence of the newspapers.

M. François Delessert, his brother, is the deputy of Boulogne, and a most loyal and ministerial deputy. He is also a most affluent and penurious banker.

M. Adam, mayor of Boulogne, the grand elector of the *arrondissement*, is also a banker well known here.

The postmaster of Boulogne, recently appointed through the influence of the mayor and of the deputy, is naturally anxious to show his gratitude, and could not but feel for the grief of the friends of MM. Delessert and Adam in London, on reading, without any previous preparation, the distressing news from India, contained in the *Chronicle*. Such refined feelings are not peculiar to the Boulogne postmaster. They are the characteristics of the whole French administration. Private interests may suffer, but general interest (that is to say, the interest of the supporters of the administration,) is benefited; and, consequently, there is no harm done, no just cause for complaint, no claim for redress.

A Frenchman knows all this very well, and, therefore, never thinks of bringing an action for damages in such cases; but he does not eulogise the promoters or the authors of such a system: on the contrary, he cordially detests them. With a little more knowledge of the French administration, and a little more experience of the costs and profits of administrative justice, the *Chronicle* will be brought to entertain the same sentiments.

I might adduce many more important cases of injury done to the reputation, the property, or the person, by the offi-

cials of the government, with perfect impunity. I will instance only two. An ex-counsellor of state, ex-prefect, who had given up his functions to remain an independent deputy, had established cotton spinning mills in his chateau. The government, in order to punish him, established powder mills against the walls of his park, and succeeded in blowing up his manufactory, and never paid any compensation for his losses. Baron de Laitre died an insolvent, although reinstated in his public functions after the Revolution of July.

A few years ago, an assistant mayor of Paris, returning home with a friend, passed along the railings of the *bourse*, just at the moment the policemen were rushing from the building, striking indiscriminately with their bludgeons the people who had assembled on the spot. The poor assistant was knocked down, and had a broken head for his share in the distribution. A staunch Philippist, he complained to the superior authorities; but he was told that, under such circumstances, it was impossible to make any distinction.

In vain he represented that there had been no necessity whatever for such violent proceedings. He was answered that he knew nothing of the facts, and that his being knocked down, with many others, had prevented a dreadful insurrection. Not satisfied with this answer, he wrote a letter to the editor of a newspaper; and soon afterwards, he received—his dismissal.

I need say no more on this subject, but will conclude this chapter with the same words with which I began it. "The individual liberty of a French citizen consists in a perpetual vassalage to all the delegates and hirelings of the ministry of the interior, and of his police, and in a perpetual terror of the officials of the ministry of justice."

CHAPTER III.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION; TENDING TO KEEP THE PEOPLE
IN IGNORANCE, OR TO TEACH ERRORS.

To maintain the people in a state of slavery, they must either be maintained in a state of ignorance, or be taught only what the rulers think adapted to render them more subservient; and therefore all despotic governments, whatever may be their constitutional forms, autocratic, aristocratic, or oligarchic, claim the monopoly of public instruction. France, under Napoleon, was subjected to a military system of education; under the Restoration, an ecclesiastical discipline regulated all the schools. Both systems were equally obnoxious to the nation. Civil and religious liberty was the war-cry during the glorious and deplorable Revolution of 1830. Civil and religious liberty was, of course, adopted as a pass-word by the ambitious and designing men who could not seize the power without passing over the barricades, and conciliating their vigilant guardians. Civil and religious liberty was the first promise of Louis Philippe, when he arrived at the Hotel de Ville; and, when pressed by Lafayette to be more explicit in his declaration of principles, he immediately promised, that the freedom of the press, the freedom of public meetings, the freedom of public instruction, and the trial by jury, should be the basis of the new constitution of the country.

Unfortunately, the fulfilling of those solemn promises was entrusted to men whose previous political conduct was little calculated to inspire confidence. The Duke de Broglie

and M. Guizot were placed at the head of the ministry of public instruction and of the home department. Their only object, in the exercise of their authority, seemed to be, the restoration of the governmental system which had so recently been overthrown; and the public indignation compelled the King to dismiss them, three months after their installation. But, in that short period, they had already paved the way for the establishment of the ministerial despotism; and had promulgated as a law, that, until the realization of the promises of the charter, the monopoly of public instruction belonged to the university.

Some noblemen and gentlemen, finding that the promises of the charter were not likely to be ever realized, and at the same time venturing to question the authority of the law of MM. Guizot and Broglie, as enforced by their successors, MM. Merilhou and Montalivet thought proper to establish a society for the defence of religious freedom and the freedom of public instruction. At the head of the society were, the young Count de Montalembert, a peer of France; M. De Coux, a rich gentleman; and the Abbé Lacordaire. They took a large house in the Rue des Beaux Arts, and publicly announced, on the 9th of May, 1831, that they would, on the following day, open a free-school for poor children, to whom they would themselves give the first elements of instruction.

The government sent a police commissioner to interrupt the lessons, and shut up the house. M. Lacordaire insisted upon his rights, in conformity with the charter; and his arguments had so much weight with the officer, that he retired without executing his order; but, on the following day, he came again, and then ordered the boys to leave the house. On their refusal to comply with his orders thrice repeated, he called in a police force; and, notwithstanding

the resistance of the Abbé Lacordaire, violently ejected the children ; and, to prevent the school being re-opened, shut up the room, and affixed his seal to the door.

For this violation of M. Guizot's law, MM. Montalembert, De Coux, and Lacordaire were indicted before the Court of *Police Correctionnelle*. But the Count Montalembert having, in the interval, succeeded to the peerage of his father, a royal ordonnance convoked the court of peers for the trial of their colleague and his accomplices. The trial began on the 19th of October, 1831. The attorney-general, Persil, appeared for the prosecution. After having heard the defence, the court of peers of Louis Philippe sentenced Count Montalembert, De Coux, and Lacordaire, to a fine of 100 francs each, for having kept a public school without being authorised by the Imperial University, in conformity with the imperial decree of the 15th of November, 1811!

Such is still the law ; and the only object of the government since 1830 has been, not merely to enforce it to its utmost extent, but also to reduce the professors and masters to the most degrading servilism, by arbitrarily depriving obnoxious parties of the diplomas and authorisations granted them. Very little, however, had been done until October, 1832, when Guizot was installed in the ministry of public instruction, which office he retained until February, 1836. To him principally, and to his then assistants, and since, alternately, as it suited their interests, his *cads* or rivals, Villemain and Cousin, must be attributed the present degraded state of education in France.

In the chapter on the condition of the people in France, I have stated, that two-thirds of the French population are in a state of gross ignorance ; that 17,000,000 inhabitants are unable either to read or to write ; that 7,000,000 can read but imperfectly, and cannot write ; that about

7,000,000 can read and write but imperfectly ; and that only 3,000,000 are properly or completely educated. Such results do not speak much in favour of the system of public instruction established in France. Yet, M. Guizot has taken care to have his administration celebrated in all the newspapers and all the literary *coteries* in Europe and America, as having performed wonders ! Nay, that opinion has been so industriously and so perseveringly inculcated in England, that I feel bound to quote some authority in support of my statements.

According to the official returns of the ministry of war, half of the recruits annually raised by the conscription can neither read nor write. In many departments, the proportion is two-thirds or three-fourths in favour of complete ignorance. In the department of *La Corrèze*, of 1,000 recruits, 819 can neither read nor write. In the *Morbihan*, the proportion is 796 per 1,000 ; in the *Allier*, 785 ; in the *Finisterre*, 768 ; in the *Haute Vienne*, 762 ; in the *Indre*, 761. There are twenty-five other departments, where the proportion is between 600 and 750 per 1,000 ; and in seventeen departments, it is between 500 and 600. Thus in forty-eight out of eighty-six departments, the absolutely ignorant are in the proportion of between fifty and eighty-two per cent. of the population.

How then, in the presence of such facts, has it been possible to deceive and mislead the public, on the French system of public instruction, on the author of that system, and on its working ? This will easily be explained.

Until 1833, the schools of elementary instruction, the primary schools in the *communes*, were private establishments under the patronage of the principal inhabitants and of the parish priests ; and, in almost all the *communes*, the clerk was the schoolmaster. The children were taught on paying a small sum, a penny or twopence per

week. The masters were in some sort independent of the government, and subject only to the control of the local authorities, for their method of teaching, and for their conduct.

M. Guizot, considering that his authority and his patronage would be considerably extended, and his love for domination gratified, by placing all such schools under the immediate control of his administration, proposed and obtained a law for that purpose.

It was enacted: That all the *communes* of France (37,187) should support a primary elementary school, or should unite with a neighbouring *commune* for that purpose; and the number of those schools was fixed at 34,000. That, in order to pay for the rent of the school and the stipend and board of the schoolmaster, the *communes* should pay an additional tax of three per cent. on their direct contributions. That, in order to give uniformity to the method of instruction, normal schools should be established in all the departments and at their expense, to train teachers for the primary schools. That committees of primary instruction should be established in all the *arrondissements*; and that inspectors-general and sub-inspectors should be appointed, by the minister and the rectors of the university. That the schoolmasters of the *communes*, the directors of the normal schools, and the pupils, should be nominated by the minister, the rectors, and the committees. Lastly, that no books should be used in the schools but those authorised by the minister.

This law was, in fact, nothing but the taking complete possession of the monopoly of public instruction, and the enlistment in the ministerial army of 34,000 schoolmasters, at the expense of the *communes*. As it might easily be anticipated that the *communes*, and even the general councils, would not relish such an organisation, and might

refuse to tax themselves, for increasing the ministerial influence, it was enacted, that, in such case, the government should be empowered to tax both the reluctant departments and the *communes*. 26,000 *communes*, and even many general councils, refused to comply with the provisions of the law; and the ministry had to compel the *communes* to pay for the new organisation of their schools, a sum of 3,300,000 francs, in addition to their other taxes.

Having done this, M. Guizot condescended to come to the aid of the *communes*, by instituting a *fund of encouragement for primary instruction*. The amount of the aid thus given by the state was 624,700 francs: this is just half of the "encouragement" granted to the opera, and the "*conservatoire de musique*;" one third of the "encouragement" granted to the studs (*haras*); and one fifth the "encouragement" granted to the secret police.

Such are the benefits conferred by the legislation and administration of M. Guizot, on the education of the people! Such are his titles to the gratitude of his country, and the admiration of foreigners, as minister of public instruction! It appears, however, that his system did not answer very well, even for his own purposes; as we find, in the first report of his successor, and, till then, his friend, Salvandi, in 1838, that great inconveniences were experienced; that the good results anticipated had not been realized, and that "*l'autorité n'a pas assez d'action sur le vaste corps des instituteurs primaires.—L'unique moyen de parer à tant d'inconvénients est de procéder à une organisation complète, définitive, normale, du département de l'instruction publique.*"

Salvandi's complete, definitive, and normal organisation was nothing but a new distribution of the ministerial bureaux and the creation of new officials of all sorts.

Without entering into more details on the subject, I will conclude with a short statistical statement, drawn from official sources, of the actual distribution of public money to the different classes of public instruction.

Francs.

Ministerial bureaux, inspectors-general, rectors, inspectors, and secretaries of the twenty-six academies	1,680,000
Classical and superior instruction	3,800,000
Literary and scientific institutions	2,500,000
Total	7,980,000

Instruction <i>primaire</i>	1,600,000
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Thus, nearly 8,000,000 of the contributions paid by the country are expended upon the education of the rich, of the placemen, of the sons of the electors and jurymen, in public schools; and 1,600,000 francs only are consecrated to the education of the people. And of those 1,600,000 francs, more than half is given away to useless inspectors and other sinecurists. Can we wonder, then, at the general ignorance of the French population? Does not the system sufficiently explain how, in forty-eight departments, from fifty to eighty per hundred of the inhabitants can neither write nor read? Is it not evident, that, although pretending to promote public instruction, such a system can have no other object, as it has no other result, than to keep the mass of the people in a state of complete ignorance?

As to the education given to the privileged and rich classes, with the exception of Greek, Latin, and Mathematics, which do not admit of any sophistry or falsehood, it is of the very worst character. Literature, history, philosophy, and ethics, *doctrinarised*, if I may use the expression, by Villemain, Guizot, Cousin, and Salvandi, are but a

compound of wild, extravagant ideas, and obscure or absurd theories, a mixture of all the paradoxes they have been able to collect from the rhetors and sophists of the *bas empire*, with the delirious speculations of the Fatalism and Illuminatism of modern Germany. Of course, the founders of the new school are at the same time its models. Their works must be the only ones used in the colleges and the academies, which they can compel, as grandmasters or directors of the university; and that answers the double purpose of filling their purses and extending their reputation. No professors are appointed or promoted, unless they bind themselves to inculcate the doctrines and proclaim the infallibility of their patrons, although all of them have repeatedly changed their literary, historical, philosophical, moral, and political opinions, principles, and attachments in the course of their career.

The effect of such a system, and of such incoherent doctrines, is, to unsettle, to bewilder the mind; to render it inaccessible to truth and reason; and to lead it to the conviction that there is no object, no reality, but in the pursuit and gratification of personal and material interests. A rising generation, thus educated, must be fit only for ministering or submitting to any despotism, and for setting the example of servility and degradation to the uneducated classes of the people. That being the object of the government, the monopoly of public instruction must necessarily be maintained, and form one of the ministerial departments. Similar was, in 1839, the object of Lord John Russell. Such is, in 1843, *the object of Sir James Graham*.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MINISTRY OF FINANCES ABSORBING ALL THE RESOURCES OF
THE COUNTRY.

IN the preceding chapters we have seen what are the tendencies and the operation of the three principal departments of the French administration. That the ministry of the interior seemed instituted only to annihilate, as far as it can be done, the rights and the liberties of the citizens; the ministry of justice, to insure their oppression; and the ministry of public instruction, to maintain them in a state of ignorance. Yet, the system is incomplete; something more is required to secure the perpetuity of despotism. The natural intelligence, the industry, the activity of the people, being so carefully excluded from all other fields of action, must be entirely directed towards the acquisition of wealth. But wealth is an element of strength, a principle of independence, and a dispenser of instruction: and instruction, independence, strength, lead to investigation, to resistance, and to emancipation. Therefore despotism must, for its own security, oppose the acquisition of wealth. It must assume the direction of the commercial and agricultural interests of the country, in order to impede their efforts and their progress. It must paralyze the activity, and absorb the resources, of the people. It must constantly increase the amount of the taxes, and prevent the free circulation and employment of capital, unless it passes through the hands of its agents. The French administration is admirably adapted to these purposes, which

are completely realised by three ministries, those of finance, the public works, and commerce and agriculture.

In the first part of this volume, I have shown the organisation of those administrations, and what they cost the country merely for salaries paid to the *employés*. To judge of the progress of the administrative science in France, let us, for a moment, go back to the beginning of the present system, and see the cost of the government under the consulate and the empire.

From 1801 to 1809, both included, during a period of nine years, the total expenditure, for all the services, was 6,375,000,000 francs; or, on an average, 711,000,000 francs a-year. The territory of France, including Belgium, Luxembourg, Savoy, and Piedmont, comprised 116 departments, thirty more than at present. At that period, Napoleon had to prepare for his projected *descente en Angleterre*, and to wage the wars of 1806, 1807, and 1809, against Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The taxes raised in the 116 departments never exceeded 670,000,000 francs a-year; the surplus of the expenditure was paid by the conquered emperors and kings.

In 1810, on account of the war in Spain, the expenditure was 785,000,000 francs.

In 1811, Holland, Hamburg, and the neighbouring territories being united to the French empire, then composed of 130 departments, the expenditure rose to 954,000,000 francs. The war in Spain continued.

In 1812, the expenditure was 1,036,000,000 francs. The war in Spain and in Russia accounts for that increase.

In 1813, France being at war with all Europe, the expenditure amounted to 1,115,000,000 francs. But the taxes imposed upon the people, even during that eventful period, never exceeded 890,000,000 francs; the surplus being provided for by loans and the sale of national pro-

perty. Napoleon, at the same time, was executing the most gigantic works—all of them for the benefit of the country.

During the first five years of the Restoration, the total expenditure was 4,920,000,000 francs, which gives an average of 982,222,000 francs; but, during those five years, France had to support an army of occupation, and to pay 700,000,000 francs of war contributions, besides about 200,000,000 for indemnities to the foreign claimants, for their losses during the war.

From 1818 till 1823, the annual expenditure averaged 920,000,000 francs a-year, which were obtained from the taxes imposed upon the people. But the territory of France had been reduced from 130 to 86 departments; and the forty-four departments thus alienated, were the most opulent of the empire, like Belgium and Holland, and had contributed, to the amount of 275,000,000 francs, to the revenue of the empire. So that the eighty-six departments of old France paid, in taxes of all sorts, during the disasters of Napoleon, only 615,000,000 francs; that is to say, 305,000,000 less than under the Restoration before 1823.

In that year, the invasion of Spain took place, and the expenditure of the government increased to 1,123,000,000 francs, which is 8,000,000 more than the expenditure in 1813, when Napoleon had to create a new army, and to contend against all Europe.

After the war in Spain, the law of indemnity in favour of the emigrants increased the expenditure; and, from 1825 to 1830, the average of the taxes raised upon the people was 950,000,000 francs.

Since the Revolution of July, the expenditure has been constantly increasing, and taxation has increased in the same proportion. Under the citizen King, the government cannot be carried on without exacting from the people

more than the ambition and the conquests of Napoleon, and more than the aristocracy and the clergy of the Restoration, had ever cost. In 1831, the expenses were settled at 1,215,000,000 francs, owing, it was said, to the hostile attitude of the continental powers. In 1832, 1,150,000,000 francs and, in 1833, 1,163,000,000 francs, were voted for the necessities of the government; and, at present, in 1843, the expenditure is above 1,490,000,000 francs. The average, during the twelve years of the present reign, is 1,150,000,000 francs a-year; that is to say, 240,000,000 francs more than the average under the Restoration, and 400,000,000 francs more than under Napoleon, with a France of 116, or 130 departments!

The average of the taxes levied upon the eighty-six departments of France, during the Empire, the Restoration, and the present government, is as follows:—

	Francs.
During the Empire	544,000,000
During the Restoration	950,000,000
During the present government	1,360,000,000

Thus, in the fifteen years of the consulate and of the empire of Napoleon, when France was constantly engaged in wars, with the exception of the short peace of Amiens, the total amount of contributions paid by the eighty-six departments, was 8,160,000,000 francs; in the fifteen years of the Restoration, the same departments paid 14,250,000,000; and, in the thirteen years of the reign of the citizen King, they have paid 14,210,000,000 francs.

Yet with such a revenue, the present government cannot go on without periodical loans and sales of the national forests. More than 800,000,000 francs have been raised by these means; and yet, such is the extravagance of the expenditure, that there is now a *deficit* amounting to 1,300,000,000 francs. That *deficit* must soon be provided for by another loan, which will again necessitate an increase of taxation

to pay the interest; and that account will no sooner be settled, than new means will be devised for increasing the expenses, and again running into debt.

Such are the advances made in financial science by the actual rulers of France! It is no longer the study and knowledge of that political economy, which consists in the improvement of the public revenue, by promoting and extending the productive resources of the country, and in regulating the expenditure, on the amount of the revenue, so that a part of it shall always be in reserve for eventualities.

A minister of finance in France needs only to know how to cast accounts, and then he is perfect. "*La science des finances est l'art de grouper des chiffres*," said Thiers, in the chamber of deputies. Considerations as to the propriety of such and such a tax, the impropriety of such and such an expense, or the necessity of economy, disqualify a man for that office. M. Humann was the only minister of finance who ever dreamed of any such thing; and he once proposed the reduction of the interest of the public debt. For that offence against the present order of things, he was obliged to resign; and, when he resumed his office, he had grown wiser, and never again thought of such a measure. He confined himself to his task, which is to cast up all the demands of all the ministers and of the court, to propose taxes on every thing to the same amount, to order the payment of those taxes, and, when collected, to distribute the produce amongst the court and the ministers. And, as the court and the ministers claim every year an additional income, it follows that the established taxes must be increased every year. Let us quote a few examples.

The budget of the minister of war, and of the minister of administration of the war department, during the empire, amounted, on an average, to 330,000,000 francs. In 1813,

when, after the disasters of the campaign of Russia, the cavalry and the artillery, nay, the whole army, was re-organised, the total expenditure was 420,000,000 francs. In the last twelve years, the average of the expenses of the ministry of war has been 480,000,000 francs !

Under the Empire, the budget of the ministry of the interior, in which were included the public works, and agriculture, and commerce, was 15,000,000 francs. Now, the same administration costs 59,000,000 francs.

The total amount of the expenditure for all the services of the government, besides the army and navy, were, under Napoleon, 300,000,000 francs a-year. During the last twelve years, the expenditure, for the same services, has exceeded 700,000,000 francs; 400,000,000 of which are paid in salaries and sinecures, and the rest is squandered away in jobs, gratuities, and corruption of every kind.

And this is what now necessitates the levy of 1,280,000,000 francs a-year by taxes on the people. The number of the heads of families, or citizens above twenty-one years of age, being 8,696,000, it follows that the average of taxes paid per head, is 135 francs.

Is it not clear, that such a financial system must absorb all the resources of the people, and abstract from *them* all the means of bettering *their* condition, of improving in industrial, agricultural, and commercial pursuits, of advancing in instruction and morality? Let it not be said, that the greater proportion of the taxes bears upon the rich: it is quite the contrary. Most of them are almost exclusively paid by the poorer classes and the tradespeople. The 700,000,000 produced by the excise, the tax on salt, the customs, and the stamp duty, fall entirely upon these classes, which besides participate, in a due proportion, in the payment of the other taxes. The fact cannot be controverted; and official returns, carefully examined,

prove that the total amount of taxes paid by the ruling or governmental class, the 200,000 electors and jurymen, does not exceed 54,000,000 francs; that is to say, the twentieth part of the whole amount of the contributions levied upon the people. Here in England, the rich man pays for the gratification of his pride, of his tastes, for the enjoyment of his pleasures and for his luxuries; he pays for his servants, for his carriage, for his horses, for his hounds, for sporting a coronet, a helmet, a buck's head, or any other family devices. In France, such taxes are not known; but the beverage of the artizan, the spade of the labourer, the axe of the woodman, pay 100 per cent. of their value.

Much has been lately said, in both houses of parliament, and at public meetings, about the difference existing between the relative taxation of Great Britain and France. And we are continually meeting, in reviews and other publications of the day, with the most erroneous statements, especially with regard to the land-tax. Some of our orators and writers have stated, that in France the land-tax produces £20,000,000 a-year; whilst, in England, it produces only £1,000,000; and of course this statement furnishes the text of violent animadversions on the influence of landed interests in England. The less extravagant of the writers or orators estimate the amount of taxes paid on land at £10,000,000 only.

An imperfect notion of the French system is the cause of the inaccuracies, which we think it necessary to expose. What the French call *contributions directes* (direct taxes) is mistaken for land-tax only; while it comprehends four distinct sorts of contributions:—

1st. *Contribution foncière* (land and house-tax), the produce of which, for the whole of France, is £6,220,000.

2d. *Contribution personnelle et mobilière* (capitation and furniture tax), which produces £1,360,000.

3rd. *Contribution des portes et fenêtres* (door and window-tax), which amounts to £900,000.

4th. *Les patentes* (licences), which every man, engaging in any trade, commerce, or manufacture, is obliged to renew annually, £1,600,000.

The land contributes a portion only (not more than half), to the first class of direct taxes ; and when I say, not more than half, it is certainly over the mark : the rest is paid on buildings. To enable my readers to form an opinion upon the subject, I will quote an instance.

The territory of the department of Seine contains 47,500 *hectares*, and pays for land and house-tax 6,938,000 francs ; while the department of Yonne, with 738,906 *hectares*, or thirty-eight times the extent of territory, pays only 1,780,000 francs.

The tax on the land in France, does not amount to more than £3,000,000 sterling.

CHAPTER V.

THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND AGRICULTURE TRAMMELING AGRICULTURE, MANUFACTURES, AND COMMERCE.

THE general system of the government, which secures the monopoly of the elective, representative, legislative, and administrative privileges to 200,000 of the citizens, comprising the most affluent portion of the population, is the principal cause of the deplorable condition of agriculture, industry, and commerce in France. The most pleasant condition in life, the most free from anxiety, the most secure, and at the same time that which necessitates the smallest amount of mental or bodily exertion, is that of an *employé*. Five or, at the utmost, six hours of daily attendance to his duties, secure to him the monthly payment of

his salary. There is no risk of capital, no incessant toils, no perpetual fears, as in industrial, agricultural, and commercial pursuits. Favourable or unfavourable, the seasons will not deprive him of his income: shipwrecks, failures, bankruptcies, will not ruin his prospects. The worst that can happen to him is, to be overlooked in the promotions, and to remain in the same situation; but he loses none of his comforts; while the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant, are constantly exposed to vicissitudes and reverses, resulting, not only from natural causes, but also from the bad measures of the government.

Young men belonging to the families of the 200,000 electors, knowing that they will be entitled to the *employs*, provided that their parents vote at the elections for ministerial candidates, prefer a dependence on ministerial favour to a life of exertion, of strife, and of uncertainty, in cultivating their fields, or in working their capital. They, therefore, let their lands, or they invest their money in the public funds; and the rent or the interest of their money, added to the emoluments of their offices, gives them affluence and security.

The annual income of the 200,000 electors is, in the aggregate, about 450,000,000 of francs. Under a better system of government, the capital producing that revenue would be employed in improving the agricultural and industrial processes, so as to increase the produce, and give a better return. At present, that capital is inactive; and agriculture, industry, and commerce are occasionally abandoned to people of small property, who, after providing for the maintenance of their families and the payment of their taxes, have hardly anything left for improving their concerns.

Such is the main cause of the stationary condition of manufactures, agriculture, and trade in France; but it is not the

only one. The influence of the ministry of commerce and of the administration of the customs, is almost equally injurious to their progress. It would seem, indeed, as if they had expressly been organized for the utter ruin of the country, particularly the customs' system.

In order to appreciate the working of this system, it is not enough to know that the cost of collection is twenty-two and a half per cent. of the income raised by its means; we must also ascertain the value and the nature of the goods on which that amount of duty is paid. I find, by the official returns, that the general commerce of France, imports and exports, is, on an average, 75,000,000*l.* sterling a-year; and that the imports are more than 37,000,000*l.* sterling, or very nearly half of the whole trade of the country; and, besides that, more than three-fifths of the imports consist in *matières premières*, goods necessary to the French manufactures. Thus, of the goods imported from the United States, and averaging in value 5,300,000*l.* sterling, 5,000,000*l.* are of that kind. Of the imports from England and her colonies, amounting to 4,700,000*l.* sterling, 3,000,000*l.* are for those *matières premières*. So that the first effect of the system is to tax and to cripple French industry, which must afterwards be compensated by protective and prohibitive duties. And, indeed, I defy human ingenuity to go further in the way of pretended protection. To form an idea of the French tariff, you need only to draw up a complete catalogue of all the natural productions or manufactured articles in existence, and (with the exception of a very few of them, which are of first necessity) to put at random, on every article, a duty from 10 to 100 francs per cent., or a prohibition. Such is the want of intelligence which seems to have presided over the construction of that tariff.

The imports on which the duty seems to have been imposed, after some consideration, are iron, coals, and cotton.

The duty on iron is 250 francs (10*l.* sterling) per ton; the quantity exported from England is about 14,000 tons, which pay 3,500,000 francs; which is more than the average value of iron in England (9*l.* 11*s.* per ton). The quantity of iron manufactured in France is about 130,000 tons a-year, which, sold at 450 francs per ton. produce . . . 58,500,000 francs. The same quantity of iron might be obtained from England, at 225 francs per ton 29,250,000 —

Consequently, the loss to the French people every year is 29,250,000 —

The manufactures of the western coast of France, that would consume 230,000 tons of British coals, which they could procure at 35 francs per ton, cannot use that combustible, unless they pay a duty averaging 100 francs per ton; and they are compelled to use wood as fuel, which increases their expenses to the amount of more than 17,000,000 francs a-year.

The cotton wool imported from the United States, or from England, into France, amounts, in value, to about 130,000,000 francs a-year; the duty on which, at twelve per cent., is 15,600,000 francs.

So that these three articles of the tariff entail upon French industry an annual loss of 61,850,000 francs!

Of course, there is a corn law, and not a sliding, but a progressive scale. When wheat is from twenty-eight to twenty-six francs the *hectolitre*, the duty is twenty-five *centimes* on corn imported in French ships, and one franc fifty *centimes* on corn imported in foreign ships. When from twenty-six to twenty-two francs the *hectolitre*, the

duty rises one franc for every franc's diminution in price. But when the price is under twenty-two francs, then the increase of duty is one franc fifty *centimes* for every franc's fall in price per *hectolitre*.

Then, we find duties of 6*l.*, 10*l.*, 14*l.*, 18*l.*, 25*l.*, and 50*l.* sterling per ton weight on twist cotton, flax, and hemp; and duties ranging from 12*l.* to 280*l.* per ton weight of woven cotton and flax, according to their quality; but the best qualities are entirely prohibited. This is the set-off against the taxes imposed upon the manufacturers. It is evident, that they lose still more than they gain by such a protective system. Such is the general opinion in the country; yet the system must not be altered.

The leading journal of England, the *Times*, had, a few months ago, a most ably written article on the commercial relations of the two countries; in which, however, the writer committed a capital error, when he remarked, that "the grand obstacles to commercial reform, and to the establishment of sound commercial principles abroad, are, the vague notions of favour and privilege which are still attached to the commercial operations of international trade." No; that is *not* the case. The grand obstacle is, the utter impossibility of reconciling a free trade, so likely to be advantageous to the country, with a gigantic customs' establishment, so indispensable to the government and to the administration. Twenty-seven thousand *employés*, and about 25,000,000 francs a-year distributed amongst the sixty-two *arrondissements* of the French frontier, are the only security, not against the fraudulent introduction of foreign goods into the French territory, but against the much more dreaded introduction of independent principles into the electoral colleges, into the chamber of deputies, and into the laws. These frontier *arrondissements* are so much tainted with liberalism, and their 18,000 electors are so

much inclined to oppose the government, that it would not be safe to reduce either the number of placemen or the amount of their emoluments. Suppress the customs' officers, or dissatisfy them by curtailing their salaries, and there remain but 40,000 *employés* in these *arrondissements* to secure a majority amongst the 12,000 electors, and the goodwill of their sixty-two deputies. Even with the present establishment, the ministers can hardly outnumber their opponents: and, in many localities, they have been defeated. What, then, would be the result of the electoral battles, if they disbanded such a formidable *corps d'armée*? We Englishmen, a nation of shopkeepers, think of nothing but manufactures and trade, and our government indulges our fancies. But France is a grand administration; and, in the proposal of a free-trade, the French government cannot but perceive an invitation to suicide.

There are some other causes which must not be overlooked, as they bear with almost equal force on the question. The bulk of the property of the King is in forests. As Duke of Orleans, his income from these forests is at least 300,000*l.* a-year. The crown estates which he possesses as King, are also principally in woods, which yield him 250,000*l.* a-year more. The leaders in the house of peers, like M. Roy, late minister of finance, are also owners of large forests, which they purchased during the Revolution. Marshal Soult, the Duc de Caze, Count Jaubert, and M. Harlay, possess extensive iron works, which, in spite of the high protective duties, are in a most deplorable condition. Nay, Decazeville's iron works are in the hands of assignees or trustees, the noble duke being an insolvent, although the *referendaire* of the house of peers. If British iron and British coals were admitted with a duty of twenty per cent. *ad valorem*, the King would lose 350,000*l.* a-year; and thirty peers, and as many deputies, would be reduced to insol-

vency. These are the grand obstacles to commercial reform; and the *Times*, so generally well informed, would confer a benefit on both countries, if, instead of putting the saddle on the wrong horse, it were to state the plain facts, and let the responsibility fall on the guilty parties.

There is in France, as well as in England, a political sect disposed to find fault with almost any duty on any commodity—the Utilitarians; and I admit, that their zeal in the cause of non-taxation augments the number of their proselytes in so large a proportion, that a minister of commerce would soon succumb under their attacks, if he had to bear all the responsibility of the customs' duties which he imposes. The general councils of agriculture, of manufactures, and of trade, release him from the greater part of that responsibility; so much so, that, in almost every case, the minister is enabled to say, "The duty is a great deal less than that recommended by one of the general councils." This, for a long time, has enabled the minister of this department to carry all his measures. But of late, the general councils have begun to disagree on almost every question. The council of agriculture is in direct hostility to the council of manufacture; and both are striving against the superior council of trade. A very numerous class, the wine-growers, have been the first cause of these disagreements. They say, that the protective duties on behalf of the French manufacturers, prohibit the export of their wines, and that their annual loss is not less than 100,000,000 francs. Their complaints have long been disregarded; but now something must be done, as Languedoc and Bordeaux threaten a rebellion. There not being *forts détachés* in those districts, the minister is exceedingly perplexed, not knowing what to do.

The conflict between the colonial and the home-manufactured sugars embitters the dissension. The imperial

government, and even that of the Restoration, considered the fabrication of beet-root sugar as a sort of national conquest; and millions were liberally granted to promote that branch of industry, and to render France independent of her colonies, which, in the event of a war with England, would be immediately lost. The success has surpassed the most sanguine expectations. A capital of 100,000,000 of francs is at present invested in that manufacture. Two-thirds of the sugar consumed in France is of home growth; and the quality being as good as that of the colonial sugar, and the price lower, the colonists claimed a protecting duty on the home produce. It was granted after many discussions; but, the tax being considered too low to enable the colonists to compete with the home producers, it was increased. Notwithstanding the high duty now imposed, the colonists and the importers contend, that nothing can prevent their utter ruin but the prohibition of the manufacture in France. This the minister had promised to effect, and he last year had proposed a law for that purpose; but, when he considered the large indemnity he was bound to pay to the French manufacturers, he retraced his steps and withdrew his law. This caused great dissatisfaction to the colonial party: the minister was compelled to renew his proposal; this led to the enactment of the law lately passed, which has caused the utmost irritation in the northern departments, which grow the beet-root, and manufacture sugar.

These departments are also those of the flax and hemp-growers and spinners, and linen manufacturers. They had long remonstrated against the introduction of the twist, flax, and linen from England. The duty was increased to an enormous amount; and, by this concession, the ministry has secured a majority in five out of eight electoral colleges of the department of the North, and at Lille.

Such is the working of the ministry of commerce and of

the administration of the customs ! But, in spite of protective or prohibitory duties, the agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests of the country are in the utmost distress.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS AN OBSTACLE TO, OR A CAUSE OF FAILURE IN, THE EXECUTION OF PUBLIC WORKS.

TRAVELLERS may speak with admiration of the monuments, the palaces, the public gardens, the churches, and the *Bourse* of Paris ; and those of my readers who have seen them, may be startled on reading the title of this chapter. I must hasten to tell them that all those public edifices and monuments are under the control of the ministry of the interior, and that, strange as it may appear, the ministry of the public works has nothing at all to do with them.

I may as well observe, that all those which principally attract the more public attention, even the Tuileries and the Louvre, as they now are, were planned and begun under Napoleon. The Restoration began the church of St. Vincent de Paul. Louis Philippe built three new prisons, and transformed some other buildings into barracks, besides *asphalting*, decorating, and gilding the Place de la Concorde, and making the interior of Notre Dame de Lorette and La Madeleine look more like playhouses and picture galleries than religious edifices.

The ministry of the public works is properly the direction of the *ponts et chaussées et des mines* (navigation of the rivers and the canals, and of the national, royal, or departmental roads.) Nobody can doubt, that, with a proper organization, and skilful and honest agents, that adminis-

tration might confer incalculable advantages on the country ; but, unfortunately, the bad organization of the administration, the practical ignorance and the dishonesty of its agents, have been productive of the most ruinous consequences, as we shall presently demonstrate.

Since the beginning of the Restoration, the legislative chambers have voted 500,000,000 francs for a complete *canalization* of the country, by continuing the old established canals, by making new ones, and by putting them into communication, either with one another, or with navigable rivers. All the surveys, all the plans, have been made by the engineers of the *ponts et chaussées et des canaux*, who superintended and had the direction of their execution, at the expense of the government, or of companies to whom the enterprise had been granted. But almost all the canals so undertaken, have proved complete failures. No comprehensive system has presided over their establishment. Private interest, local influence, and favouritism, have uniformly been the only motives of the government, either in undertaking or in granting the concession of the canals ; and this accounts for the apparent want of judgment in their selection. Some are quite isolated ; others are established as if it were to compete with navigable rivers ; and others, for the mere purpose of gratifying some high personage, or a staunch ministerial department. In every case, the survey had been made in so defective a manner, that the plans had to be altered during the construction of the works. The estimates have constantly been so erroneous, that the cost has never been less than double, and often was more than treble, the proposed expenditure ; so that all the companies, without exception, have been compelled to solicit, either a release from their contracts, or the assistance of the government in fulfilling them. A few only of the canals so undertaken are now

completed; and these are hardly navigable for more than five or six months in the year, for want of water, or on account of the frost during winter. Finally, none of these canals has ever produced one per cent. on the capital, either to the shareholders or to the State. The chamber of deputies, last year, passed a Bill to enable the government to purchase the shares of those canals, and granted from fifty to sixty millions of francs for that purpose. Yet this relief has benefited very little the poor shareholders. These millions were absorbed by some few influential jobbers, headed by Counts Roy and Jaubert, and some other peers and deputies, or bankers. A small part only of the amount was paid to the losing parties; and probably had previously been promised as the reward of *a good and loyal vote* at the elections.

I need not say more on the subject of the *canalization* of France. The reader can now appreciate the services of the administration of the *ponts et chaussées*, with regard to these public works; and he may probably conclude that the government will give up the unprofitable concern of canal-making. But this would be a mistake. The government and the administration will continue to expend millions on other canals, and will even project and undertake some new ones, with a similar result; to the injury of the country, it is true; but to the increase of ministerial patronage and favouritism.

The state of the roads in France is not more creditable to the *ponts et chaussées* than their *canalization*. No one who has travelled even on the best of these roads, from Boulogne to Paris, or from Paris to Rouen, or to Orleans, can help saying that they are a disgrace to the country and to the administration. With half the emoluments uselessly lavished on the engineers, these roads might be rendered as good as the best turnpike roads in England,

and permanently kept in that state; but good roads, how agreeable soever to travellers, do not afford to the minister the support he has a right to expect from thousands of largely-paid subordinates. What is the breaking down of carriages, *diligences*, or post-chaises, compared with the breaking up of a ministry?

Many of my readers, I am aware, will consider the foregoing statements as too highly coloured, and, perhaps, as unjust aspersions dictated by hostile feelings against a body of men so long represented as the *élite* of European engineers. I am, therefore, bound to justify my opinion by official documents, and by the evidence of disinterested parties.

In 1827 and 1828, the complaints of the chamber of deputies against the administration of the *ponts et chaussées*, compelled the government to assent to an inquiry on the causes of the backwardness of the works, and the considerable increase of expenditure. A commission was appointed, the chairman of which was M. Molé, who had been, under Napoleon, director-general of the *ponts et chaussées*. In his report, M. Molé severely censures the administration, which had presumed to propose the construction of canals, to the amount of 1,113,000,000 francs, and which had deceived the capitalists by the inaccuracy of the estimates of the costs, and by extravagant promises of profits: he reproves the engineers and the director-general for having stated that the surveys and all the plans had been carefully made, while the thirteen canals which had been authorised, had been begun without plans or regular surveys; and he complains that these plans and surveys are not yet made, although 130,000,000 francs had been expended, and the administration demanded 45,000,000 more to complete the works.

In 1831, 64,000,000 francs were wanted to finish these

same canals, which, according to the agreements made with the capitalists, ought to have been navigable in 1827. An inquiry was demanded by a deputy,—a man of science,—Baron Ferussac. The demand was referred to a commission, of which Baron Charles Dupin, a member of the administration, was chosen reporter. Certainly nobody will accuse him of being hostile to his brother engineers, or of wishing to deprive the government of a portion of its influence; yet Charles Dupin was obliged to be as severe as M. Molé, on the *ponts et chaussées*; and his report,* in

* “D’autres canaux sont exécutés à des conditions dont les charges s’aggravent chaque année. La dépense de tous les canaux, sans exception, dépassent les provisions du gouvernement. L’administration des ponts et chaussées n’a pas été plus heureuse dans ses calculs sur le temps nécessaire à l’exécution des travaux, et cet autre genre de mécomptes entraîne de nouvelles pertes que doit supporter le trésor, etc. etc. etc.

“Lorsque le ministère proposa les divers emprunts, que nous venons d’énoncer, quelques députés auraient voulu qu’on présentât à la chambre des mémoires justificatifs et des devis pour des projets d’une aussi vaste dépense : on repoussa leur demande, et les emprunts furent votés.

Pour l’entreprise de douze canaux l’état avait déjà dé-

pensé en 1821 une somme de.....	50,000,000 f.
Depuis il a été forcé d’emprunter pour l’achèvement des mêmes canaux	127,000,000
Aujourd’hui d’emprunter encore pour le même objet....	63,000,000
	—————
Total.....	240,000,000
	—————

“Vous le voyez, Messieurs, dans une conception originairement grande et belle, qui promettait de la gloire à l’administration, qui *lui garantissait, pour plusieurs années, cette influence croissante occasionnée par l’emploi d’un grand nombre d’hommes et le maniement d’un grand nombre de millions, l’administration a perdu, pour long temps, pour toujours peut-être, la possibilité de conduire de pareilles entreprises. Elle voulait réserver pour elle seule, la connaissance de tous les documents, et l’exécution de tous les travaux; elle n’a réussi qu’ à se faire juger, à tort sans doute, incapable de rien entreprendre avec fruit. En disposant, sans modération, d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, elle s’est elle-même deshéritée de la faculté d’user de*

favour of the inquiry, fully establishes that the administration has failed in all its enterprizes, has acted without any plans, has refused even to communicate its estimates, has wantonly expended immense sums, borrowed on ruinous conditions, and has shown itself unequal to the task of planning and superintending the execution of these public works, and even of maintaining the public roads in a tolerable state.

The report of Charles Dupin in 1831, had no better results than that of Molé in 1828. The inquiry was put an end to by the dissolution of the chambers. Since then, millions after millions have been voted every year, always under the same pretence of terminating these canals, most of which, as I said before, are still in an unfinished state, and most of the others as fit, during five months in the year, to be used by waggons as by boats.

The ministers are every session assailed by new complaints of the deputies, on the negligence and the mismanagement of that branch of the public service; but they have always a majority ready to vote against any proposition likely to disturb that administration. Besides this, the director-general is a member of the chamber of deputies, and there are also in the house a dozen of general inspectors, of inspectors of divisions, and of engineers in chief, who know how to gain over to their party a suffi-

nouveau, fût-ce avec avantage de son expérience et de son autorité, pour diriger, au nom de l'état, des entreprises de canalisation."

Speaking afterwards of the roads,

" Il ne s'agit plus ici, comme pour les canaux, de quelques plaintes limitées à des ouvrages à demi terminés. C'est l'état de toutes les routes ouvertes à la circulation que, chaque année, des orateurs plus nombreux attaquent avec plus de véhémence. Ils se plaignent que les chemins de France sont dans un état déplorable de dégradation. Ils affirment qu'en aucun pays de l'Europe les voies publiques n'offrent l'image d'une telle imperfection et d'une telle décadence."—*Ch. Dupin's Report to the Chamber of Deputies, Feb. 20, 1831.*

cient number of supporters to laugh at their assailants. As to the public, nobody cares about it. Two or three newspapers may animadvert on some acts of the administration; but all the facts stated, however incontestable they may be, are immediately denied, according to the practice of the government.

The administration of the *ponts et chaussées*, of course considers the state of the roads and of the canals as justifying the monopoly of construction of the public works by its engineers; and for the last ten years has endeavoured to obtain from the chambers the funds necessary for undertaking the principal lines of railway in France, or to prevent those lines being conceded to private industry, aided by unofficial genius. So far back as in 1834, the administration promulgated the conditions and regulations relative to the making of railways; and these regulations were so framed, as to deter companies from entering into competition. First, the concession of a railway to a company was for a term of years, instead of being perpetual, as in England; secondly, the government reserved to itself the right of redeeming the railway, when it thought proper; thirdly, the government regulate the management of the railway, with regard to the amount of fares for passengers or goods, and the number of trains, and the time of starting; fourthly, no line could be proposed to the legislature by a company, unless the surveys were approved of by the administration of the *ponts et chaussées*. Then came regulations about the gradients and the curves, the crossing of the roads, &c., &c., all of which are of so difficult or ruinous an execution, that no company would submit to such conditions.

Having succeeded in deterring the capitalists from embarking in these undertakings, the administration hastened to make the surveys of the principal lines; and the

plans and estimates of the cost of such lines were presented to the chambers. The deputies could not be induced to vote hundreds of millions of public money for such a purpose, and declared that these enterprises ought to be left to private speculation ; but all the plans and surveys were found so defective, that they were rejected by the companies. In 1838, however, a company undertook to execute the project of M. Defontaine, one of the inspectors of division, for the Paris and Havre railway ; but it was soon found to be impracticable, and the chamber of deputies exonerated the company from its obligations. The Paris and Rouen railway, now completed, had been opposed in 1836 by the *ponts et chaussées*, the surveys having been made by an engineer, a stranger to their body ; as they have opposed, and still oppose, the plans of M. Corréard for a railway from Paris to Tours.

During the last three years, many attempts have been made to organise a company for making a railway from Paris to Boulogne. A French nobleman, whose character and intelligence are still superior to his considerable wealth, and who considers a union between France and England as the best security for the peace and the welfare of the rest of Europe, was the principal promoter of the project, and, with some of his friends, proposed to invite some leading British capitalists to join them in the undertaking, but on condition only that the French government, and the administration of the *ponts et chaussées*, should not interfere, and that the company should be organised and managed on English principles. That could not be obtained. The government is well aware of *the influence resulting from the employment of many thousand men, and from the expenditure of many millions*, as stated in the report of Charles Dupin, and would not allow a company to acquire that influence, and to set an example which would have soon

been followed. Ministerial influence is the only influence that must exist. The success of a company and its prosperity would complete the ruin of the *ponts et chaussées*, and evoke a spirit of enterprise which, in a few years, would place, as it has done in England, 500,000,000 or 600,000,000 francs at the disposal, and 50,000 or 60,000 men under the direction, of independent societies. The idea of such a concentration of means haunts the government as a forerunner of its subversion.

This is the principal cause of the apparent backwardness of the French capitalists in railway-making; but it is not the only one. In fact, the government would not have them. Railways, by facilitating and hastening the communications between the most distant parts of the country, by uniting them, would operate against the principle of the government, which is to divide, to isolate the people, in order to enfeeble them: they could not but afford more rapid means of disseminating, generalising, and organising the opposition to a most abominable system: they would at once put an end to the deceptions and the robberies, which the monopoly of the post-office and the telegraph enable the high officials to practise upon the public. Therefore, No railroads! still is the motto of the French rulers! And if they cannot resist the demand for these new communications, they must be the monopoly of the government, and procure an increase of patronage by the creation of thousands of new employs.

This double purpose is obtained by the laws proposed and passed in the last session, to enable the government to undertake railways to Nantes, to Bordeaux and Bayonne, to Lyons and Marseilles, to Metz and Strasburg, to Lille and to a sea-port, on the British channel, not yet determined upon. As in 1821, no surveys, no plans, no estimates were submitted to the chambers; and, as in 1821, the law

passed both houses, so that every deputy on returning into his department to solicit the votes of the electors, could tell them, "I have obtained a railway for you! vote again for me."

The electoral trick did not succeed so well as it was expected, although it saved the ministry from immediate defeat; but now, the difficulties that are encountered in the execution of the laws, will be a just cause for abandoning all these projects, or for doing with railways what has been done with regard to the canals,—beginning them all at once: and some twenty or thirty years hence, asking supplementary credits for continuing the works.

Such has been, such is, and such will continue to be, the administration of the public works,—an obstacle to all improvements; a source of disgrace to the country; a powerful engine of corruption; and a pretence to put more money at the disposal of the government, and to add to the distress of the people.

CHAPTER VII.

MINISTRIES OF MARINE AND OF WAR.

I HAVE but a few observations to make on these two administrations. Having, in the first part of this volume, shown their cost, I have now only to show the result they have produced.

Until lately, the whole expenditure of the ministry of marine, and all the naval expeditions, seemed to have no other object than to afford to one of the King's sons, Prince de Joinville, opportunities of justifying the intention of his royal father, to make him lord high admiral, a dignity which

had long belonged to the Orleans family,* and of which the last two heads of the family had been deprived. It is said, and I believe it, that the prince is a good and brave officer. But the naval education of Nelson, or even of the late King William IV., was not so expensive. The last grand exploit of the prince was, the bringing over to France from St. Helena the remains of Napoleon, and accompanying them to Paris, with the crew of his frigate, *La belle Poule*. Of course he became as popular as the first minister of the day (Thiers) intended. But the popularity soon evaporated, and a bad joke now is the most frequent, if not the only allusion to that event,—“*Le coq Gaulois a envoyé un de ses poulets montant la belle poule pour ramener l'aigle impérial.*”

To silence the critics, it was resolved to perform some grand achievements. The budget of the ministry of marine was increased, at the end of 1842, by a supplementary grant. The Marquesas islands were conquered, and the queen of Tahiti was compelled to submit to the protection of France.

This is all the benefit, if benefit it may be called, derived by the French, from an annual expenditure of nearly 90,000,000 sterling, during the last thirteen years, by the ministry of marine.

The ministry of war has higher claims to the gratitude of the King, if not of the country, and boasts of more distinguished services, which, I admit, must for ever be remembered by the French people. Almost all the principal towns of France have been attacked, captured, and partially pillaged by a French army, for resisting the administrative despotism, and maintaining their rights. Lyons, in the short space of three years, was twice besieged, and

* This is indicated by the prow of ships, which are everywhere sent under the *galezie* of the Palais Royal.

saw its industrious inhabitants and its houses falling together under the sabres, the cannon-balls, and the bombs of the citizen King. Paris itself has not escaped. In June, 1832, and in April, 1834, it presented the spectacle of a stormed city, and on many other occasions was all but in a state of *siege*.

Algeria furnishes an additional title of the ministry of war to an unenviable fame. The whole history of the occupation, and what is called the colonization, of Algeria, is a series of crimes. We will begin at the beginning.

Charles X., having taken it into his head to play the St. Louis, undertook a war against Algiers, in order to earn the benediction of the Pope, and to conciliate the army, which, according to the promises of the archbishop of Paris, Quélen, was to ensure him a heavenly, as well as to secure his earthly crown. Sailing from Toulon, May 10, 1830, the fleet and army did not arrive in the latitude of Algiers till the 14th of June. Previously to the landing of the troops, the commander-in-chief, Bourmont, issued a proclamation, in which he told his soldiers, that the Arabs, too long oppressed by a rapacious and cruel soldiery, would hail in them their liberators—would implore their alliance, and, re-assured by their good faith, would supply them with the produce of the soil. The debarkation was scarcely finished, when the Arabs came to seek that alliance by discharges of musketry; and the only produce which reached the French ranks, were balls and bullets. After a fortnight's fighting, the Dey of Algiers was obliged to yield to superior numbers and force of arms. On the 4th of July, articles of capitulation were agreed upon, the first and second of which were to the following effect:—

“The commander-in-chief of the French army engages to his highness the Dey of Algiers, to leave him his liberty and the possession of all his personal property.

“ The exercise of the Mohammedan religion shall remain free. The liberty of all classes of the inhabitants, their religion, their property, their commerce, and their industry, shall receive no injury. Their women shall be respected. The commander-in-chief undertakes this upon his honour.”

While the French were taking possession of their conquest, and the Dey and his followers were setting out in quest of an asylum, poor Charles X., giving himself up to the intoxication of victory and celestial hopes, risked and lost his throne, dragging down his dynasty in his own ruin, and, like the deposed Dey, Hussein, became an exile from his lost dominions.

With the new dynasty, avarice supplied the place of fanaticism ; and the coalition of Orleanists, Imperialists, and *Doctrinaires*, having succeeded in dividing France among themselves, left to their secondary agents the pillage of Algiers. General Clausel was sent out by the new government to supersede the conqueror. He arrived on the 2nd of September, and was speedily followed by a host of adventurers of all classes and of all countries, determined upon co-operating in the colonization of Algiers, according to the system adopted,—namely, by driving out the inhabitants, and seizing their goods,—without having either the resources or the energy necessary for carrying the system into execution. The old Dey, on leaving the country, had given the French the best advice as to the manner of dealing with the Arabs, *and had cautioned them against making enemies of the kabyles (clans) of the desert.* Clausel, however, an old soldier of the army of Egypt, who had done nothing since 1815, was unable to profit by this good advice. The fine and fertile plains of the *Metedja* appeared to him a mine of wealth which it was necessary to seize upon. He expelled the proprietors, drove back the indigenous inhabitants beyond the Lesser Atlas, and, after having installed

a new Dey at Tittery, and proclaimed to his soldiers, that "they had, on the Atlas, united the fire of their bivouacs to the fire of the stars," led back his troops to Algiers; whence he returned to Paris to receive a marshal's *baton*, and to arrange with the ministry the concession of an immense territory, as a compensation for his having so long remained without employment.

In the meantime, all the Arab tribes, Bedouins as well as others, indignant at the conduct of the invaders, entered into a league against them. During the year 1831, General Berthezene was constantly occupied in repulsing them; now attacking them in their cantonments, laying waste their country, burning their crops and their huts, and carrying off their herds; now compelled to retire within the walls of Algiers, after having destroyed all the French establishments in the environs. These disasters suggested the necessity of a change of system, by which the civil administration should be separated from, and rendered independent of, the military government. Baron Pichon, a worthy man, was appointed intendant-general; but, at the same time, the Duke of Rovigo was appointed to the military command, in order to repair his fortune, and as a recompense for domestic dishonour. Another unprincipled fellow, named Barrachin, was sent out as his civil intendant at Oran; so that M. Pichon found it quite impossible to do any good; and his efforts to prevent evil produced only his own recall, leaving Rovigo in possession of undivided power. The consequence was, that pillage, burning, and massacre again became the order of the day, and were carried on, without interruption, up to 1834, in all parts of the colony. In January of that year, General Desmichels, governor of Oran, concluded a treaty of peace and amity with Abd-el-Kader, which, being observed with good faith on both sides, secured a year of tranquillity and prosperity to that part of the country. This treaty was,

however, found fault with by the colonists, as too favourable to Abd-el-Kader and the natives; and the faithful adherence of the brave General Desmichels to its terms, was represented at home as a *quasi* treason. He was consequently superseded by General Trezel, who, finding Abd-el-Kader occupied with organising his dominions and strengthening himself, hastened to march against him. Both the march and the retreat which followed it, were disastrous to the French. Abd-el-Kader, after repulsing the invaders, made renewed protestations of his pacific disposition towards France; and, throwing the blame of what had occurred on the animosity of General Trezel, proposed a peace on the same conditions as those which had been assented to by Desmichels.

These disasters led to the reinstatement of Marshal Clausel in the government of Algeria, which his avarice induced him to accept. After having sought to introduce division among the Arab tribes, he marched against Abd-el-Kader, accompanied by the Duke of Orleans and General Oudinot, who came expressly to avenge the disasters of the preceding campaign, in which Colonel Oudinot, brother of the general, and second son of the marshal of that name, had been slain. Abd-el-Kader defended, step by step, in his retreat, the route to his capital, Mascara, which he partly burned before he abandoned it. Clausel, having entered it, completed the destruction, and then retired. His retreat, harassed by Abd-el-Kader, was almost as disastrous as that of Trezel. General Oudinot was severely wounded; the Duke of Orleans himself was struck by a spent ball, and had no sooner arrived at Mostaganem, than he hastened to embark, and arrived at Toulon five days afterwards.

Clausel attempted, without any better success, some other expeditions, beginning with one against Tlemesen. In every instance, his enemy escaped him in advancing, and pursued his retreat. In April, Clausel returned to France, after having lost the remainder of his reputation, both as a poli-

tician and a commander. The command *ad interim* devolved on General Rapatel, a former spy and paid correspondent in France of the Duke of Wellington, in 1815 and 1816. Clausel's object, in returning to France, was to represent the necessity of sending out to Algeria a considerable force, such as should strike terror and produce submission by some great achievement. The ministers granted only half of what he asked ; and their first step was to send out reinforcements to Oran, the command in chief of which was intrusted to Bugeaud.

This Bugeaud, a vulgar fellow, utterly ignorant of what is meant by delicacy or honour, but brave as an Italian ruffian, having by his base servility, alike under the Restoration and under Louis Philippe, attained to the rank of major-general, had consented to be appointed gaoler to the Duchess of Berry, at the castle of Blaye, and had made all the arrangements for her *accouchement*. He afterwards had called out, and shot dead, an opposition member of the house of deputies, *Dulong*, the adopted son of Dupont de l'Eure, a mild young man, who had never handled a sword or a pistol. Such was the man whose claims on the gratitude of Louis Philippe were rewarded with the command of the expedition against Oran. Bugeaud, on his arrival, put himself at the head of 6,000 men, and marched first in advance against Abd-el-Kader, and then back again, with Abd-el-Kader hanging on his rear, for six weeks ; after which, he returned to Paris to celebrate his victories, and to receive the rank of lieutenant-general. Meantime, Marshal Clausel with other reinforcements, accompanied by the Duke of Nemours, marched upon Constantina. They arrived before the place, after encountering the greatest difficulties, and were compelled to retire, with the loss of all their provisions and munitions of war. At the close of this glorious campaign, Clausel was recalled, and the government of Algeria was committed to General Danremont. He arrived at the

head of a much more considerable army, with which, accompanied by the Duke of Nemours, he resumed, in 1837, the expedition against Constantina, and was killed before the walls at the storming of that place. The command devolved upon General Vallée, who was subsequently created a marshal, as a reward for not having too rashly exposed his own person, and for having effected a speedy retreat without a very serious loss.

Bugeaud had returned to Oran as chief in command, at the end of April, 1837: but, his prudence prevailing over his courage, he thought it more easy to deceive Abd-el-Kader in a negotiation, than to vanquish him in the field; and, after some difficulties on the part of Abd-el-Kader had been got over, he concluded with him, May 30th, 1837, the treaty of Tafna, which, like that of Desmichels, in 1834, recognised the authority and the territory of the Emir. Only Bugeaud exacted, by a secret article, that Abd-el-Kader should pay him about 6,000*l.* sterling for his own use. This treaty was ratified, and the money was paid to Bugeaud; but the secret article became known to the governor-general, and drew from him some severe animadversions. Bugeaud declared, that he had demanded this money for himself, only to expend it in improving the roads of his department, and to secure his election as a deputy. This excuse, added to his former delicate and confidential services as assistant man-midwife to the Duchess of Berry, decided Louis Philippe, the ministry, and the deputies in his favour.

Abd-el-Kader remained faithful to the treaty, and exerted all his influence to prevent either his subjects or his allies from committing any act of hostility against the French. It is but justice to Marshal Vallée, too, to say, that, happy to remain quiet at Algiers, he did not venture upon any attacks, and that he observed the treaties with the

Arabs, which preserved Algeria in peace up to the end of 1839. At that period, they were at a loss at Paris for a theme of conversation; and the princes did not know what to undertake for the glory of the new dynasty. After holding the camp at Fontainebleau, the Prince Royal (Duke of Orleans) chose to visit the camp in Algeria, where every thing was in peace. This would have been all very well, had they not put it into his head to undertake a military promenade, terminating at some narrow defiles, which, having never been penetrated because they led to nothing, and were the limits of the territory, were called the Iron Gates. These iron gates (which were no gates at all) were passed through with all the parade of victory, no obstacle presenting itself; but it was a violation of territory, contrary to the treaty; and scarcely had intelligence of the Prince's having passed the boundary got abroad, than all the Arab tribes flew to arms against the foreigners who had thus broken faith. The retreat by which this promenade was followed, resembled that of 1835. The Prince Royal made the best of his way back to Paris; and, since then, hostilities have never ceased in Algeria, the natives being unwilling to enter into any more negotiations with people who constantly violate the treaties they have concluded. Marshal Vallée, not having lent himself sufficiently to the marauding of the colonists, was recalled; and now, at length, Bugeaud has succeeded to the governor-generalship of Algeria. In a country in which the meaning of the terms probity, conscience, honour, and humanity was understood, such a man would scarcely venture to show himself: in France, he is the favourite of the King, and a marshal's *baton* awaited him. To furnish a pretext for creating him a marshal, 80,000 men have, during the past eighteen months, been massacred, and whole provinces, laid waste by fire and sword, present only heaps of ruins and cinders. Nature

and humanity, outraged by such proceedings, cry out for vengeance upon these barbarians of civilization.

The reader will now be able to understand and appreciate the despatches from Marshal Bugeaud, in which he boasts of the successful results of his campaigns, and sums up the state of affairs in the words, "great commerce, great security, great activity;"—despatches faithfully translated in the *Times* and other English papers, without comment or exposure. At the present moment, the destinies of Algeria are committed to a commission, the chairman of which, Enfantin, was, nine years ago, branded, by the verdict of a jury, as a violator of all social laws and a swindler, and was sentenced to a fine and one year's imprisonment. His accomplice and favourite disciple, Chevalier, was sentenced to the same penalty, for the same offence. Now behold him a councillor of state, and M. Guizot's candidate for the ministry of public works!

After the foregoing faithful account of the military operations of the French in Algeria, nothing remains but to show the cost of the new glory acquired for the country by the "Napoleon of Peace." This will be done in a few words.

The official accounts annually presented to the chambers by the secretary at war, establish, that the total amount expended in the colonization of Algeria, by the extermination of the aborigines, was, in January last, 36,840,000*l.* sterling.

The loss to the invading colonisers, during the same period, is estimated at 135,000 men. But the official accounts are very inaccurate; and it is stated, on very good authority, that more than 220,000 Frenchmen have perished since the landing of General Bourmont on the African shores.

A few voices are heard from time to time in the two

chambers, remonstrating against the infernal system so obstinately prosecuted, and calling for the abandonment of Algeria. But they are constantly silenced by the government, for the following reasons :

1st. Algeria must be retained as a military school for the French army, where every regiment in turn may be exercised in the science of war.

2nd. To prevent discontent amongst the officers of the army, who, if it were not for the war in Algeria, would have no chance of promotion and distinction.

3rd. Because war greatly promotes military discipline and subordination ; and regiments that have been, for two or three years, accustomed to execute orders in Algeria, are best fitted to execute orders in France, and can best be depended upon for keeping the people in subordination.

The majority in both chambers readily admit the force of these reasons, and vote without hesitation for the continuance of the system which they consider as their only safeguard.

One benefit, however, will ultimately result from the organisation of the army of 400,000 men, constantly kept in active service, to maintain the people in the most abject submission to the will of their rulers. The military service of the conscripts lasts but seven years. Not one in a thousand soldiers, notwithstanding all the seductions employed for that purpose, can be induced to re-enlist at the expiration of their military servitude. Every year, 50,000 men of 28 years of age leave their regiments, return to the places of their birth, and resume their rank amongst their fellow citizens ; since 1830, 600,000 of these men have been scattered throughout the whole of the country, and thus place at the disposal of the people a constantly increasing number of men well drilled, accustomed to the

use of arms of all sorts, regardless of the perils attending military conflicts; most of them the more strongly attached to their civil rights, for having been long deprived of them, and ready to lead their fellow men to the rescue of freedom when an opportunity offers itself. From them will one day come the liberation of the country.

The French government is aware of this, and, to prevent the danger, is now, I am told, meditating a law for increasing the length of military service; so that, by keeping the conscripts a few years longer, till they are unfit to resume their former habits and occupations, they may more easily be induced to re-enlist. But the proposal or the passing of such a law would cause a rebellion in the army; therefore no change is likely to take place, and the minister at war will continue to contribute his share, with his present means, to the ruin and the disgrace of the country.

CHAPTER VIII.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ONE single fact will be sufficient to show the working of the French foreign office under its Royal manager.

In the thirteenth year of his reign, after having in turn employed, in the direction of his foreign relations, Talleyrand, Molé, Sebastiani, de Broglie, Thiers, Soult, and Guizot, FRANCE HAS NOT A SINGLE POLITICAL OR EVEN COMMERCIAL ALLIANCE WITH ANY NATION OR GOVERNMENT IN THE WHOLE WORLD.

I was present in the French chamber of deputies when, in December, 1840, Guizot, expounding his views as minister for foreign affairs, declared that the foreign policy of France ought to be a policy of isolation. "NOTRE POLI-

TIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DOIT ÊTRE UNE POLITIQUE D'ISOLEMENT."

Now, in October, 1843, I read in the French official papers, that, before the end of the year, 2,500 guns will be mounted on the fortresses erected round Paris, to defend the French metropolis against foreign aggression.

This indicates that *the policy of isolation* has been transformed into *a policy of anticipation*; and such avowed anticipation relieves me from the necessity of adding a single remark on the management of the foreign affairs of the country. To a people who tolerate such a state of things, I can only address the lines of Moore to the Neapolitans,—

"Down! down to the dust with them! slaves that they are."

CONCLUSION.

THIS last part of the task I have undertaken was to me the most difficult, and at the same time the most unpleasant. Recapitulations are apt to appear to the reader tedious repetitions; and vituperation of a most abominable system may be considered as emanating from partial or unjustly hostile feelings. I therefore consigned to the flames the pages I had first written, with the intention of confining myself to the exposition of statistical facts, leaving to the public to draw their own conclusions.

For this purpose, I studiously examined and compared all the official returns relative to the population, the instruction, the morality, the criminality of the people; the state of industry and agriculture, the food, the longevity of the inhabitants, and the extent of pauperism. I confess that, when, after preparing these several tables, I attempted to

account for or to explain facts, which are in direct contradiction to generally entertained ideas, I was confounded at the result. I certainly found, as I had expected, that the agricultural departments are worse fed than the others; that instruction is more general in the manufacturing districts, and that those districts contribute more than the agricultural to the revenue of the State. But when I attempted to compare ignorance and pauperism with morality and criminality, in order to discover the causes of the evil, and thus be able to indicate the remedy, I found that all the prevailing notions were unjustified, that ignorance and poverty are not parents of immorality and crime, any more than instruction and affluence; nay, even that the poorest and most ignorant departments are less immoral and less addicted to crimes than some of the best instructed, and those which contain the smallest number of paupers and beggars.

Thus disappointed, I turned my views to another mode of comparison. I wished to ascertain if immorality and crimes were not owing to the absence of religious instruction; and, taking for standard of religious zeal and instruction, in each department, the number of men, of twenty-one years, entering the church, I prepared general tables, in which all the departments are placed according to their respective population, to the degree of religious zeal, and instruction, industry, agriculture, food, longevity, pauperism, morality, and criminality, with the amount of assessed taxes paid by each one of the departments. Alas!

“ Quæsi vi cœlo lucem, ingemuique repertâ ! ”

I call to the facts revealed by the tables at the end of the volume, the serious attention, not of statesmen and politicians only, but also of all that take an interest in, and wish to promote, the welfare of their fellow men.

To remedy the evils disclosed by the fore-mentioned tables, what can be expected from the existing government? Without hesitation I answer, Nothing! Nay, more; all the men, without exception, at the head of the government, as long as they remain in power, can do nothing but demoralise, more and more, the country, by the scandalous prosperity, the corrupting triumph of want of principles, of baseness, cupidity, hypocrisy, treachery, and cruelty. Why, there is not one of them who has not forfeited his honour by the violation of his oaths,—who has not outraged human and Divine laws by the most unjust, the most cruel measures,—who is not an object of contempt or hatred to the whole country. And this forms their only recommendation to the choice of their master, who knows too well that honest men, honourable and honoured men, men who, at least, have never forfeited their pledges, or rendered themselves odious to the people, would not submit with equal subserviency to carry out his tyrannical designs. The unpopularity of his ministers is the security for their devotion to his will, and for their hatred towards the people.

Since the last accession of Guizot to power, the whole of the daily press in this country has been constantly sounding his praise. I am sure, that most of the editors who do so are unacquainted with the political life of that man. In order to rectify their opinion and instruct the public, I will only show what he has been since the Revolution of July, as well as his colleagues, by a table of the fifteen ministries formed since 1830.

COMPOSITION OF THE FIFTEEN MINISTRIES FORMED SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF JULY (12 YEARS.)

MINISTRIES.	1st. August, 1830.	2nd. November, 1830.	3rd. March, 1831.	4th. October, 1832.	5th. April, 1834.	6th. November, 1834.	7th. November, 1834.	8th. February, 1835.
President of the Council	...	Lafitte.	Cas. Perier.(3*)	Marshal Soult.	Mar. Soult. (5*)	Bassano.	Mar. Mortier.(5*)	Duc de Broglie.
Foreign Affairs.....	Count Molé.	Sebastiani.	Sebastiani.	Duc de Broglie.	Rigny.	Bresson.	Rigny. (6*)	Duc de Broglie.
Justice	Dupont de l'Eure	Dupont de l'Eure.(1*)	Barthe.	Persil.	Persil.	Persil.	Persil.	Persil.
Public Instruction	Duc de Broglie.	Merilhon. (2*)	Montalivet. (*)	Guizot.	Guizot.	Teste.	Guizot.	Guizot.
Interior	Guizot.	Montalivet.	Cas. Perier. (*)	Thiers.	Thiers.	Bassano.	Thiers.	Thiers.
Commerce	...	...	D'Argout.	D'Argout.	Duchatel.	Teste.	Duchatel.	Duchatel.
Public Works	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Finance	Baron Louis.	Lafitte.	Baron Louis.	Humann.	Humann.	Passy.	Humann.	Humann. (7*)
War	Marshal Gerard.	Marshal Gerard.	Marshal Soult.	Marshal Soult.	Mar. Soult. (4*)	General Bernard.	Mar. Mortier. (*)	Marshal Maison.
Marine	Sebastiani.	D'Argout.	Rigny.	Rigny.	Jacob.	Ch. Dupin.	Duperré.	Duperré.
* Indicates that the individual was replaced by	... {	(1) Merilhon. (2) Barthe.	(3) Montalivet.	... {	(4) Mar. Gerard.	... {	(5 6) Duc de Broglie.	(7) D'Argout.

COMPOSITION OF THE FIFTEEN MINISTRIES FORMED SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF JULY (12 YEARS).

MINISTRIES.	9th. February, 1836.	10th. September, 1837.	11th. April, 1838.	12th. March, 1839.	13th. May, 1839.	14th. March, 1840.	15th.	
							December, 1840.	1843.
President of the Council	Thiers.	Count Molé.	Count Molé.	...	Marshal Soult.	Thiers.	Marshal Soult.	Marshal Soult.
Foreign Affairs.....	Thiers.	Count Molé.	Count Molé.	Montebello.	Marshal Soult.	Thiers.	Guizot.	Guizot.
Justice	Sauzet.	Persil.	Barthe.	Girod de l' Ain.	Teste.	Vivien.	Martin.	Martin.
Public Instruction	Pelet la Lozère.	Guizot.	Salvandi.	Parent.	Villemain.	Cousin.	Villemain.	Villemain.
Interior	Montalivet.	Gasparin.	Montalivet.	Gasparin.	Duchatel.	Remusat.	Duchatel.	Duchatel.
Commerce	Duchatel.	Martin.	Martin.	Gasparin.	Cunin Gridaine.	Gouin.	Cunin Gridaine.	Cunin Gridaine.
Public Works	...	...	...	...	Dufaure.	Count Jaubert.	Teste.	Teste.
Finance	Humann.	Duchatel.	Lac. Laplagne.	Gautier.	Passy.	Pelet la Lozère.	Humann. (8*)	Lac. Laplagne.
War.....	Marshal Maison.	General Bernard	General Bernard.	General Cubieris.	Gen. Schneider.	General Cubieris.	Marshal Soult.	Marshal Soult.
Marine	Duperré.	Rosamel.	Rosamel.	Tupinier.	Duperré.	Roussin.	Duperré.	Admiral Mackan.
* Indicates that the individual was replaced by	...	...	...	...	...	...	(8) Lac. Laplagne.	

This table shows,—

Firstly. Marshal Soult, the actual president of the council, has held office in five administrations: in the ministries of 1831 and 1839, in opposition to Guizot, Thiers, and Molé; in the ministries of 1832 and 1834, in co-operation with Guizot and Thiers; in the ministry of 1839, in opposition to both Guizot and Thiers; and now, in co-operation with Guizot, and in opposition to Thiers.

Secondly. Guizot has been seven times in office: in 1830 and 1837, in co-operation with Count Molé; in the four administrations of 1832, April, 1834, November, 1834, and 1835, in co-operation with Thiers; and now, in opposition to both Count Molé and Thiers.

Thirdly. Martin held office, in 1837, under Count Molé with Guizot; in 1838, under Count Molé against Guizot and the Coalition; and he is now with Soult and Guizot against Count Molé.

Fourthly. Villemain was in the administration of 1839, in opposition to Count Molé, Guizot, and Thiers; he is now in the ministry with Guizot.

Fifthly. Duchatel made part of the three administrations of April and November, 1834, and February, 1835, in co-operation with Thiers and Guizot; then, in 1836, under Thiers against Guizot; in 1837, under Molé, and with Guizot, against Thiers; in 1839, with Passy and Dufaure, against Molé, Guizot, and Thiers.

Sixthly. Cunin Gridaine was in the Passy-Dufaure ministry, against Molé, Guizot, and Thiers.

Seventhly. Teste was also in the Passy-Dufaure administration.

Eighthly. Humann had been in four administrations with Thiers and Guizot. Then, in 1836, he was with Thiers, in opposition to Guizot and Soult; and he latterly was with Guizot, in opposition to Thiers.

Lacave Laplagne, his successor, was in the Molé ministry of 1838, in opposition to Thiers and Guizot; he is now with Guizot, against Molé and Thiers.

Ninthly. Duperré was with Thiers and Guizot in the ministries of 1834 and 1835; then in the ministry of Thiers, in opposition to Guizot, in 1836; then in the Passy-Dufaure administration, against Thiers and Guizot, in 1839; and now, with Guizot, he is in opposition to Thiers, Passy, and Dufaure.

And this is the administration daily commended by the London press for the abilities, the consistency, and the unanimity of its members! Indeed, I cannot account for the extraordinary concurrence of all our journals in the same views of the subject, but by a most extraordinary influence exerted over their correspondents; and I have no doubt that the editors, if better acquainted with the facts, would not hesitate to retract their erroneous notions, and honestly represent the vices inherent in the French governmental and administrative system.

Can there be any better proof of those vices than the simple fact, that, in the ten years from August, 1830, to December, 1840, there have been fifteen changes of ministry in France? What would all the editors, without exception, say, if such ministerial revolutions happened in England? Would they accuse the people, and attribute so frequent changes to the recklessness and to the ungovernable passions of the nation? In England, there might be some reason, or rather some excuse, for such accusations, because the nation, with twelve hundred thousand electors, with public meetings, with numerous associations, and a free press, influences, more or less, the march of the government. But in France there is nothing like this, and the people have no hand in the management of public affairs, or in the ministerial combinations. A short history of the

causes of the fourteen revolutions of the French ministry will, no doubt, convince the whole press and the public of the injustice of their attacks upon the French people.

The first ministry is the only one that was overthrown by the force of public opinion; and the two principal causes were, the direction of foreign affairs under the guidance of the apostate priest, the arch-traitor, Talleyrand, and the direction of the affairs of the interior by the savage executor of the bloody vengeance of the Restoration, Guizot. That ministry lasted three months.

The second ministry was threatened with a dissolution at the end of the first month, when Dupont de l'Eure left it in disgust, owing to the mendacity of the King. Lafitte was induced, by the tears and embraces of his sovereign, to remain in office; but, three months afterwards, he left, with the same feelings, and for the same causes, as Dupont de l'Eure.

The illness and the death of Casimir Perier put an end to the third ministry. Casimir Perier hated and despised Guizot and the *doctrinaires*; and, besides, he compelled the King to abide by the decisions of the council: his decease, therefore, was a relief to the King and the *doctrinaires*.

The refusal, by the chamber of deputies, to grant twenty-five millions of francs, in execution of the treaty with the United States of America, led to the resignation of the Duke of Broglie, and to the dissolution of the fourth cabinet. The chamber had refused the twenty-five millions, because the American *créances* were invalid, and had been bought, in great part, for a mere trifle, by the speculators of the Court and of the Exchange. The chamber of deputies was dissolved.

In the fifth ministry, Marshal Gérard was induced, by the supplications of the King, to take the place of Marshal

Soult, whose *pilfering* and contracting propensities and heavy expenditure, unsatisfactorily accounted for, had given dissatisfaction to the deputies, and to Humann, the minister of finance.

The new chamber having condemned the policy of the Soult-Guizot-and-Thiers conjoint administration, by saying, in their address to the King, that “*une politique libérale et modérée est la seule digne du gouvernement que la France a choisi,*” and having claimed in the same address “*un choix d’agents éclairés et fidèles,*”—the ministry prorogued the chamber, and resigned before the meeting of the deputies.

The sixth ministry lasted *three days*. Passy and Dupin, wishing to conform to the address of the deputies, and being opposed by their colleagues and by the King, retired; and the preceding ministers were re-installed under the presidency of Marshal Mortier, who accepted office only at the pressing entreaties of the King; but resigned three months after, and was replaced by de Broglie.

The conversion of the five per cent. stocks threw the apple of discord amongst the members of the ministry. Humann, who was in favour of that measure, resigned, and d’Argout took his place. The chamber, disgusted with the insolent behaviour of the silly Duke of Broglie, overthrew the ministry by passing a resolution in favour of the conversion.

The ministry formed under the presidency of Thiers, (for which reason Guizot, who had till then acted with him, would not join it,) was dissolved, by the resignation of Thiers, on account of the refusal of the King to act in co-operation with England, for putting an end to the civil war in Spain.

The tenth cabinet, Molé-Guizot, thus formed in opposition to the English alliance, was abandoned by Guizot,

Persil, Gasparin, and Duchatel, because Count Molé wanted to adopt, in the administration of the interior, the moderate and liberal policy recommended by the chambers.


The second cabinet of Count Molé (the eleventh administration) was assailed by the coalition headed by Guizot and Thiers. The chamber was dissolved; and, the new chamber being hostile to his foreign policy, which was that of the King, Count Molé resigned,—conquered by the coalition.

The twelfth administration, composed of mere hirelings of the King, lasted only one month; and was succeeded by the Passy-Dufaure ministry, under the presidency of Soult, who had the foreign department; by which arrangement the King had the entire direction of the foreign affairs. It was then that Louis Philippe treacherously communicated to Russia the proposals of Lord Palmerston for a union of the French and British forces to decide the Eastern Question. This administration, being outvoted on the proposal of a dotation for the Duke of Nemours, resigned.

Thiers was placed at the head of the fourteenth ministry, and immediately proclaimed his partiality for an English alliance; and the chamber of deputies approved of his anti-Russian policy. Those dispositions were of no avail to induce the Whig ministry to renew negotiations with the French government. The Treaty of July was concluded without his knowledge; Guizot, the French ambassador, being himself ignorant of the negotiation. The consequences of that treaty led to the resignation of Thiers, and to the organization of the present administration, in which Guizot holds the ministry of foreign affairs, probably as a reward of the diplomatic abilities he exhibited during his embassy; or because *to be declared by the British ministry*

unworthy of confidence, is a title to be the minister for foreign affairs of the French King.

Such is the working of the constitutional system, as regulated by the King of the Barricades, with the co-operation of the renegades of all the preceding governments with whom he has surrounded himself! And the French people are accused of fickleness, and declared to be unworthy of constitutional freedom, because they are dissatisfied with such a state of things; because they cannot bear with the tyranny of the most degraded set of politicians; because they are indignant at the scandalous amalgamation, in one ministry, of a parcel of shameless political profligates, who, for ten years, have in turn been opposed to one another, on every question of internal or external policy, and to the system which they now pretend unanimously to follow!



France Her governmental, administrative and social organisation, exposed
and considered in its Principles, in its Working, and in its Results

London 1844

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